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ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WRA

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

J. A. KRUG, Secretary

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

D. S. Myer, Director

1946

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Foreword

EVER since the earliest days of the War Relocation Authority the officials of the agency have been keenly aware of a responsibility for reporting rather fully and frankly to the public on a program which is clearly without parallel in American history. During the spring of 1946, after the last of the relocation centers had been closed, a large share of the agency's time and effort was concentrated on the job of preparing a number of special reports dealing with the various major phases of WRA operations. Nine such reports, in addition to this one, have been completed.

The distinction between this report and the other nine is mainly one of focus and of scope. This final report of the Director is an attempt at a comprehensive view of the WRA program in its entirety; each of the others deals in detail with some particular facet of the program which is necessarily covered here somewhat summarily and sketchily. The other final reports of WRA are

Wartime Exile—The Exclusion of the Japanese Americans from the West Coast
Impounded People—The Story of Life in the Relocation Centers
The Relocation Program
Wartime Handling of Evacuee Property
Administrative Highlights of the WRA Program
Community Government in War Relocation Centers
Legal and Constitutional Phases of the WRA Program
Token Shipment—The Story of America's War Refugee Shelter
The Evacuated People—A series of statistical tables

A great many members of the WRA staff have contributed to the outlining and preparation of this final report. The Director wishes to express his personal appreciation to all of them and especially to M. M. Tozier, Chief of the agency's Reports Division, who pulled the material together and did most of the final writing.

In conclusion, the Director should also like to pay a tribute to the men with whom and under whom he has worked throughout the life of the Authority—the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Director of the Budget Harold D. Smith, former Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, former Under Secretary of the Interior Abe Fortas, the first Director of the Authority M. S. Eisenhower, and the present Secretary of the Interior J. A. Krug. All of them have given their generous and far-sighted support in accomplishing our main objectives.

The Director also wants to pay tribute to a most excellent and loyal staff who has made the completion of this program possible.

D. S. MYER, *Director.*

A Chronology of the Evacuation and the WRA Program

1942

January 29: Attorney General Francis Biddle issued the first of a series of orders establishing limited strategic areas along the Pacific Coast and requiring the removal of all enemy aliens from these areas.

February 13: West coast congressional delegation sent a letter to President Roosevelt recommending the "immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage * * * aliens and citizens alike" from the "entire strategic area" of California, Oregon, and Washington.

February 14: Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, sent a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recommending the evacuation of "Japanese and other subversive persons" from the west coast area.

February 19: President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066 authorizing the Secretary of War, or any military commander designated by the Secretary, to establish "military areas" and exclude therefrom "any or all persons."

February 20: Secretary Stimson wrote to General DeWitt designating him as a military commander empowered to carry out an evacuation within his command under the terms of Executive Order No. 9066.

March 2: General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1 designating the western half of the three Pacific Coast States and the southern third of Arizona as a military area and stipulating that all persons of Japanese descent would eventually be removed therefrom.

March 11: General DeWitt established the Wartime Civil Control Administration, with Col. Karl R. Bendetsen as Director, to carry out the evacuation program.

March 18: President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9102 creating the War Relocation Authority to assist persons evacuated by the military under Executive Order 9066. Milton S. Eisenhower named as Director.

March 21: President Roosevelt signed Public Law 503 (77th Congress) making it a Federal offense to violate any order issued by a designated military commander under authority of Executive Order 9066.

March 22: First large contingent of Japanese and Japanese Americans moved from Los Angeles to Manzanar Reception Center in Owens Valley of California.

March 23: General DeWitt issued Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 ordering the evacuation of all people of Japanese descent from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound and their removal to the Puyallup Assembly Center near Seattle by March 30.

March 27: General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 4 (effective March 29) forbidding further voluntary migration of Japanese and Japanese Americans from the west coast military area.

April 7: Representatives from the governments of 10 Western States met at Salt Lake City with Director Eisenhower of WRA and Colonel Bendetsen of WCCA to discuss resettlement plans for the evacuated people. Majority of conferees registered uncompromising protest against unrestricted migration.

May 8: First contingent of evacuees arrived at Colorado River Relocation Center near Parker, Ariz.

May 21: Group of 15 evacuees left from Portland Assembly Center for seasonal agricultural work in Malheur County, Ore., under civilian restriction order of the Western Defense Command.

May 27: First contingent of evacuees arrived at Tule Lake Relocation Center in northern California.

June 1: Manzanar Reception Center was transferred from WCCA to WRA and renamed Manzanar Relocation Center.

June 2: General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 6 forbidding further voluntary migration by people of Japanese descent from the eastern half of California and simultaneously announced that all such people would eventually be removed from this area directly to WRA centers.

June 17: President Roosevelt appointed Dillon S. Myer to succeed Milton S. Eisenhower as Director of WRA after Eisenhower's resignation to become Deputy Director of the Office of War Information.

July 20: WRA adopted its first leave policy permitting American-born and American-educated evacuees to leave its centers for private employment in the Middle West. On the same day the first contingent of evacuees (from Turlock Assembly Center) arrived at the Gila River Relocation Center near Sacaton, Ariz.

August 7: Western Defense Command announced the completion of the first phase of evacuation—removal of 110,000 people of Japanese descent from their homes in the military area either to WCCA assembly centers or WRA relocation centers.

August 10: First contingent of evacuees (from Puyallup Assembly Center) arrived at Minidoka Relocation Center near Twin Falls, Idaho.

August 12: Heart Mountain Relocation Center near Cody, Wyo., received its first contingent of evacuees from Pomona Assembly Center.

August 13: WRA began an agency conference in San Francisco to determine basic policies for the operation of relocation centers.

August 27: Granada Relocation Center near Lamar, Colo., received its first contingent of evacuees from Merced Assembly Center.

September 11: First contingent of evacuees (from Tanforan Assembly Center) arrived at Central Utah Relocation Center near Delta, Utah.

September 18: Rohwer Relocation Center near McGehee, Ark., received its first contingent of evacuees from the Stockton Assembly Center.

September 26: WRA issued its basic leave regulations to become effective October 1.

October 6: First contingent of evacuees (from Fresno Assembly Center) arrived at Jerome Relocation Center near Dermott, Ark.

November 3: Transfer of evacuees from WCCA to WRA jurisdiction was completed with the arrival of the final contingent from the Fresno Assembly Center at the Jerome Relocation Center.

November 14: Evacuees in Unit One of the Colorado River center staged a community-wide demonstration and strike against the WRA administration in protest over the arrest of two residents suspected of beating up a third.

November 23: The "Poston Incident" was settled by an agreement between the administration and a committee of the residents.

December 6: Evacuees at the Manzanar center staged a demonstration in protest over the arrest of one resident which was finally quelled by the military police and ended in transfer of the center temporarily to military control.

1943

January 4: The first WRA field office was established at Chicago to facilitate relocation over a large area of the North Central States.

January 20: Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs appointed a subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky to investigate the WRA program and study the feasibility of transferring the agency's functions to the War Department.

January 28: Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announced plans to form a Japanese American combat team to be made up of Nisei volunteers both from the mainland and Hawaii.

February 8: Army enlistment and leave clearance registration began at most relocation centers.

March 11: Director Myer wrote a letter to Secretary of War Stimson recommending an immediate relaxation in the west coast exclusion orders against persons of Japanese descent. This recommendation was rejected by the Secretary in a reply dated May 10.

March 20: Director Myer took the first step in a decentralization of the relocation program by authorizing Project Directors to issue leave permits in cases where leave clearance had previously been given by the Washington office.

April 8: Senator Chandler wrote to Director Myer setting forth the tentative recommendations of his subcommittee regarding the WRA program and urging that the "disloyal" evacuees be separated from the other residents of WRA centers.

May 12: Two investigators from the staff of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities arrived at the Manzanar center to begin a probe of the WRA program.

June 3: Chairman Martin Dies of the Committee on Un-American Activities announced the appointment of a three-man subcommittee, under the chairmanship of John M. Costello of California, to carry out the WRA investigation.

June 25: Director Myer wrote to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy regarding the plans for a segregation program at WRA centers and the selection of Tule Lake as the segregation center.

July 6: Director Myer appeared before the Costello subcommittee to testify on his administration of the WRA program.

October 11: Last group of evacuees in the major segregation movements arrived at the Tule Lake center.

November 1: A mass demonstration was staged at Tule Lake for the benefit of the National Director who was there on a visit.

November 4: An outbreak of violence occurred at Tule Lake between WRA internal security staff and a group of dissident young evacuees; troops were called in and the center transferred to military control.

November 8: Fact-finding committee of the California legislature began its investigation of the Tule Lake disturbance by holding hearings in the nearby village of Tulelake.

November 24: Director Myer testified before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs regarding the Tule Lake disturbance.

November 29: Costello subcommittee began a series of hearings on the Tule Lake situation.

1944

January 14: Tule Lake center was transferred back by the military to WRA supervision.

January 20: Secretary of War Stimson announced that in view of the record achieved by Japanese Americans in the Army, they would thereafter be recruited through the regular Selective Service procedures.

February 16: President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9423 transferring WRA to the Department of the Interior.

June 8: President Roosevelt announced a plan to bring approximately 1,000 European refugees into the United States outside the regular immigration quotas and quarter them at an Emergency Refugee Shelter to be administered by WRA at Oswego, N. Y.

June 30: Jerome Relocation Center, last of the WRA centers to open, was the first to be closed, with its 5,000 remaining residents transferred to other centers.

July 1: President Roosevelt signed Public Law 405 (78th Congress) permitting United States citizens to renounce their citizenship on American soil in time of war under procedures approved by the Attorney General.

August 3: European refugees arrived at New York harbor on way to Emergency Refugee Shelter at Oswego.

December 17: War Department announced the revocation (effective January 2, 1945) of the west coast mass exclusion orders which had been in effect against persons of Japanese descent since the spring of 1942.

December 18: Director Myer announced that all relocation centers would be closed before the end of 1945 and that the entire WRA program would be liquidated by June 30, 1946. United States Supreme Court ruled (in the Korematsu case) that the west coast evacuation was constitutional and (in the Endo case) that WRA had no authority to detain a "concededly loyal" American citizen.

1945

January 8: An attempt was made to burn and dynamite the packing shed of a returned evacuee in Placer County, Calif.; this was first of the "west coast incidents."

February 16: An "all-center" evacuee conference was held at Salt Lake City for the purpose of discussing the problems inherent in the liquidation of WRA centers.

April 30: Director Myer, appearing before a House Appropriations subcommittee, estimated that there would be approximately 44,000 "relocatable" evacuees left in centers by June 30.

May 14: Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes publicly denounced the incidents of west coast terrorism and called for more vigorous local law enforcement."

July 13: Director Myer announced a schedule of closing dates for all centers (except Tule Lake) between October 15 and December 15.

July 16: Capt. George Grandstaff, a Caucasian officer with the all-Nisei 442nd Combat Team, began a speaking tour on the west coast to plead for tolerance toward the returning evacuees.

August 1: Director Myer issued Administrative Notice 289 calling for the scheduled relocation of remaining residents during the last 6 weeks of operation at each WRA center.

August 15: VJ Day.

September 4: The Western Defense Command issued Public Proclamation No. 24 revoking all individual exclusion orders and all further military restrictions against persons of Japanese descent.

December 22: President Truman announced that the refugees at Oswego should be considered for admission to the United States under the regular immigration quotas.

1946

March 20: Tule Lake Segregation Center, the last of the WRA centers to remain in operation, was officially closed.

May 15: The last of the WRA field offices were closed.

June 30: Official termination of the War Relocation Authority program.

Introduction

ONE DAY in early March of 1942—at a time when the Japanese armies were tightening their hold on the Philippines and sweeping over the oil-rich island of Java—one of the staff officers of the Secretary of Agriculture in Washington was hastily summoned into conference

A migrant minority

by one of the staff officers of the President and handed an unusual assignment. The Army, he was told, had decided to remove all people of Japanese descent—approximately 110,000 men, women, and children—from a broad strip along the Pacific Coast. Nobody knew exactly what should be done with these people, but a civilian agency was clearly needed to take them off the hands of the Army as rapidly as possible. The assignment would be to head up that civilian agency and formulate

its program. Two weeks later, on March 18, the War Relocation Authority was created by Executive Order of the President and Milton S. Eisenhower, coordinator of land use programs for the Department of Agriculture, was named as its first director.

In the months that followed, the new agency gradually took over the management of ten barracks cities hastily built under supervision of the Army Engineers at isolated points across the western two-thirds of the country. Into these rough communities it received the tenth of a million evacuated people from the Pacific strip and made arrangements for feeding them, for providing the sick with medical care, for educating the children, and for putting the adults to work on useful projects. Before the year was out, the Authority had received the last contingent of evacuated people from the temporary custody of the Army, had laid down the major outlines of policy which were to guide its operations throughout its active life, and had already experienced disturbing upsurges of protest from the evacuee population at two of its ten barracks cities. Meanwhile, Milton Eisenhower had long since moved on to another assignment as Deputy Director of the Office of War Information and had been succeeded on June 17 by Dillon S. Myer, also of the Department of Agriculture, who was to remain in charge of the program from that time forward.

Before the majority of the evacuees had even moved into WRA centers, the agency had already begun a program to help them resettle in ordinary communities across the country outside the West coast exclusion area. Beginning in the latter months of 1942 and continuing through 1943 and 1944, nearly 35,000 people of Japanese descent left the WRA centers and settled down, with assistance from the Authority and from cooperating private groups, in cities and on farm lands all the way between the Sierra Nevada Mountains and the Atlantic seaboard. Then, about a week before Christmas, 1944, while General MacArthur's forces were advancing toward the outskirts of Manila, the Army revoked the mass exclusion orders which for nearly 3 years had barred the people of Japanese descent from returning to their west coast homes, and the WRA program entered on its final lap. Throughout 1945 and the early months of 1946 the Authority assisted more than 70,000 additional evacuees to leave the institutionalized environment of government-operated centers and start on the road back to normal life, either in their former localities or in other sections of the country. The last of the WRA centers—Tule Lake in northern California—closed its gates on the last departing evacuee on the evening of March 20, 1946, just 4 years and 2 days after the Authority was created by Executive Order of the President. Thus ended a wartime program without precedent in American history, a unique and widely misinterpreted experience in the practice of American democratic government.

Viewed against the back-drop of total war around the world and the migration of millions across the continents of Europe and Asia, the experiences of our west coast people of Japanese descent between 1942 and 1946 may not loom very large. But since we are a freedom-

cherishing people and since we are continually striving, with the better part of our minds, to be a united people, it becomes important for us to understand and evaluate what we did, both officially and unofficially, to this particular racial segment of our population in time of global war. This report of WRA operations has been prepared for the primary purpose of shedding new light on one of the more obscure chapters of the Nation's wartime history. But it is submitted in the earnest hope that it will help to foster a growing civic alertness to the dangers that lie in overemphasizing the racial and national strains in our population and underemphasizing the infinite variety of the human personality within those racial and national strains.

Before considering the WRA program at close range, however, some space must first be given to the fundamental forces that entered into the shaping of that program and the persisting factors that had to be borne in mind and weighed at almost every stage of operations.

Forces and Factors

The Administrators

The staff responsible for solving the [WRA] problem had been trained largely in various branches of the Federal Government. Until this situation was precipitated by forces which took advantage of the war, few Americans realized what a reservoir of social engineering talent has been developed in such departments as those of agriculture and the interior.

From an article by Galen M. Fisher in the *Christian Century*, September 1, 1943.

IN THE very early days of the WRA program, selection of the agency's key personnel was something like the paneling of a jury. A conscious effort was made to pick people who had not formed pronounced prejudgments on the major issues of the program—to avoid both those with marked antipathies against all persons of Japanese descent and those who indulged themselves in excessive emotionalism about the plight of the evacuated people. Milton Eisenhower and the members of his immediate staff, most of whom had followed him from the Department of Agriculture, felt strongly that in such a delicate and unprecedented operation, clear-headedness and open-mindedness were needed above almost all other qualities.

WRA was not uniformly successful in finding these qualities, as the subsequent history of the agency was occasionally to demonstrate. But it is significant that most of the personnel were selected with an eye to their objectivity on the "Japanese problem" as well as to their special skills and talents. In the beginning at least, the WRA staff members at practically all points had a great deal to learn about people of Japanese descent. Many, in fact, had never seen a Japanese face before joining in the program; and only a few, who came to the agency after its operations were well under way, could properly be called experts. Knowledge about America's Japanese population was gained the hard way—first through hasty research in the Library of Congress, second through consultation with a few recognized experts in the field, and lastly through direct experience in dealing with the evacuated people.

The Administered

The humble Japanese farmer and storekeeper [on the west coast] who went industriously about his work over the years during long hours daily in an endeavor to raise a family and educate his children had no more to do with the cause of the war with Japan than he had to do with an earthquake.

From a letter by Chief Justice James H. Wolfe of the Supreme Court of Utah, February 6, 1946.

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One of the first really significant things that WRA learned in the spring of 1942 about the people who were soon to pass under its supervision was that they were divided into three major groups: (1) the Issei or immigrant Japanese born in Japan; (2) the Nisei, American-born and American-educated children of the Issei; and (3) the Kibei, born on American soil but educated wholly or partially in Japan. Although the agency was to discover later that the individual variations of personality within these categories were more important than the generalizations which could be made about each of them, the basic facts about the Issei, Nisei, and Kibei provided a highly valuable introduction to the background, attitudes, and behavior of the evacuated people.

The Issei

When the bombs fell at Pearl Harbor and split the American and Japanese nations violently apart, there were approximately 40,000 citizens of Japan living in a broad strip along the American Pacific Coast. These people were aliens in our land not through deliberate choice but because American law prevented them from being anything else. Most of them, however, had lived on this side of the Pacific for over 25 years, had raised families and acquired property here, and had every intention of staying in this country for the remainder of their lives.

With a few exceptions, these immigrant Japanese had arrived in this country at some time during the period between 1890 (when Japanese immigration into the continental United States began on a really significant scale) and 1924 (when it was virtually abolished by Act of Congress). The majority of the men had come in before 1908 (when the Gentlemen's Agreement, curtailing further immigration of Japanese laborers into the continental United States, took effect) and were passing from middle life into old age when war broke out between their native land and their adopted country. The women had reached this country somewhat later—predominantly in the decade between 1910 and 1920—and had an average age of about 52 at the time of evacuation.

Coming mainly from the poorer classes of Japan, these people had started at the very bottom of the American economic ladder—as section workers on the railroads, domestics in the homes of the well-to-do, and especially as harvest hands in the fruit orchards and vegetable fields of the agricultural West. Some had never risen above this station and were still following the seasonal harvests up and down the Pacific Coast States as late as the fall of 1941. But others, by years of hard work and frugal living, had acquired a stake in the land, an equity in the wholesale or retail marketing of agricultural products, or a small business in one of the larger west coast cities. A very few had risen to positions of prominence and wealth.

When WRA staff members with eastern or middle western backgrounds first saw the Issei in the mass at civil control stations or assembly centers in the evacuation area, they frequently overestimated the age of these people by as much as 10 or 12 years. Unremitting

toil under the California sun had made harvest hands in the late 50's look like bent septuagenarians, while the cares of housework and family raising in urban or rural slums had added the creases of age to the faces of many women who should have been, by the calendar's reckoning, still in the prime of life. Speaking very broadly, the west coast Issei in the spring of 1942 were a tired, hapless, and bewildered group of people who retained a sentimental attachment for the Japan they had known as children or adolescents in the earlier years of the century but who wanted nothing more acutely than to live out the rest of their lives in comfort and in peace. It was a bad time and a bad place for the fulfillment of such desires.

The Nisei

Although WRA staff members managed to form a few vague and superficial impressions of the Issei quite early in the program, they were for many months far more conscious of the Nisei. In striking contrast to their parents and elders, the 70,000 Nisei who entered relocation centers in 1942 were predominantly an adolescent and young-adult group; completely American in speech, dress, and manner; and far more inclined than the average Issei to seek out WRA personnel and give free expression to their opinions. As a group, they were easier to approach, easier to understand, much more readily available as consultants and intermediaries.

Because most of the west coast Issei married and settled down to family responsibilities comparatively late in life, the age gap between them and their American-born children was uncommonly pronounced. An abnormally high percentage of the Nisei, as compared with the total population of the country, were between the ages of 15 and 25 when they entered relocation centers; an even more strikingly low percentage of them had passed the age of 30; and only a few hundred were over 35. The Nisei had many qualities which later proved valuable and stimulating in the gradual unrolling of the WRA program. But seasoned judgment and maturity were not conspicuous among them.

The Americanism of the Nisei, WRA soon discovered, was one of the most central and warmly debated issues in the whole west coast Japanese "problem." Technically at least, there could be no question about their status as Americans. The 14th Amendment to the Constitution provides unequivocally that "all persons born * * * in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." As far back as 1898, the Supreme Court ruled that this provision applies even to the children of oriental parents who are themselves not eligible to acquire American citizenship by naturalization. The courts since that time have consistently sustained this view.

Superficially too, WRA staff members were quick to note, these youngsters gave every appearance of being more American than their elders. They looked generally taller and straighter, and in some cases

even seemed to have a less pronounced oriental cast of features. In all but a few cases, their language was distinctively American as were the clothes they wore, the games they played, the social customs they followed, and the entertainments they enjoyed—sometimes to the consternation of their parents.

But the question of the Americanism of the Nisei went far deeper than any or all of these things—and was infinitely more complex. In the popular mind, it was the age-old question of the comparative strength of heredity and environment in the molding of the human personality. Basically, the question was this: How thoroughly have these young people with Japanese names and faces been imbued with American ideals, American traditions, and American modes of thought? Is their Americanism merely a veneer or has our distinctive type of civilization become a deep and inherent part of their consciousness and their attitudes?

One of the first really qualified people to provide WRA with expert guidance on this question was Lt. Comdr. K. D. Ringle, a naval intelligence officer who was detailed to work with WRA for several weeks in the spring of 1942 and who had been studying the Nisei both in Hawaii and on the west coast for almost a decade. In a memorandum to the Director of WRA, written shortly after his assignment to the agency, Commander Ringle had this to say about the Americanism of the Nisei and the conflict in attitude between them and their Issei parents:

> In considering the degree to which the Nisei have become Americanized and the factors which have brought this about, the attitude of the Issei parents has a great influence. It has been conceded generally that there are a great many Issei who are at least passively loyal to the United States. It must be remembered that the last Issei to enter the United States did so in 1924.[1] It should likewise be recognized that American influences have affected these Issei, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly, constantly since that time. Furthermore, it must be remembered that one of the chief factors affecting this Americanization of Issei has been the children themselves, in the reports they bring back from their school life, their play, or from their associations with white American children * * * it must therefore be conceded that the Americanization of the Nisei has proceeded with at least the tacit consent, if not the active cooperation, of many of the Japanese-born parents. In fact, it is such a natural thing that it has proceeded and will proceed to a greater or lesser degree despite the active opposition of the parents. * * * That some of the Nisei are more Americanized than others is not so much a measure of the success of an Americanization program as it is a measure of the strength of the opposition to such a program, usually on the part of the parents. Unless there is conscious, active continuous opposition, the child will absorb Americanization as naturally as he breathes. * * * Furthermore, I do not believe it can be said that the school influence ceases with the dismissal bell. Quite the contrary. The school influence carries over into the home and to the hours outside the school through such media as school books, school magazines, extracurricular school activities such as games, sports, and contests, hygiene, diet, dress, and so on.

Practically all observers who had made an open-minded study of the Americanism of the Nisei had reached similar conclusions.

In the beginning, WRA staff members were strongly impressed by

[1] This is substantially correct but not strictly accurate. A number of Japanese did enter the United States after 1924 as treaty merchants or under the other exception clauses of the 1924 Act and a considerable percentage of them have remained here ever since.

the raw statistical fact that the Nisei in the original evacuated population outnumbered the Issei by nearly two to one. But this ratio, as later events demonstrated with increasing clarity, was somewhat misleading. Although there were over 70,000 American-born evacuees who passed under WRA jurisdiction in 1942 as against less than 40,000 aliens, the Issei exercised an influence in the evacuee population out of all proportion to their numbers. This was partially due to their greater maturity and stability as well as to the prestige which age and parenthood traditionally command in Japanese communities. But it was also due, perhaps in even greater measure, to the plain fact that practically all of the nearly 40,000 Issei were adults while a substantial majority of the Nisei were under 21. Actually, if adults alone are considered, the Issei evacuees, as WRA has subsequently learned, outnumbered the American citizen group by a margin of almost four to three.

The principal organization of the Nisei was the Japanese American Citizens League, a group which had its beginnings in Seattle as far back as the 1920's. The JACL was incorporated under California law in 1937 and by the spring of 1942 claimed to have a membership of "approximately 20,000" in nearly 300 communities throughout the country. Membership was confined to American citizens but not necessarily to persons of Japanese descent. The great bulk of the members, however, were Nisei and they lived in the three Pacific Coast States.

When the question of evacuating all persons of Japanese descent from the west coast became a public issue in February 1942, the leaders of JACL were faced with the most crucial problem in the entire life of their comparatively young organization. The stand which they decided to take was phrased perhaps most clearly by the national secretary of the group in testimony before a Congressional committee, which was exploring the evacuation problem, at San Francisco on February 23. In a prepared statement, which was read to the committee members and widely quoted in the press, he had this to say:

> If, in the judgment of military and Federal authorities, evacuation of Japanese residents from the west coast is a primary step toward insuring the safety of this Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying with the necessities implicit in that judgment. But, [and this was not so widely quoted in the press] if, on the other hand, such evacuation is primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires of political or other pressure groups who want us to leave merely from motives of self-interest, we feel we have every right to protest and to demand equitable judgment on our merits as American citizens.

Beyond a doubt, this attitude of ungrudging cooperation in governmental policy decisions, once those decisions have been fairly reached and formulated, was sincerely and deeply felt by the national secretary of JACL and the other leaders of the organization. It is a fact that the evacuation was carried out without serious protest and without any real attempts at resistance by the evacuee population. But there is room for serious doubt whether the San Francisco statement of the JACL national secretary accurately reflected the attitudes held toward the evacuation by a majority of the evacuees, a majority of the Nisei, or even a majority of the rank-and-file members of his own organization.

Although one Nisei was able to tell a roving magazine writer, with wry humor, in the late fall of 1941 that he was fattening himself up "for the days ahead in the concentration camp," this was by no means a typical point of view. The great majority of the Nisei—it now appears from letters they have written over the past 3 years, testimony they have given at numerous government hearings, and informal talks they have had with WRA staff members—were far from psychologically prepared for the shock of evacuation when it came in the early months of 1942. Although it was widely recognized among the west coast Japanese population that war with Japan might mean serious restrictions on the freedom of the Issei, most Nisei persisted in believing throughout January and February that their American citizenship would protect them from similar treatment. When it became apparent on March 2 that the government was making no distinction, for all practical purposes, between alien Japanese and American citizens of Japanese descent and that all of either class who lived in a broad strip along the Pacific coast would be ultimately cleared from their homes, the Nisei community of the far Western States was hit as it had never been hit before in its history.

Some of the more thoughtful Japanese Americans, like the leaders of the JACL, chose to regard the decision as one of the vagaries of American democracy, realized keenly that it was the acid test of their future status in the United States, and resolved firmly to prove their worth as American citizens beyond all possibility of reasonable doubt. Others, less mature in years and in judgment, were stunned by the unprecedented action and unable to express their own thoughts about it coherently for many months to come. A few were deeply and permanently embittered.

As the Nisei filed into the gates of WRA centers throughout the spring, summer, and early fall of 1942, many of them gave every outward appearance of being carefree and casual. A considerable number were impassive, shy, uncommunicative. A very few were openly sullen and resentful. But in the minds and hearts of nearly all, to a greater or less degree, there were trouble and confusion and sharply conflicting emotions. Several hundred had already started down a road which was to take them a few months after VJ Day to a filthy, poorly heated, and lonesome set of barracks near Uraga on the home islands of Japan.

The Kibei

The one group in the west coast Japanese population which excited the imaginations of popular magazine writers and aroused the suspicions of governmental authorities more than any other in early 1942 was the Kibei.

Technically a subgroup of the Nisei, since they were born on American soil, the Kibei were rather consistently regarded and treated as a wholly separate category. Although there were probably upwards of 20,000 American-born evacuees who had been to Japan at some time or other, the majority of these were youngsters who had merely made

brief childhood visits or obtained a smattering of schooling there. The "real" Kibei, as defined by Commander Ringle and other intelligence authorities, were those who had received 3 or more years of education in Japan particularly after the age of 13. On this basis, there were approximately 9,000 Kibei among the 72,000 American citizens in the evacuee population.

By long experience and a considerable amount of searching study at relocation centers, WRA has learned that the Kibei are far from a homogeneous group. Despite the common background of their schooling in Japan, they represent the full range of reaction to Japanese civilization—all the way from conscious and defiant identification with that civilization through indifference or moderate acceptance of some of its values to the other extreme of total and passionate rejection. Substantial numbers of Kibei have proved their patriotism to the United States in dozens of ways throughout the war period; and several hundreds were, by the testimony of their officers, among the most useful soldiers the American Army had in the war against Japan.

But little indeed of all this was known or recognized by WRA staff members or others back in the spring and summer of 1942. The tendency then was to generalize about the Kibei, to regard them all as suspicious and somewhat sinister characters, and to assume that they were guilty of pro-Japanese war sentiments or subversive intentions until they had proved themselves blameless. Rejected by most Nisei as "queer" and "Japanesey," regarded with distrust and occasional contempt by governmental authorities, not fully understood even by a majority of the Issei, the Kibei were by all odds the most acute "problem group" in the whole evacuee population. It was only natural that many of them should play a highly distinctive role in the drama of life at the relocation centers.

The Public

A good solution to the Jap problem in Idaho—and the Nation—would be to send them all back to Japan, then sink the island. They live like rats, breed like rats and act like rats. We don't want them buying or leasing land and becoming permanently located in our State.

From a newspaper report of a speech made by Governor Chase Clark of Idaho, May 22, 1942.

On December 8, 1941, almost at the hour when Congress was declaring war on the Empire of Japan, Attorney General Francis Biddle issued a statement in Washington announcing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was already rounding up a previously selected group of Japanese nationals regarded as "dangerous to the peace and security" of the Nation. He added, significantly, that "only a comparatively small number" of the resident Japanese would be taken into custody and warned against any tendency to regard all of them as enemies.

Before the first week of war was out, the Attorney General reported twice again on the progress in apprehending enemy aliens and renewed his plea for tolerance with increasing emphasis and clarity of expression. In a statement made later in the day on December 8, he declared

that "even in the present emergency, there are persons of Japanese extraction whose loyalty is unquestioned" and asked State and local authorities not to take any action against such people without first consulting the Department of Justice. On December 10 he asserted that "the great majority of our alien population will continue to be loyal to our democratic principles if we, the citizens of the United States, permit them to be." Already, however, there were forces in motion which would strain that loyalty—and even the loyalty of some 70,000 citizens—as it had never been strained before.

The history of organized hostility against the resident Japanese on the Pacific coast goes back to the early days of the present century when this minority element in the coast States' population was just becoming large enough to be really noticeable. The first significant public pronouncements against further Japanese immigration were made in 1900, at a mass meeting held in San Francisco under the auspices of the California Federation of Labor, and were voiced by a number of prominent speakers, including the mayor of the city. Although this meeting attracted little notice outside San Francisco at the time, by 1905 anti-Japanese sentiment had gathered enough momentum in California to produce the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, the first of a long line of similar organizations which were to play a prominent part in the subsequent history of the State. From that time until the present day, the west coast has never been without at least one powerful, zealous, and single-minded group devoted wholly to the purpose of preventing Japanese immigration and dispossessing as many as possible of the Japanese residents already established on this side of the Pacific. At certain periods, organizations of this kind have proliferated to the point where it was difficult to draw up a complete list of them or to keep adequate track of their aims and activities. This was particularly the case in the early 1920's and again in 1943.

The most prominent and persistent of these nativist organizations—an association which has, in fact, been called "the most powerful single group in California"—is the California Joint Immigration Committee, which was pulled together in 1921 under the leadership of the late V. S. McClatchy, publisher of the Sacramento *Bee*. Formed originally for the purpose of coordinating the anti-Japanese and anti-oriental activities of four State-wide organizations, the Joint Immigration Committee consisted at the start of Mr. McClatchy, the Attorney General of the State of California, the Deputy Adjutant of the California Department of the American Legion, the Secretary-Treasurer of the State Federation of Labor, the Master of the State Grange, and the Grand President of the Native Sons of the Golden West. Since that time the leaders of these four organizations have consistently supported the activities of the committee, have attempted to throw the full weight of their membership behind it, and have themselves followed an unwavering line of making the lives of the resident Japanese population on the west coast as insecure and uncomfortable as possible. Nearly all of the restrictive measures aimed at the alien Japanese

population which have been introduced periodically in the California legislature from the early 1900's to the present day have been sponsored either by the Joint Immigration Committee itself, its predecessor organizations, or the groups associated with it. These same groups also claim and undoubtedly deserve a major share of the "credit" for the congressional enactment of the Japanese exclusion provision in the Immigration Act of 1924—a provision which outraged the whole Japanese nation and almost certainly helped to make the attack at Pearl Harbor an ultimate reality.

In their campaign down through the years, these groups have been greatly aided by some of the most widely read newspapers in the State—particularly those owned or controlled by William Randolph Hearst—by powerful interests competing with the Japanese in the production or marketing of fruits and vegetables, and by a number of the region's more articulate and influential political leaders. Almost every conceivable device has been used to create a mounting impression that all people of Japanese extraction are sly, sinister, ruthless, unprincipled, aggressive, biologically more fertile than the white man, and totally incapable of genuine loyalty to the United States. The emphasis has varied somewhat at different times and under varying circumstances, but fundamentally the attack has always rested on the one major premise that the Japanese are a racially undesirable element in American life.

Although the campaign died down considerably, even in California, for several years after passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, it was given fresh impetus and new ammunition when the war lords of Japan embarked on their career of steadily widening oriental conquest in 1931. The culmination of this aggressive drive in the dawn attack at Pearl Harbor provided the California Joint Immigration Committee and its supporting organizations with a salient propaganda item which must have far exceeded their most optimistic hopes. The very nature of the attack—its "sneak" approach and ruthless execution—seemed to underscore indelibly all the principal accusations about the "Japanese character" which these groups had been carefully nurturing on the Pacific coast and gradually spreading throughout the Nation for more than twenty years. If there was ever an opportunity to accomplish their ultimate objective of ridding the country entirely of its Japanese minority, this was certainly it.

For a period of about 2 weeks after December 7, there were almost no significant public outcries against the resident Japanese and no serious attempts to molest them. The first public demand for their mass exclusion from the coastal region, on December 12, appeared in a fairly obscure small-town California paper and was generally overlooked in the excitement and the far-flung preoccupations of the period. The first incident of violence was recorded on December 23 when a 30-year-old Nisei, recently honorably discharged from the Army Medical Corps, was found stabbed to death on a Los Angeles sidewalk. On Christmas Day, a number of Japanese residents were manhandled and one was killed by a marauding gang of Filipinos in Stockton; and then

throughout January the rising tide of emotional fury and violence spread from one end of the State to the other.

Meanwhile, a number of things had been happening which had a profound and far-reaching effect on the temper of west coast public opinion toward the resident Japanese.

On December 15, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox returned to Washington from his flying visit to Pearl Harbor and held one of the most heavily attended press conferences of the whole wartime period. In commenting on the effectiveness of the attack and the unpreparedness of the defending forces, he made the undoubtedly sincere but extremely unfortunately phrased remark that "the most effective fifth-column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii, with the possible exception of Norway." Secretary Knox did not say or even hint that this fifth-column work was done by the Japanese *residents* of Hawaii, and there is no reason to suppose that he ever intended to convey any such meaning. In fact, practically all the officials of Honolulu in position to know the facts—the chief of police, the chief of military intelligence, and the special agent in charge of the local office of the FBI at the time of the attack—have since that time specifically and categorically denied that there was ever any sabotage by Japanese or Japanese American residents of the Territory. What Secretary Knox actually had in mind, it now seems clear from all the available evidence, was *espionage* activity which was carried out by agents in the Japanese consulate at Honolulu and perhaps, to some extent, by special emissaries who had quite recently come into the Territory from the Japanese home islands. But unfortunately the Navy Secretary did not *say* this; and, equally unfortunately, the term "fifth-column," especially when used in the same context with Norway, conveys a quite different kind of meaning. To the average reporter at the press conference and to the average newspaper reader throughout the country, Secretary Knox *seemed* to be saying that Japanese residents of Honolulu had carried out a carefully planned campaign to hamper the Pearl Harbor defenses, and that the efforts of this treacherous element in the population had been uncommonly successful. Although Secretary Knox added, in the same press conference, that a number of Hawaiian Nisei had played a heroic role in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base, this information undoubtedly did not have anywhere near the same impact on the public consciousness as the "fifth-column" statement. An erroneous impression was created, particularly in the minds of newspaper readers on the west coast—where the "fifth-column" remark was generally given headline treatment—that has been exceedingly difficult to erase. In fact, the impression that there was resident Japanese treachery at Pearl Harbor is undoubtedly held with sincerity by some people of that region to this very day.

The final chapter in this tragicomedy of semantic errors was not supplied until January 17, 1946. On that day the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack received in evidence a report which was written by Mr. Curtis B. Munson in the late fall of 1941. Mr. Munson, whose exact status has not been

made entirely clear, was sent out from Washington by the government, apparently in September or October of 1941, to make a quick but intensive survey of loyalty trends among the resident Japanese both in Hawaii and on the west coast. His report, submitted some time in late October or early November, generally corroborates the findings about the Americanism of the Nisei which WRA learned later and which have already been set forth in an earlier section of this report. But in a supplementary document written several weeks *after* the Pearl Harbor attack, Mr. Munson took occasion to comment specifically on Secretary Knox's "fifth-column" statement of December 15. His remarks are worth quoting rather fully:

> We suggest that this paragraph creates the wrong impression in that it uses the term "Fifth-Column." This term is loose and has been widely abused. Should not the term "complete physical espionage" have been used instead? "Physical espionage" is supplied unwittingly by the gabble of Navy wives, by the gabble of loyal second-generation Japanese, by the gabble of the postman and classified by definite agents of a foreign government. To this may be added years of photographing, sounding and "look seeing" by disloyal and paid American people for the last 20 years. Fifth-Column activities, such as in Norway, impugns the loyalty of a certain large percentage of a population. Your observer still doubts that this was the case in Honolulu. He doubts, for instance, that outside of sabotage, organized and paid for by the Imperial Japanese Government beforehand (i.e., professional work) that there was any large disloyal element of the Japanese population which went into action as a Fifth-Column, running around and intentionally disrupting things on their own hook. * * * Some reaction of an undesirable nature is already apparent on the west coast due to this statement of the Secretary's.

It is regrettable—to state the matter mildly—that this report was not revealed in December 1941, and given the same kind of publicization as Secretary Knox's statement.

In the week before and the week after Christmas, the initial impression created by the Secretary's remark was greatly fortified and supplemented as a result of two simultaneous and unrelated developments: (1) the continuing reports—some of them undoubtedly authentic—of enemy submarine activity off the California coast, and (2) the wholly unfounded rumors of resident Japanese sabotage at Pearl Harbor which were brought into the mainland on Christmas Day with the first ship load of women and children refugees from Honolulu.

The submarine reports had the effect of heightening the tension on the west coast and greatly increasing the fears of an attempted continental invasion. The sabotage rumors, which had been making the rounds by word of mouth in Hawaii, dovetailed neatly with the interpretation which had already been placed on Secretary Knox's press conference statement and seemed merely to supply the vivid details for his somewhat generalized revelation. One of them dealt with the blocking of roads between Pearl Harbor and the downtown section of Honolulu by Japanese vegetable trucks. Another described a truck which roared down the runway at Hickam Field and knocked the tails off several Army bombers. A third concerned a milk truck which drove onto the field shortly before the attack and let down its sides to reveal a concealed machine gun nest, presumably manned by resident Japanese. There were a number of others, all in a similar vein.

Not one iota of reliable evidence has ever been found to substantiate any of these stories. But against the background of Secretary Knox's statement and the widely known facts about fifth-column activity in Norway and the Low Countries, it was inevitable perhaps in early 1942 that they should be accepted as gospel truth even by normally sceptical west coast citizens. Several of them were later presented, with an air of impressive authenticity, in the Warner Brothers motion picture "Air Force." And one of them was repeated in Walter Winchell's column as late as December 1945, on the fourth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Throughout January and early February 1942, as these stories gained increasingly wider currency and the Japanese forces steadily expanded their area of conquest in the Southwest Pacific, many sober citizens of the west coast became deeply concerned about the future safety of their region and the possible intentions of the Japanese minority in their midst. The radio commentator John B. Hughes, who has more recently been one of the most ardent defenders of the rights of loyal Japanese Americans, devoted a large percentage of his broadcasting time during this period to the dangers of resident Japanese sabotage and the necessity for drastic precautionary action. The San Francisco *Chronicle*, a newspaper which has maintained a consistent and well deserved reputation in recent years for restrained editorial judgment, was calling on February 9 for "realism" in the handling of the enemy alien problem and declaring that "there is no infallible way to separate the sheep from the goats in a mass order." Meanwhile, the forces allied with the California Joint Immigration Committee and the publicists supporting its point of view were maintaining a constant din of alarmism which at times bordered on hysteria.

When the Department of Justice began, on January 29, to clear all Japanese aliens from a number of comparatively small but highly strategic coastal areas designated by the Western Defense Command of the Army, the tension relaxed only slightly and only momentarily. Inside of a week there were shrill complaints in the press and over the radio that this was only a "partial" solution to the problem and that much more far-reaching action was required immediately. On Lincoln's Birthday, the nationally known and widely respected columnist, Walter Lippmann, who was then in San Francisco, summed up the thinking of a great many west coast people in a column whose impact can scarcely be overestimated. He wrote—

> The Pacific coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and from without. * * * This is a sober statement of the situation, in fact a report based not on speculation but on what is known to have taken place and to be taking place in this area of war. It is the fact that the Japanese navy has been reconnoitering the Pacific coast more or less continually and for a considerable period of time, testing and feeling out the American defenses. It is the fact that communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy agents on land. These are facts which we shall ignore or minimize at our peril. It is also the fact that since the outbreak of the Japanese war there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific coast. From what we know about Hawaii and about the fifth-column in Europe, this is not, as some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is well organized and that it is held back until

it can be struck with maximum effect. * * * I am sure I understand fully and appreciate thoroughly the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a policy of mass evacuation and internment of all those who are technically enemy aliens. But I submit that Washington is not defining the problem on the Pacific coast correctly. * * * The Pacific coast is officially a combat zone; some part of it may at any moment be a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on a battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good reason for being there. * * *

On the following day seven members of Congress from California, Oregon, and Washington addressed a letter to President Roosevelt recommending the "immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States, from the entire strategic area of the States of California, Oregon, and Washington, and the Territory of Alaska." The letter was written, the signers indicated, following a meeting of Congressmen from the West Coast States and represented the unanimous feeling of all those present.

On February 19, 6 days after the west coast congressional letter and 5 days after urgent and similar recommendations had been received at the War Department from Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command in San Francisco, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066. Under terms of this order, which was without precedent in American history, General DeWitt was able, 11 days later on March 2, to designate the entire western half of California, Oregon, and Washington as a "military area" and to announce that all persons of Japanese ancestry would eventually be removed from that area "in the interest of military necessity."

In his final report on the evacuation, which was published in the late summer of 1943, General DeWitt took occasion to define what he meant by "military necessity" in this context. "Essentially," he wrote, "military necessity required only that the Japanese population be removed from the coastal area and dispersed in the interior, where the danger of action in concert during any attempted enemy raids along the coast, or in advance thereof as preparation for a full scale attack, would be eliminated." At the time of the evacuation, however, General DeWitt made no attempt to define the term nor to set forth any detailed explanation of the reasons that had prompted the evacuation order. The only explanation given was the bald term "military necessity" and the public was left free to supply its own definitions. In the absence of an official explanation, it was only natural, perhaps, that very large segments of the public should suspect the very worst about the resident Japanese.

"There must be something seriously wrong with those people," a motion picture representative in Washington told a WRA staff member in the late spring of 1942, "or the Army wouldn't have 'em all under wraps. That's all I need to know." This terse statement epitomizes the apprehensions and misgivings which have undoubtedly been felt

at one time or another during the past 4 years by a substantial portion of the entire American population. In a later section of this report we shall have more to say about the evacuation and the factors—both military and non-military—which lay behind it. Here it is sufficient to note that the stark fact of evacuation *under government order* had a tremendous impact on public attitudes toward the people of Japanese descent. Twenty years of intensive propaganda effort under the sponsorship of the California Joint Immigration Committee had attached a stigma to these people in the minds of a very large segment of the public, both on the west coast and in other sections of the country; the evacuation, unintentionally but nonetheless effectively, seemed to corroborate that stigma and to give it the final seal of governmental recognition and approval.

The Demands of Total War

I can tell you it is a different world that I am in these days. For 16 years I found in the Department of Agriculture that if you pushed a button something happened. [Nowadays] you can pick up the telephone and push a button and nothing happens.
From a speech by Milton S. Eisenhower at Salt Lake City, Utah, April 7, 1942.

One day in the late spring of 1942 the Deputy Director of the War Relocation Authority made a trip to the War Production Board offices in Washington in an effort to obtain priorities for the procurement of building material which was acutely needed to finish off the basic construction at relocation centers. After he had outlined the needs of the agency as clearly and fully as possible, the WPB official countered with a question. "Just a moment," he said, "let me be sure I understand you. Are you asking for these priorities on this scarce material for the benefit of JAPS?"

When the Deputy Director assured him that two-thirds of the people affected were American citizens, the conversation was restored to a somewhat more objective and business-like basis—and some of the priorities requested were eventually granted. But this story is indicative of the physical and psychological handicaps under which WRA had to labor, more or less chronically, throughout the history of its program. Some of these handicaps were common to all government agencies—and particularly the civilian ones—which were trying to do a job in time of total war; others were peculiar to the Authority because of the unique, controversial, and widely misunderstood nature of its program. All of them had to be considered, at one time or another, in advance planning of the agency's operations, and all had a profound effect on the manner in which those operations were carried out.

One of the first of these difficulties to arise was in the field of communications. Before the Authority was more than a few weeks old, with part of its small staff located in Washington and the balance across the continent in San Francisco, personnel of the agency were already keenly aware of the fact that the Nation's telephone and telegraph facilities were badly overloaded and not functioning at anywhere

near their prewar level of efficiency. This communications problem was most acute in the first few months of the program and was largely alleviated by the end of 1942. But the Authority, with its 10 centers situated in rather remote sections of the country and its personnel eventually scattered at about 60 different field stations across the Nation, was never wholly free of communications difficulties.

Like all other agencies in wartime, WRA had to do without many items of equipment and materials which would have been extremely useful in its program and had to make use of many items which would doubtless have been rejected, in a peacetime economy, as totally inadequate. Because of the tremendous requirements of the country's war machine, there seldom were really enough automobiles, trucks, and tractors at WRA centers, seldom enough typewriters, telephones, or mimeograph machines for the quick and efficient execution of the government's business, never really enough buildings, furniture, washtubs, and latrines to meet the needs of the community.

Furthermore, even when such items could be procured, there were frequently long and nearly disastrous delays in having them shipped to the points where they were needed. At several of the relocation centers the early contingents of evacuees arrived before enough barracks had been finished to accommodate them, before stoves had been delivered for the community kitchens, and before electric lights, running water, or sanitary facilities had been completely installed. Many of the evacuees had to live for days—and some of them for weeks—in overcrowded communities where meals were sometimes cooked out of doors over open pits, where candles and kerosene lamps were frequently pressed into service in the highly inflammable barracks, where baths were an almost unknown luxury, and where sewage facilities were either primitive or lacking. Although these conditions did not exist uniformly at all centers and never prevailed for very long at any of them, they did hit the evacuees at a highly impressionable period and unquestionably intensified the subsequent center management problems of the Authority.

One other handicap which WRA faced, in common with practically all civilian agencies, was the extreme shortage of qualified personnel. This was particularly noticeable after October 1943 when the drafting of pre-Pearl Harbor fathers began to make heavy inroads on the agency's previously recruited staff and compounded the difficulties of making suitable replacements. In a complex program such as WRA's, continuity of staff is perhaps more important than it is in some other government operations, and the high rate of turnover was an unusually serious problem. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the Authority was fortunate in having such a stimulating and challenging task to do that it consistently attracted a sincere, hard-working, public-spirited, job-devoted, and frequently imaginative kind of personnel. Without people of this type on its staff, the agency would never have been able to accomplish its objectives in the allotted time with so little ultimate cost in human degradation.

The Organic Law of the Land

By far the most catastrophic of all inroads on the civil rights of American citizens arising out of the war * * * .

From a reference to the west coast exclusion program in the annual report of the American Civil Liberties Union, June 1944.

"Many of the members of the WRA staff," the Solicitor of the agency told a general meeting of the Washington office personnel in the summer of 1942, "are walking around these days with heavy constitutional consciences." It was an apt phrase and it summarized a great deal of early WRA thinking. Almost from the start, the key personnel of the agency—the policy formulators—were acutely aware that the job they had to do was one which raised grave and delicate legal and constitutional issues. They also realized that the resolution of these issues in WRA program and policy could have far-reaching implications for the future of American democracy.

The only specific provision of the American Constitution really relevant to the WRA problem was the Fifth Amendment which prohibits the Federal Government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without "due process of law." But the whole spirit of the Constitution and of the laws and judicial decisions which have subsequently grown up around it goes much further than this somewhat vague and generalized language of 1791. Time after time in the halls of Congress and from the bench of the Supreme Court, it has been emphasized that protection of the civil rights of the individual is part of our basic national heritage and that arbitrary or unreasonable interference with these rights is repugnant to all our deepest national instincts.

Certainly the framers of the Constitution could not have foreseen the almost fantastically complex situation which developed on the Pacific coast in the early months of 1942 and spread its virus to the interior States before the spring of that year was more than a few weeks old. But just as certainly, it was incumbent on the War Relocation Authority to consider, constantly and painstakingly, the individual rights of every last one of the more than 100,000 people who were then passing under its supervision and to sanction infringement of those rights only when it was clearly necessary in the interest of the national safety or the future welfare of the entire evacuated group. This, in essence, was one of the most fundamental of the several guiding principles which were formulated very early in the WRA program and which guided the activities of the agency throughout the whole period of its official life.

The Global Implications

The Anglo-Saxon race feels superior to the Asiatics. Latest happenings [in the United States] show that their slogan, equal rights for all the people, is nothing but a lie.

From an official Japanese broadcast, July 7, 1943, during the height of the congressional investigation of the WRA program.

Back in the summer of 1929, a year after the Kellog-Briand Pact had outlawed war as an "instrument of national policy" and two years before the Japanese armies stormed into Manchuria, the representatives of 47 nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, and worked out an international agreement or "convention" governing the treatment of military prisoners in future wars. Although the terms of this Convention are somewhat broad and occasionally not too specific, its purposes were clearly humanitarian and inspired by a desire to eliminate some of the worst abuses which military prisoners had suffered in wars of the past.

For reasons which are not particularly relevant here, the Japanese government, although represented in the meeting at Geneva, never saw fit to ratify this Convention. Almost immediately after Pearl Harbor, however, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed, through neutral diplomatic channels, to be mutually bound by the provisions of the Geneva Convention in their treatment of prisoners of war and to *extend* its provisions, insofar as they were applicable, to their mutual treatment of each other's civilian nationals held as internees.

When WRA first started receiving people of Japanese descent at its relocation centers in the late spring and early summer of 1942, the forces of Imperial Japan controlled an enormous sweep of territory stretching from the outermost Aleutians across some 5,000 miles of ocean to Sumatra and the Straits Settlements of southeast Asia. Inside this ring—behind the enemy lines—were about 10,000 American civilians—men, women, and children—and many additional thousands of members of the American armed forces. Some of the civilians and all of the military personnel were being held in camps or prisons under armed guard and subject to a rigidly regimented routine of daily life; other American civilians were under "house arrest," which meant that they were permitted to live in their former dwellings but that all their movements were carefully watched and controlled; still others were allowed considerable freedom and required merely to observe certain curfew regulations.

The future attitude of the Japanese government toward the entire group was extremely uncertain and difficult to predict. But it was abundantly clear that all of these Americans—military personnel as well as civilians—were potentially at the mercy of the Japanese government and that the ruthless warlords of that nation might seize almost any pretext to justify a tightening of restrictive measures and an increase in harsh or abusive treatment.

Strictly speaking, the American civilians caught behind enemy lines in Japanese-held territory were not the true counterparts of the Issei evacuees who entered War Relocation Authority centers. The great majority of these civilians were *visitors*—business men, missionaries, newspaper correspondents, and educators whose affairs had taken them to the Far East for varying periods of time and who happened to be there when war broke out or when the enemy moved in. But extremely few of them indeed had sunk any real roots in the Orient and almost none had any thought or intention that their children and grand-

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children would continue living indefinitely in the home islands of Japan. The Issei, by contrast, were *immigrants* who had come to this country mainly with the intention of staying here and who had cherished the sometimes wistful hope that their children and grandchildren would be increasingly identified as integral parts of the American population pattern.

Despite this very real difference between the two groups, however, the technical and inescapable fact remained that the Issei at relocation centers *were* nationals of Japan. Although they were not strictly internees, they were commonly regarded as such by the general public and frequently designated as such by the newspapers. And in any event, both the State Department and WRA recognized that any attempt to distinguish these people from the Issei at Department of Justice internment camps, for Geneva Convention purposes, might strike the authorities in Japan as a mere quibbling attempt to evade serious international responsibilities. Consequently, the State Department urged—and WRA readily agreed—that the terms of the Geneva Convention should be applied, insofar as possible, to the Issei at relocation centers.

Throughout most of the war, Japanese interests in the United States were represented by the Spanish Embassy, while American interests in Japanese-held territory were represented by the government of Switzerland. Under terms of the mutual agreement, agents of the Spanish Embassy made periodic visits to WRA centers throughout the life of the program and submitted detailed reports on conditions at the centers to their home government which passed them on to Tokyo. Thus WRA was under a constant and heavy responsibility to avoid any action—or even any *appearance* of action—in its treatment of Issei evacuees which might precipitate an outburst of repression and reprisal against American citizens in the Far East.

Furthermore, throughout most of the WRA program, the State Department was carrying on protracted and extremely delicate negotiations, through neutral channels, in an effort to effect the fullest possible exchange of nationals with Japan. Unfortunately, Japan was not nearly as eager as the United States to bring about such exchanges and was consequently in much the stronger bargaining position. This situation further increased and complicated the international ramifications of the WRA program. In plain language, it meant that any adverse report about the treatment of Japanese nationals in WRA centers which reached the eyes and ears of authorities in Tokyo from any source might destroy the results of months of patient and extremely vital diplomatic negotiations by the State Department.

These were grim realities which were only faintly understood or appreciated at the time by the general American public. But WRA had other and more positive reasons for wanting to conduct its program with a maximum of decency and fairness to the evacuated people. Quite aside from the possibility of Japanese reprisals or the hazard of upsetting exchange negotiations, it was obvious that the WRA program was an acid test of American democracy's ability to handle a racial minority problem justly and humanely in wartime and that it would

be watched and evaluated as such by freedom-loving peoples in every quarter of the globe. In the Orient, there were vast millions of people whose good will and active collaboration were badly needed in the war against the Axis and who were being told constantly by Japanese propagandists that American democracy had a deep-rooted bias against all Asiatics. Throughout Latin America, Africa, and the South Pacific islands there were millions of other non-white people who wanted to believe in the genuineness of the Four Freedoms but who found many reasons for scepticism and aloofness. Beyond a doubt, only a tiny fraction of these people were ever aware, even faintly, of the WRA program and its global implications. But all of them were, potentially at least, its audience; and if the program had taken a different turn at some of its crucial stages, the repercussions might have been felt thousands of miles away and for many years to come.

The Centers

THE ten barracks cities which played such a large and focal part in the WRA program were widely scattered across that broad expanse of continent which lies between the Sierra Nevada Mountains of California and the lower Mississippi River. Two of them were in the interior, and more sparsely populated, sections of California; two others were situated almost 2,000 miles to the east, on the flat Mississippi Delta lands of southeastern Arkansas; and the other six were located in between in five different States—two in Arizona and one each in Utah, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming.

Two of these sites—Manzanar in the Owens Valley of east-central California and Colorado River on sagebrush Indian reservation lands of extreme western Arizona—were selected by the military authorities "for Japanese relocation purposes" in late February and early March of 1942 before the War Relocation Authority was established. The other eight were picked by WRA over a period of 3 months, between the latter part of March and the middle of June, after a process that involved examination of at least 200 possible sites on paper, field inspection of several dozen of them, and numerous negotiations with State and local officials in the areas that might be affected.

The requirements for a satisfactory site were extremely exacting and, in some ways, inconsistent with one another. WRA, which at this time was thinking in terms of rather large-scale work programs to be carried out by the evacuees at or near the centers, was interested primarily in sites which had possibilities for extensive agricultural development or for year-round employment opportunities of other types. The Army, basically concerned about the national security and deeply distrustful of the evacuated people, insisted that all sites be located "at a safe distance" from strategic installations (including such things as power lines and reservoirs) and categorically refused, because of the manpower requirements that would be involved, to provide military guards for any center unless it was planned for an evacuee population of at least 5,000. In addition, considerations of good public policy made it desirable to locate the centers on lands either in Federal ownership or available for Federal purchase—so that improvements would not be made at Federal expense to increase the value of private property—while operational requirements dictated the selection of sites which were within reasonable distance of a railhead and which had access to a dependable and comparatively economical supply of water and of electric power.

Three of the eight WRA-selected sites which survived the winnowing process and eventually emerged as relocation centers were on undeveloped portions of Federal reclamation projects. These were Tule Lake

Manzanar

in the Klamath Falls Basin of extreme northern California, Minidoka in the Gooding Reclamation District of south-central Idaho, and Heart Mountain in the reclamation project of the same name in northwestern Wyoming. The two Arkansas centers, Rohwer and Jerome, were about 15 miles apart on lands controlled by the Farm Security Administration and purchased originally for the rehabilitation of low-income farm families. The two in Arizona, Colorado River and Gila River, were both on unused parts of Indian reservations and were separated by nearly 250 miles. The Granada center in southeastern Colorado was on privately owned land which was purchased by the Army for the War Relocation Authority. The Central Utah center involved a mixture of public domain land, a number of tracts which had reverted to the county for non-payment of taxes, and several parcels which were still in private ownership when WRA began its inspection and negotiations. The entire area was eventually transferred to Federal ownership and WRA supervision. The Manzanar center was on land which was controlled by the City of Los Angeles as protection for the municipal water supply and which was taken over by the military authorities as the site for an evacuee "reception center" in March of 1942. It was administered by the Wartime Civil Control Administration of the Western Defense Command until June 1, 1942, when it was transferred, along with its population of nearly 10,000 evacuees, to the War Relocation Authority.

The 10 centers which eventually came under WRA control (listed together with their popular or post office names in parenthesis, their locations and their evacuee housing capacities) were:

Name	*Location*	*Capacity*
Central Utah (Topaz)	West-central Utah	10,000
Colorado River (Poston)		
Unit 1	Western Arizona	10,000
Unit 2	Western Arizona	5,000
Unit 3	Western Arizona	5,000
Gila River (Rivers)		
Butte Camp	Central Arizona	10,000
Canal Camp	Central Arizona	5,000
Granada (Amache)	Southeastern Colorado	8,000
Heart Mountain	Northwestern Wyoming	12,000
Jerome (Denson)	Southeastern Arkansas	10,000
Manzanar	East-central California	10,000
Minidoka (Hunt)	South-central Idaho	10,000
Rohwer	Southeastern Arkansas	10,000
Tule Lake (Newell)	North-central California	16,000

Since only a couple of these centers were ready for occupancy in the spring of 1942, when the evacuation started, temporary accommodations for the evacuated people had to be provided by the Wartime Civil Control Administration in the west coast exclusion zone. For this purpose, 15 so-called "assembly centers" of barracks construction were speedily established at race tracks and fairgrounds near the principal

centers of Japanese American population between Puyallup, Wash., on the north and Pomona, Calif., on the south. By June 7 the movement into these centers had been completed, but 5 days earlier the Western Defense Command had taken the first steps leading toward evacuation of the eastern or non-coastal half of California. The group of approximately 10,000 people of Japanese descent who were eventually removed from this area—including several thousand who had moved there from the coastal section of the State to escape evacuation—were all transferred directly from their homes into WRA centers without passing through the assembly center stage. Practically all other evacuees, however, spent periods ranging anywhere from 6 weeks to 6 months in the centers under WCCA administration before passing under the supervision of the War Relocation Authority.

The major movement into the relocation centers began auspiciously on March 21, when the first contingent of "volunteers" from Los Angeles arrived by motorcade, in a welter of flashbulbs and grinding newsreel cameras, at the gates of WCCA-administered Manzanar. It ended inconspicuously some seven and a half months later, on a morning in early November, when the final group from the Fresno district reached the Jerome Center in Arkansas after an exhausting train trip of nearly 2,000 miles. Between these two dates, trainloads of evacuees were arriving at the WRA centers almost every other day from the time when each center was physically able to accommodate some residents until the center's population capacity was reached. The physical details of the movement were handled by the Wartime Civil Control Administration with a rigid respect for the sanctity of schedules. Despite frequent protests by WRA about the tempo of the transfers and the delays in the construction of relocation centers, a great many of the evacuated people were sent to centers that were ill-prepared to receive them or even to meet some of their most basic needs. The movement from assembly to relocation centers was definitely not one of the brighter chapters in the wartime history of America's west coast Japanese minority.

The Crucial Issue: Detention or Resettlement?

Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator of the Dies committee, last night assailed the War Relocation Authority for its "willy-nilly" methods of releasing 1,000 Japanese internees a month "without proper check" and said the policy may result in turning trained saboteurs loose in this country.

From a United Press dispatch, May 30, 1943.

These people [the evacuees] * * * were arrested without warrants and were held without indictment or a statement of charges, although the courts were open and freely functioning. They were transported to camps far from their homes, and kept there under prison conditions. * * *

From an article by Eugene V. Rostow, Harper's Magazine, September 1945.

THE two quotations given above represent extreme attitudes toward one of the most tangled, thoroughly misunderstood, badly misrepresented, and crucially important issues in the whole War Relocation Authority program. A clean understanding of that issue and of the way in which it was finally resolved in 1942 is essential to a proper comprehension and evaluation of nearly all of the Authority's subsequent operations. Because the two men quoted above lacked such an understanding, they arrived at judgments which are, to say the least, unfortunate and highly debatable.

Stripped down to bare essentials, the issue under discussion here may be stated in a series of questions. What was the War Relocation Authority to do with the evacuated people once they had passed under its supervision and control? Should it keep them all confined and under guard in centers for the duration of the war? Should it open the gates wide and give them all complete freedom of movement once they had been removed from the west coast exclusion zone? Or should it attempt to steer some sort of middle course between those two extremes?

The Executive order which created the agency on March 18 and which contained its basic grant of authority from the President furnished little guidance toward solution of this problem. It authorized WRA to "provide for the relocation" of evacuees "in appropriate places" (these could be relocation centers), to "provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and to supervise their activities." This last phrase, of course, could be interpreted to sanction a program of detention if such a program was found necessary, but it certainly could not be regarded in any sense as a clear-cut directive that such a program should be carried out.

General DeWitt's Proposal

Before WRA was created or even contemplated, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command had faced the detention issue and developed a rather definite plan for meeting it. In his memorandum of February 14, setting forth his final recommendations to the Secretary of War on the subject of west coast evacuation, General DeWitt urged that the evacuation should be initiated on a designated day and "carried to completion as rapidly as practicable," that Japanese aliens and other enemy aliens should be interned at selected places of internment under guard, and that American citizens of Japanese descent should "be offered an opportunity to accept voluntary internment, under guard," at the same places. Nisei who declined to accept voluntary internment, he added, should "be excluded from all military areas and left to their own resources" or given such help in resettlement as State and Federal agencies might be "prepared to offer." If this plan had been adopted, it might well have resulted in the compulsory or "voluntary" internment of an extremely large percentage—possibly a great majority—of the entire Japanese, Japanese-American, German, and Italian populations in the West Coast States.

The Period of Voluntary Migration

These recommendations, however, were only partially approved by the Secretary of War. On February 20—the day after the President had authorized evacuation of designated persons from designated military areas—Secretary Stimson wrote a letter to General DeWitt naming him as a military commander who might carry out such an evacuation within his command and laying down a number of principles to guide the west coast evacuation. Three of these were at variance with the recommendations made by General DeWitt 6 days earlier.

First, Secretary Stimson expressed a wish that "Italian aliens and persons of Italian lineage" should not be disturbed unless they were found to be "undesirable" or a "definite danger" to the defense of the western coastline; this policy was necessary, he added, because such persons were considered "to be potentially less dangerous, as a whole, than those of other enemy nationalities." Secondly, the Secretary indicated that "removal of individuals from areas in which they are domiciled should be accomplished *gradually* [italics supplied] so as to avoid, so far as it is consistent with national safety and the performance of your mission, unnecessary hardship and dislocation of business and industry." Thirdly—and perhaps most important—the Secretary called upon General DeWitt to take "fullest advantage * * * of voluntary exodus of individuals and of the facilities afforded by other government and private agencies in assisting evacuees to resettle."

Ten days later, when General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1, defining the west coast exclusion zone, he indicated that the classes of people being considered for evacuation were Japanese

aliens, American citizens of Japanese ancestry, German aliens, and Italian aliens in that order. The General never did issue mass evacuation orders covering the last two groups and made it clear from the very start that it was the Japanese group which he had primarily in mind. "Immediate compulsory mass evacuation of all Japanese and other aliens from the Pacific coast," he added in an official statement to the press, "is impracticable. Eventually, orders will be issued requiring all Japanese, including those who are American-born, to vacate all of Military Area No. 1. Those Japanese * * * who move into the interior out of this area now will gain considerable advantage and in all probability will not again be disturbed."

For reasons which have never been made clear to WRA, General DeWitt did not see fit to prepare the interior States for the voluntary migration which he had thus encouraged or to explain adequately that the people of Japanese descent were regarded as a hazard *only in the coastal zone*. Fortunately for the welfare and stability of the western United States, only a comparatively small number of Issei, Nisei, and Kibei—about 9,000 altogether—responded to the General's urging; and approximately half of these, as indicated earlier, merely moved into the eastern or noncoastal half of California from which they were later evacuated directly into WRA centers. Those who attempted to cross over into the interior States ran into all kinds of trouble. Some were turned back by armed posses at the border of Nevada; others were clapped into jail and held overnight by panicky local peace officers; nearly all had difficulties in buying gasoline; many were greeted by "No Japs Wanted" signs on the main streets of the interior communities; and a few were threatened, or felt that they were threatened, with possibilities of mob violence. As General DeWitt indicates, with some degree of understatement, in his final report: "This group, considered too dangerous to remain on the west coast, was similarly regarded by State and local authorities, and by the population of the interior. The evacuees were not welcome."

Early WRA Thinking

It was against this kind of background that WRA began, immediately after March 18, grappling with the problem of what to do with the evacuated people. About a week earlier, the Western Defense Command, impressed by the discouragingly slow tempo of voluntary migration, had recognized that the Manzanar and Colorado River centers (then in the very early stages of ground breaking) would not be large enough for its immediate needs and had initiated plans for the immediate establishment of assembly centers. When Director Eisenhower arrived in San Francisco on March 25, the WCCA already had several assembly center sites selected and reports of trouble or misunderstanding arising from the voluntary migration were arriving almost by the hour. By that time the situation in the interior had become so critical that General DeWitt and the WRA Director agreed almost immediately on a plan to halt all further voluntary migration.

The result was Public Proclamation No. 4, the so-called "freeze order," issued by General DeWitt on March 27 and effective at midnight 2 days later. Under its terms all persons of Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 1 (the western half of California, Oregon, and Washington) were forbidden to leave that area until ordered to do so by the military authorities. In the meantime, on March 21, the President had signed Public Law 503 which had been enacted by Congress upon the urging of the War Department and which made it a Federal offense to violate any order issued by a military commander under authority of Executive Order 9066. Thus the "freeze order" had the full effect of law and any violations of it were punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Its purpose, as Director Eisenhower stated later, was to put the evacuation on a "planned and orderly basis."

During this same period, while the forces of intolerance, misinformation, and war-produced emotionalism were bringing about increasingly tighter restrictions on the liberties of the west coast people of Japanese descent, another set of forces, equally powerful but less strongly felt at the moment, was already beginning to operate in the opposite direction. Shortly after General DeWitt's announcement that all people of Japanese descent would be evacuated from the west coast, a number of large-scale agricultural producers in the interior Western States—particularly sugar beet companies with holdings in eastern Oregon, Idaho, Utah, Montana, and Colorado—began to perceive the possibilities which the evacuation presented for obtaining a large supply of badly needed labor. By March 29, the date when the "freeze order" went into effect, the labor demands from these interests upon the War Relocation Authority had already reached the point where they could not be ignored or even temporarily set aside. Careful consideration had to be given to the desirability and feasibility of making evacuee labor available in the sugar beet fields—on some basis or other—immediately.

There were a number of weighty reasons for adopting such a plan. With practically all foreign sources of sugar supply cut off by the war, it was obvious that an extremely severe sugar shortage was imminent and that the United States would have to meet its sugar needs to a very great extent from domestic production. The beet fields of the West were ready and primed to turn out a larger volume of raw sugar than ever before in their history but were acutely in need of manpower to do the planting, the cultivating, the harvesting. The west coast Issei and Nisei, many of them highly skilled in agricultural work, seemed to offer an ideal answer to the problem.

On the other side, however, there were a great many highly practical difficulties. In view of the experiences which so many of the voluntary migrants had had in the same States where the labor demand was heaviest, it was clear that any plan for putting the evacuees into the beet fields at once without some sort of protection would be almost unthinkable. The dangers of violence and bloodshed, with all the attendant domestic difficulties and international repercussions that would surely follow, were far too vivid in the minds of WRA staff

members to be lightly brushed aside. Yet when military protection was suggested, the military authorities made it abundantly plain that they were in no position whatever to furnish guards for small contingents of evacuee workers scattered all over the agricultural West. The demands for their own manpower, they told the WRA Director, were so immediate and pressing that such a scheme was wholly out of the question.

By March 29, Director Eisenhower had apparently just about given up all hope of getting the evacuees into the beet fields or other types of private employment until after the evacuation was completed and a somewhat more accurately informed public sentiment could be developed. On that date he wrote to the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures, asking for the assistance of that agency in a program of positive public information on evacuation and the evacuees, and indicated the status of his thinking on the private employment question. "The trickle of voluntary evacuees into outlying States," he asserted, "was enough to set up a strong reaction that has threatened the interests of the larger group. In fact, it has made it necessary to eliminate the possibility of private employment for the evacuees during the immediate future."

The Salt Lake City Conference

Six days after this letter was written, the impression conveyed by the quoted portion was deepened and underscored by an open letter addressed to Director Eisenhower by Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado and widely quoted in the Nation's press. The Senator wrote—

> Hundreds of Japanese migrants recently have entered Colorado and have taken up residence throughout the State without permission from anyone. I demand that control over such migrants be undertaken by you on the same basis as other Japanese citizens and aliens still remaining on the Pacific coast. Most certainly we ought not to be made the dumping grounds for the Pacific Coast States.

By the time this letter was received, both the Western Defense Command and the War Relocation Authority had reached the conclusion that an exploratory meeting with the high officials of the Western States was needed immediately in order to eliminate some of the tremendous public confusion. Such a meeting was held at Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 7; it proved to be an important turning point in the early history of the WRA program.

At the Salt Lake City meeting every one of the 11 westernmost States, except California and New Mexico, was represented. Four governors—those from Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, and Nevada—attended personally; the other five all sent close personal representatives with specific instructions to speak on their behalf. Also included in the group were the attorneys general from several of the States, some directors of the State Agricultural Extension Services, and various western field representatives of the United States Department of Agriculture. The agencies handling the evacuation and attendant problems were represented by three key officials: Tom C. Clark, chief of the

civilian agencies staff of the WCCA (on temporary detail from the Department of Justice); Col. Karl R. Bendetsen, director of the WCCA; and Milton S. Eisenhower. Also in the audience, but prevented by lack of time from presenting their point of view, were the representatives of several of the larger western beet-sugar companies.

Mr. Clark opened the meeting by briefly stating its purpose and identifying his two colleagues. He then introduced Colonel Bendetsen who spoke at some length on the background of the evacuation, the procedure that was being followed in carrying it out, and the impracticability of furnishing troops for scattered small contingents of evacuee agricultural workers. Mr. Eisenhower, as the third speaker, provided the main focus for the subsequent discussion. Admitting candidly at the start that the plans of WRA were still in a highly fluid state, he went on to indicate that he was deeply concerned about the civil liberties of the evacuated people and about the problem of making effective use of the manpower they represented. He had, he said, five types of work plans primarily in mind: (1) public works, including such things as the development of raw lands for agricultural production; (2) production of food, both for evacuee subsistence and for sale, on Federally owned project lands; (3) manufacture of goods, such as camouflage nets and cartridge belts, which were vitally needed by the military; (4) private employment; and (5) establishment of self-supporting communities which would be managed by the evacuees themselves rather than by the Federal Government. After outlining these plans, the WRA Director assured the representatives from the States that the agency would not sell land to the evacuees and that it would take no other action which might dispose the evacuated people to settle in any particular place. Such long-range questions, he indicated, should be settled by normal democratic processes and not by the administrative actions of any one agency. In conclusion, he asked those in the audience for cooperation in carrying out the program and called for their help in combating misinformation and in clarifying the situation for the people in their States.

The reaction of the State representatives to these proposals was unexpectedly critical and sharp. With the exception of the Governor's representative from Colorado and the attorney general of Utah, both of whom pleaded for collaboration in the program outlined, all the State officials who spoke out at the meeting were strongly and obviously inclined to approach the problem from their own localized points of view and were deeply resentful of what Senator Johnson had previously called the attempt to make a "dumping ground" of their States for a west coast problem. Two of the representatives—those from Arizona and Nevada—called for a complete and uncompromising program of Federal internment and for strict guarantees that all evacuees would be removed from their States at the end of the war. The Governors of both Utah and Idaho demanded that the whole program be turned over to the States for management and insisted that the Federal Government's role should be merely that of supplying the necessary funds. Practically all those who spoke indicated a deep-seated distrust

and dislike of the evacuated people and an appallingly low concern for human rights or constitutional guaranties.

Upon leaving this meeting, Milton Eisenhower felt that his course for the immediate future was clear. The meeting had served, in the last analysis, to deepen and intensify the misgivings which he had previously expressed about the feasibility of moving the evacuees directly into private employment and had confirmed his fears that the whole evacuee population would have to be housed, for the time being at least, on Federally managed and Army guarded projects. Although the first WRA Director was concerned about the liberties of the evacuated people and constantly seeking some practical method of encouraging their return to private life, events had driven him by this date to the reluctant conclusion that some measure of temporary detention was almost inescapable.

Accordingly, the agency immediately stepped up its search for suitable relocation center sites and concentrated the balance of its attentions on the twin problems of building an organization and preparing for the reception of the evacuated people.

Beginnings of Student Relocation

But the issue of detention was only dormant and by no means dead. Throughout the balance of April and into early May it was largely submerged in WRA thinking by the more pressing problems of the moment. All through this period, however, it was kept constantly alive and brought eventually to a head by two simultaneous and parallel developments: (1) the early beginnings of what came to be known later as student relocation and (2) the continuously mounting demands from western sugar producers for evacuee labor.

The rather special problem represented by the Nisei college students was noted as early as March 8 by a small group of educators and YMCA and YWCA people in the San Francisco Bay area and was brought more sharply into focus on March 19 by the preliminary report of the Congressional committee investigating the evacuation under the chairmanship of Representative John H. Tolan. At least a week before the freeze order became effective, a Student Relocation Committee was formed on the campus of the University of California at Berkeley and rough plans were drawn up for facilitating the transfer of Nisei students to midwestern and eastern institutions. On the very day of the Salt Lake City conference this movement was given further impetus when President Robert G. Sproul of the University of California wrote to Representative Tolan calling attention to the problem and indicating that he planned to submit proposals for solving it to the government agencies concerned.

Meanwhile, the Wartime Civil Control Administration had been receiving requests for exemptions from a number of mixed Caucasian and Japanese families who wished to remain in the evacuated area and from a number of other Nisei who wanted to leave the area at once and join family members or continue their higher education

farther east. At a conference in San Francisco on April 11, this whole question was discussed by representatives of WRA and WCCA, and a tentative plan for handling the exemption requests was agreed upon. Although WCCA was mainly concerned about the mixed family cases, it also felt—and WRA concurred—that permits should be given in a few especially deserving cases to students and others for immediate travel eastward.

On May 5, Director Eisenhower, who had been seriously concerned about the plight of the Nisei students from the beginning of the program, wrote a letter to Mr. Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee recommending the formation of a nongovernmental agency to deal with the problem of student relocation. Eleven days later Mr. Pickett responded favorably, and on May 29 the National Student Relocation Council was formed at a meeting in Chicago attended by college and university officials from almost every section of the country. The council, organized practically on the verge of June commencement at most institutions, was to concern itself throughout the summer primarily with the problem of facilitating Nisei student transfers in time for the opening of the academic term in the fall. But throughout April and early May its predecessor organization, the West Coast Student Relocation Committee, had already helped about 75 Nisei students to move out and resume their studies, almost without a break, at schools and colleges lying east of the exclusion zone.

The Movement into the Beet Fields

Thus the evacuation and the freeze order were never actually as tight or as comprehensive as they have sometimes been represented. At almost every stage there were exemptions and exceptions; and the criteria for granting these were so complicated and so constantly changing that it is almost impossible to trace this phase of the evacuation story with complete accuracy. Nevertheless the general pattern for the great majority of west coast people of Japanese descent in the spring of 1942 was one of closely controlled movement, first from their homes into assembly centers and then into the barracks communities of the War Relocation Authority.

The first major break in this pattern came on May 13 when the WRA and the WCCA acceded to the persistent demands of the sugar beet producers (following a suggestion directly from the White House) and agreed on a joint plan for permitting immediate recruitment of seasonal farm workers at the assembly centers. Under the plan WRA undertook to handle negotiations with the employers while the WCCA assumed at least a nominal responsibility for keeping track of the evacuee workers and assuring their ultimate return to government control. This latter objective was accomplished without the use of troops by the somewhat ingenious device of establishing each county or group of counties where the evacuees were to work as a restricted area under the terms of Executive Order 9066 and forbidding any person of Japanese ancestry to leave the designated area without spe-

cific permission from WRA. These orders were enforceable under the provisions of Public Law 503. In addition, the WRA-WCCA agreement set forth five minimum requirements that had to be met before any employer's application for permission to recruit evacuee workers could be accepted: (1) payment of prevailing wages, (2) provision of adequate living quarters (without cost to the evacuee) at or near the place of employment, (3) assurances from State or local officials that law and order would be maintained, (4) provision of transportation for the workers from the center to the place of employment and back to the appropriate center, and (5) assurances that employment of the evacuees would not result in displacement of local labor.

Actual movement of evacuees into the beet fields started on May 21 when a small contingent of 15 somewhat uncertain recruits from the Portland Assembly Center arrived on farm lands controlled by Amalgamated Sugar Company near Nyssa, Ore., in the extreme eastern part of the State. It extended through the rest of May and June, slacked off slightly in midsummer, and then was resumed and greatly intensified in preparation for the fall harvest. Altogether approximately 10,000 evacuees left WCCA or WRA centers during 1942 for seasonal agricultural work, principally in Idaho, Utah, Montana, Colorado, and eastern Oregon. Although many of them had occasional unpleasant experiences because of the widespread public misapprehensions regarding their status and a few actually ran into situations which appeared momentarily ominous, none reported suffering any bodily harm or any really serious difficulties. By conservative estimates, they probably saved enough beets to make nearly a quarter of a billion pounds of sugar.

The Theory of Qualified Detention

Throughout May, June, and early July—while stacks of lumber and rolls of tarpaper were gradually taking the shape of barracks at half a dozen WRA centers and trainloads of evacuees were moving in from assembly centers almost every other day—the WRA staff in Washington began, for the first time, coming to serious grips with the problem of detention. By July 20 the agency had evolved a cautious and tentative kind of answer; two and a half months later it laid down a much firmer, bolder, and more elaborate type of policy; and before the end of the year it had come up with a solution which was to guide practically all of its subsequent major actions and decisions.

There were two questions which WRA had to face in connection with the detention issue: (1) whether the agency had legal authority to detain the evacuees without bringing charges against them; and (2) if such authority could be found, whether it was necessary and desirable to exercise it. Although these questions were frequently merged in early WRA thinking and discussion, it is essential, for proper understanding, to consider them here more or less separately.

WRA's legal staff went intensively to work on the first question, under instructions from Director Eisenhower, within a few days after

the agency was established. By April 15 the Solicitor had produced a series of confidential memoranda which explored carefully the question of how far the courts might be expected to sustain the detention of the evacuees if circumstances should force upon the Authority a policy of detention.

WRA's authority to detain alien evacuees, the Solicitor concluded, was clear-cut and virtually unassailable. As far back as 1798, Congress had given the President extremely broad powers for dealing with aliens of enemy nationality in time of war; his powers to restrain and apprehend such people, the Solicitor asserted, are "almost unlimited." Since these particular powers had been delegated, insofar as evacuees were concerned, by the President to the Director of WRA, the agency need have no *legal* qualms about detaining the Issei or controlling their movements to whatever extent might be found necessary.

Detention of American citizens, however, was a vastly more complex, delicate, and debatable kind of question. While it was clear that the rights and immunities of citizenship as set forth in the first Ten Amendments and spelled out by the courts were not lightly to be infringed, it was equally plain that the Constitution had not been devised to serve as a strait-jacket in time of global war. The question had to be considered, the Solicitor felt, not merely in relation to the language which the framers of the Constitution used in 1789 but also "in the light of present day circumstances."

> We are engaged [he continued] in total warfare. The stakes are more than mere trade and empire; they involve the survival of our liberties and of our present form of government. If our democracy is to survive, our constitution must prove adaptable to the needs of our times. It has met that test in the past and there is no reason to believe that it will not do so today. Standard concepts of constitutional law will therefore undoubtedly be applied in the light of current war needs. That such application must always be made is itself one of the most fundamental of our constitutional doctrines.

With this basic attitude in mind, the Solicitor examined the major decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with the scope of the war powers of the President. Those powers, he concluded, are sufficiently broad and flexible to include the detention of American citizens "to whatever extent is *reasonably* [italics supplied] necessary to the national safety in wartime. The war power to that extent overrides the constitutional guaranties in the Bill of Rights. Whether there is a real danger to the national safety and whether the restraint is a reasonable one for the purpose of meeting that danger are factual questions ultimately determinable by the courts." On the additional question of whether citizens of Japanese descent could be singled out and treated as a class differently from all other citizens, he concluded that this could be done "if the discrimination can be shown to be related to a genuine war need and does not, under the guise of national defense, discriminate for a purpose unrelated to the national war effort."

Purely from the legal standpoint, therefore, WRA quite probably had, in the opinion of its Solicitor, the authority to detain the entire evacuee population or any individual member of it if such detention could reasonably be found necessary to protect the national security.

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The Solicitor recognized, however, that this position was highly debatable and that it might very probably not be sustained in the courts. WRA's program would be much sounder, he felt, and much more readily defensible in the event of litigation if the agency's detention of the evacuees were not absolute and unyielding. He wrote—

> We should not * * * overlook the fact that a large majority of the evacuees are probably loyal Americans; that there will be many cases of individual hardship if no Japanese is permitted to leave a relocation center under any circumstances; and that the shifting fortunes of war may lessen the necessity for strict detention from time to time. A supplementary device under which restricted travel is permitted would, therefore, seem administratively desirable.

Shortly after the issuance of these confidential memoranda on April 15, the Solicitor and his staff began the work of drafting such a "restricted travel" procedure. By the time it was ready for circulation and review within the agency on June 5, however, the document had expanded far beyond this original concept; it included not merely provisions for short-term leave from the relocation centers but procedures for seasonal agricultural leave, student relocation, and even "indefinite furlough" for normal residence in a normal community outside the evacuated zone. In presenting the document the Solicitor urged that such procedures were needed to strengthen the legal base of the whole WRA program and, even more importantly, to avoid an unwarranted and indefensible infringement on the civil liberties of the evacuated people. Director Eisenhower agreed but decided that the proposed regulations should be held in abeyance until the possibilities for resettlement outside the centers could be more thoroughly canvassed both with local public officials and with the other Federal agencies that were vitally concerned.

The First Centrifugal Impulse

While the Solicitor and the other attorneys of the agency were concerning themselves with the constitutional and civil liberties phases of the detention issue and urging the adoption of comprehensive leave regulations, another prominent member of the WRA staff was moving in the same general direction from a slightly different point of view. This was the chief of the agency's Employment Division who had joined the staff around May 1—several weeks after the Salt Lake City conference and at a time when pressure for sugar beet workers was just about reaching its peak. His attitude on the detention issue is perhaps best summed up in the final report which he submitted before leaving the agency in the fall of 1943. He wrote (referring back to the middle of May 1942)—

> My first view of the realities of the evacuation was at the Portland Assembly Center and I don't believe that I ever will forget the sharp impact of this brief visit. Here were thousands of working people out of work at a time when their contribution would mean so much to the country; young and old, good and bad, Japanese and American, were thrown closely together under one roof; and most of the people behind the barbed wire and the guns were American citizens. It seemed to me if military necessity had made this drastic confinement of Americans necessary that

at the earliest possible moment after these people were out of the sensitive military area they should be encouraged and assisted to get back into the normal ways of American life just as rapidly as possible.

Upon returning from this particular trip to the Washington office on June 20, the Employment Chief found that the agency had a new Director, Milton Eisenhower having been called by the President to his OWI assignment, and that a staff meeting was scheduled for the night of June 24. At that staff meeting—perhaps one of the most important in WRA's history—the Employment Chief recommended that procedures be worked out immediately so evacuees could leave the centers for year-round private employment. The new Director, on the job exactly one week, listened carefully and made no definite commitments. Before leaving on his first field trip 3 days later, however, he consulted with the Assistant Secretary of War about the possibilities of developing private employment opportunities for qualified Nisei outside the centers. Given informal assurance by the Assistant Secretary that the War Department would probably have no objections, the Director approved the substance of the Employment Chief's proposal and asked him to start immediately, in collaboration with the attorneys of the agency, on the development of a tentative leave procedure. This document, it was contemplated, would be much less sweeping than the comprehensive leave regulations already drawn up by the Solicitor's office and would be designed merely to initiate a somewhat restricted program of "outside" employment.

In the formulation of this first leave policy document, which was not actually issued until almost a month later, attention was focused on four major questions: (1) what types of evacuees should be permitted to leave the centers for resettlement purposes; (2) what kind of check on the background and attitudes of the applicant should be made before approving the departure; (3) what sections of the country should be emphasized as areas of potential resettlement; and (4) what degree of control should WRA exercise over the evacuees after they left the centers.

The first point was cleared up rather quickly. Still profoundly uncertain about public acceptance of the evacuees outside the centers, WRA decided to limit resettlement at first to the group which was least likely to cause public apprehension—the American citizen evacuees who had never at any time studied or resided in Japan. The Issei and the Kibei were made categorically ineligible.

On the second point, WRA's original impulse was to have the Federal Bureau of Investigation check into the background and attitudes of each candidate for leave and make recommendations to WRA for approval or denial. As early as June 24, the WRA Employment Chief informally approached the FBI with such a proposal and was told that the Bureau, burdened by a heavy load of war work and a somewhat depleted personnel, could not possibly undertake such an assignment. He was assured, however, that the FBI would be willing to check the name of each candidate for leave against the files which it had previously built up on the Japanese American group and would provide

the WRA with any information it had. The Bureau's files, he was told on another occasion, contained virtually all the information about individual west coast Japanese and Japanese Americans which had been developed by the Army and Navy intelligence services. As finally adopted, the first leave procedure provided that WRA should make the fullest possible investigation of each candidate for leave at the relocation center and that a record check should be made by FBI before approval was granted.

Selection of the potential area for resettlement was the result of a gradual narrowing-down process. The west coast exclusion zone, of course, was not even considered. The interior States under jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command—Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Utah, and Montana—had shown considerable capacity to accept seasonal workers, but the Employment Chief and several others felt at this time that the opportunities for "permanent relocation west from Colorado were slim." Accordingly, the entire area under jurisdiction of the WDC was eliminated. Although the Atlantic seaboard, in the grip of a deepening manpower shortage, seemed to offer employment possibilities, Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, Commanding General of the Eastern Defense Command, made it clear that he would prefer not to have people of Japanese descent relocated within easily accessible distance of the Nation's eastern coastline. The first leave policy of WRA provided, therefore, that indefinite leave would be granted only for resettlement east of the Western Defense Command area and that preference would be given for applications to accept employment in the Middle West. "Placement in the East," the Employment Chief wrote in a letter of July 21, "is not absolutely excluded, but, for the present, it should be discouraged and only in the case where the necessity is very apparent should we undertake to place anybody inside the Eastern Defense Command."

The fourth point—the degree of control to be exercised over evacuees *after* relocation—was the subject of some disagreement within the Authority. One group of staff members maintained that the launching of the leave program was an experiment; that the ultimate success of the entire program could be jeopardized through lack of care in assuring the successful relocation of the earliest resettlers; and that, therefore, the Director should reserve the right in the regulations to cancel a leave and require a resettler to return to the center. The Solicitor of the Authority, who supported this view, urged also that the legal authority of the Director to terminate a leave would be clearer if the regulations recited that persons on leave remained in the "constructive custody" of the Army and of the Authority. The Employment Chief led another group of staff members who felt, as indicated in his final report, that—

> the evacuees should be absorbed into the normal channels of American economic life as rapidly as possible. For the benefit of the country and the evacuees it was desirable to break off the wardship of the Government as quickly as possible. If the evacuee qualified for a pass to leave the relocation center it was my view that we should try to make this a permanent departure. He had been an evacuee and for a time he was a ward of the Government. Now he was a free man and it was

expected that he would build up a new life for himself in America. It was inconsistent with this view to keep the evacuated people tied back into the centers.

This issue was resolved ultimately by a compromise. A provision that the Director of WRA could revoke any evacuee's leave permit at any time he saw fit to do so was written into the very first leave procedure of the War Relocation Authority and has remained in the regulations of the agency ever since. It was used, however, on only one occasion throughout the four-year history of the program.

The tentative policy adopted on July 20 as the product of these deliberations was, in the words of the Employment Chief, "a very cautious document." But it did serve to get the resettlement program started, and it provided an answer to the second of the two questions which the agency had to face in connection with the detention issue. It said, in effect, that even though WRA might conceivably have the authority, derived from the war powers of the President, to detain all evacuated people of Japanese descent in centers indefinitely, the agency did not feel that it was necessary, desirable, or wise to do so. WRA never receded, even momentarily, from that position.

The Basic Leave Regulations

Although the leave policy statement of July 20 proved to be one of the most important milestones in the early history of the WRA program, it was received at the centers then operating, by both evacuees and staff, with little interest and scant appreciation of its ultimate significance. In fact, it seems highly probable that a substantial number—perhaps a majority—of the evacuated people never even knew of its existence at the time. According to the best records available (and they are not too accurate for this early period), only 11 evacuees actually left the centers for employment (as distinguished from student relocation) under this July 20 procedure before it was superseded on October 1 by the broader, basic leave regulations.

As indicated previously, the new Director of WRA left Washington within 10 days after his appointment for a quick trip through some of the then operating centers in an effort to learn something first-hand about the complicated problem for which he had so abruptly been made responsible. On this trip he was impressed, as other WRA officials had been earlier, by the dilemma of keeping so much valuable manpower confined in government centers at a time when every last ounce of manpower was so crucially needed. He was also impressed, perhaps even more deeply, by the disturbing fact that thousands of American citizens, particularly youngsters of school age, were in danger of going through their most formative years in an environment which he regarded as a fundamental negation of American democracy and incapable of ever becoming anything else. By the time he returned to Washington in mid-July, he had developed serious misgivings not only about the wisdom of *keeping* people in centers but even about the desirability of *permitting* them to remain there any longer than absolutely necessary.

In the meantime, the Employment Chief was traveling through the North Central States, talking with employers, community leaders, and local public officials in a number of major cities, and finding, somewhat to his surprise, that there was a considerable fund of good will toward the evacuated people in this region and remarkably little of the deep-seated public apprehension which had prevailed on the west coast and in the intermountain States. He wrote more than a year later—

> The first field trip through the Middle West convinced me that a considerable number of evacuees, especially the Nisei, could find new homes in the Middle West. This was not because there was widespread enthusiasm for a relocation program but rather because in the places I went there was someone or a number of people who were deeply interested in the problems growing out of the evacuation and were willing to give their support to doing something practical to solve them.

In mid-August WRA held an agency conference in San Francisco which was attended by practically all the key members of the Washington and San Francisco staffs and by most of the top operating officials from the then organized centers. The main purpose of this meeting was to develop major policies for the management of relocation centers, and the decisions reached will be considered in detail in a later chapter. At this point it is sufficient to note two significant developments: (1) the statement of the Director, in the course of his opening remarks to the conferees, that relocation outside the centers was to be an "integral and vital" part of WRA policy; and (2) the fact that, in addition to the committees working on various phases of the center management problem at the San Francisco conference, there was also a "furlough" committee, under chairmanship of the Employment Chief, considering the question of leave and "outside" employment.

In commenting on the relocation statement in the Director's opening speech, the Employment Chief undoubtedly put it in proper perspective when he said in his final report over a year later:

> I don't believe that the Director's statement took too strong a hold on the staff at this time. In mid-August of 1942 WRA was just in the middle of its efforts to house, feed, and settle the evacuees in the relocation centers; the officials were preoccupied with these problems. Sugar beet recruiting had been rather unpopular with the project staff during the early summer. Little or nothing was known of the possibilities for relocation in the Midwest. The development of the leave procedure was familiar to the lawyers and members of the Employment Division staff in Washington and San Francisco but not generally in WRA. An outside relocation program was generally looked upon as a novel and risky venture in contrast to a safe and sure relocation in the centers. What the Director's statement did do was to put everybody on notice that a relocation program outside the centers was to be taken seriously.

Once the sessions were under way, the furlough committee began considering a wide variety of proposals which had been made, both within the agency and by outsiders, for a leave and relocation program. The most extreme and controversial of these proposals was that WRA simply open wide the gates of its centers and leave the question of departure or continued residence to the discretion of the individual evacuee without any particular processing or procedures. This proposal, which combined the virtues of simplicity and non-interference with evacuee liberties, appealed deeply to many staff members, includ-

ing the Director, and was almost adopted. On deeper reflection, however, most staff members came to see that it involved a number of serious risks. By taking such a step, WRA would have been ignoring one of its gravest and most challenging responsibilities—the responsibility for seeing that relocation was carried forward with a minimum of disorder and disruption and a maximum of protection of the best interests of the Nation and the evacuated people. It was unfortunate but nonetheless true that public opinion over large areas of the country was not yet ready for such a *laissez faire* policy of resettlement; if adopted, it might well have produced turmoil, bloodshed, and serious international complications.

After returning from San Francisco, the Director decided to place the issue before the Solicitor General of the United States. A set of leave regulations was carefully prepared, following the theory that evacuees were to be permitted to leave the centers only after screening, and the satisfaction of certain other requirements. This draft of the regulations was then laid before the Solicitor General with the statement that the Authority would prefer to open wide the gates of the centers without procedural restrictions, if the Department of Justice would sanction and support such free movement of the evacuees. If the Justice Department could not give such approval to free departures, the Director added, he was prepared to publish the leave regulations as drafted, but even that step would be taken, he made clear, only if the Solicitor General could provide assurance that the legal validity of the regulations would be defended by the Department of Justice in the event of litigation. The Solicitor General answered that throwing wide the gates of the centers seemed an unwise procedure which the Justice Department could not sanction, approved the leave regulations, and agreed readily to defend their validity in the courts. The basic leave regulations of the Authority as thus chiseled out were now ready for publication in the Federal Register as official policy of the agency.

The leave regulations which went into effect on October 1 differed from the tentative leave procedure of July 20 in three principal respects: (1) all evacuee residents of the centers—Issei, Nisei, and Kibei alike—were eligible to apply for leave; (2) the only geographical restriction on leave (outside the evacuated area) was that a permit might be denied in a case where an evacuee contemplated settling in a community known to be markedly hostile; and (3) the new regulations covered all types of leave—short-term, seasonal (or "work group" leave as it was then called), and indefinite—rather than simply leave to take year-round employment as the July 20 procedure had done. Perhaps even more significantly, the October 1 regulations provided that—

> leave shall issue to an applicant in accordance with his application in each case * * * *as a matter of right*, (1) where the applicant has made arrangements for employment or other means of support, (2) where he agrees to make reports [to the WRA on changes of employment or changes of address] * * * (3) where there is no reasonable cause to believe that the applicant cannot successfully maintain employment and residence at the proposed destination, and (4) [where there is] no reasonable ground to believe that the issuance of a leave in the particular case will interfere with the war program or otherwise endanger the public peace and security. [Italics and numbering supplied.]

In addition, the basic regulations provided (like the earlier procedure) for checking the applicant's name against the FBI files, set up a procedure for appealing denials of leave applications, stipulated the conditions under which short-term leaves might be extended, and specified the restrictions which would be attached to the leave permits of Issei in order to conform with Department of Justice regulations governing travel of all enemy aliens.

As suggested earlier, this document represented a rather long and bold stride forward from the tentative position taken on July 20. It was the product of several forces in combination: (1) the increasingly acute and Nation-wide manpower shortage, (2) the growing confidence that came to WRA as a result of the comparatively smooth and successful movement into the beet fields, and particularly (3) the apprehensions of the Director, the Solicitor, the Employment Chief, and others about the propriety and decency of keeping innocent people confined in the unnatural environment of the relocation centers.

In the last analysis, however, the October 1 regulations represented a compromise solution of the detention-resettlement issue. Although they clearly established the right of any evacuee to apply for indefinite leave at any time, they made the granting of such leave contingent on the satisfaction of four specific requirements: (1) a personal record which indicated no potential danger to the national security; (2) a reasonable degree of public acceptance for people of Japanese ancestry in the community of proposed destination; (3) some prospect of personal economic security outside the center; and (4) assurances to keep the agency informed of changes of job or address.

Of these requirements, the first was by far the most important. It was made necessary primarily by the fact that the evacuation itself had stigmatized the evacuated people in the eyes of a large segment of the public and by the further fact that this stigma had been intensified through the widespread dissemination of "scare stories," rumors, and other types of misinformation. Some degree of assurance that evacuees were being checked over and that those with cloudy records were not being resettled was clearly essential in the interest of the whole relocation program. The second requirement—involving "community acceptance"—was needed not only to insure an orderly relocation process but also to reassure the center residents themselves that they were not being guided by the agency into areas where personal adjustment would be extremely difficult and hazardous. The third requirement—the one on personal economic security—was closely tied in with the second and was designed mainly to assure the receiving communities that evacuees would not be floating around in a loose and indefinite search for employment; it remained in effect only a few months and was largely superseded in the summer of 1943 by a more liberal "community invitation" requirement which will be described in a later chapter. The fourth, and least important, requirement about reporting changes of address was included partially for reasons of public reassurance and partially so that WRA could service the many requests which were

constantly coming to the agency for information on the whereabouts of individual resettlers.

Furthermore, the basic leave regulations provided only a *passive* kind of answer to the question of resettlement; they were essentially permissive rather than dynamic in nature. Although they made it clear that WRA was interested in relocation of evacuees in normal communities outside the centers, they furnished no clue to the degree or intensity of that interest or the extent to which the agency would later go in effectuating it. "At this time," the Employment Chief wrote in reference to mid-October of 1942, "we [in the Employment Division] were continuing to plan on ten to twenty thousand evacuees, principally the younger people, leaving the centers permanently." But the Director had already begun to develop somewhat different ideas.

The Decision for "All Out" Relocation

Throughout the month of October 1942, the Washington staff of WRA spent a large share of its time in staff meetings and elsewhere working on the development of industrial or manufacturing enterprises at the relocation centers. This type of work had figured prominently in the plans of the agency almost from the start and was conceived as having a twofold purpose: (1) to provide work opportunities for a large number of the evacuees who did not have an agricultural background, and (2) to bring about the production of goods and articles which were badly needed in the conduct of the war. The more deeply WRA went in its exploration of the problem, however, the more complex and unworkable a program of industrial enterprises at the centers seemed to become.

In the first place, there were great difficulties in obtaining the necessary equipment for some of these undertakings—for example, sewing machines for a proposed tent factory at Tule Lake. Secondly, there were complications arising from the Geneva Convention and the State Department's insistence that alien evacuees should not be employed in the production of war goods. Thirdly, there was the danger of competition with already established producers: a proposal for a pottery plant at the Heart Mountain center, for example, brought vehement protests, forwarded through congressional channels, from the ceramics industry. And finally, there was the almost bewilderingly complicated problem of compensation. Since many of the industrial enterprises originally contemplated for the centers were to be privately owned and operated, WRA obviously had to require the payment of prevailing wages in order to avoid giving certain producers an unfair competitive advantage at government expense. Yet all the residents of relocation centers were being provided with food, shelter, and medical care; and the great majority of them, on the payroll of WRA, were being paid at the rate of $16 or $19 a month. The complications that would have been created in such communities if a minority of the residents were allowed to receive as much as $200 or $250 a month can easily be imagined. To circumvent these difficulties, WRA considered a variety of

trust fund arrangements, a plan to charge private industrial employees for their board and lodging (as well as that of their dependents), and even a scheme to set up some of the industries on a cooperative, community-wide basis. But no solution seemed entirely satisfactory, and the compensation difficulties, when taken with the other complications, were enough finally to throw the whole industrial program well into the background of WRA thinking. Before the Director left on a field trip in early November, he had decided definitely against the establishment of any further private industries at the relocation centers beyond those already established and the few for which commitments had previously been made.

The Director's field trip—his second major one since joining the agency—took him through the two Arizona centers, into Salt Lake City for the twin purpose of meeting with the Project Directors and addressing a conference of the Japanese American Citizens League, and finally on into San Francisco. During the first few days of his stay in Salt Lake City he met with a large number of people individually—potential employers of evacuee workers, civic leaders, State and local public officials, and a great many others. He found that every last one of these people were concerned, to a greater or less degree, with the deepening manpower crisis in northwest Utah and throughout the Nation; few of them indicated any real doubts about the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the evacuees; and several did not even mention the subject of evacuee loyalty. The Director came to the conclusion that the manpower demands were so great that the government could not keep the evacuees in centers even if it wished to do so.

This condition, it should be pointed out, was exactly what the Director had been hoping to find; it coincided nicely with his decision to scrap industrial plans and with the agency's deep misgivings about the environment of relocation centers. It greatly strengthened his resolve to make relocation outside the centers the very first order of WRA business. On Sunday, November 22, he addressed an audience of about 300 people in one of Salt Lake City's auditoriums and told them that WRA had decided to "go as rapidly as possible" into a program of "permanent" resettlement. "I think it can be done," he added. "It is a job very important to our war effort, and I'm very much heartened by what I have found out about the people of the United States in regard to this problem." The following day the Salt Lake City *Tribune* carried a report on the meeting under the only-slightly-exaggerated headline "WRA Plans Dissolution of Japanese Centers." The sole flaw in this headline was that it did not include the word "eventual" before "dissolution." Otherwise it was perfectly true and represented the real culmination of WRA thinking on the detention-resettlement issue. In a very real sense, the "all out" relocation program was born in Salt Lake City, the same community where, 6 months earlier, the representatives of the Western States had dealt evacuee liberties a severe and almost fatal blow.

Upon arriving in San Francisco a few days later, the Director immediately summoned the Employment Chief in from the Heart Mountain

center and instructed him to start making plans at once for a greatly expanded relocation program. Field offices would be needed, he indicated, in a number of cities throughout the interior of the country and should be established at the earliest possible moment. "We had been planning," the Employment Chief recalled, perhaps a trifle wearily, many months later, "to handle through Washington around five or six hundred [leave] applications a week. The Director's idea was that we should aim to double, or if possible, triple this figure."

The Price of Prejudice

Since [1942] the people of Japanese ancestry who were evacuated from the [Pacific] coastal area have been thoroughly investigated from the standpoint of loyalty, probably more thoroughly than any other segment of our population.

From a War Department press release of December 17, 1944, announcing revocation of the mass exclusion orders.

IT WOULD take a rather fat volume to explain fully why so many Americans assumed, somewhat uncritically, on December 7, 1941, that the west coast people of Japanese descent were the most dangerous element in our domestic population. The important points to note here are (1) that such an assumption *was* widely made, (2) that it was shared in the beginning by many WRA staff members, and (3) that it went for a period of many months almost entirely unchallenged. Because this assumption did gain such widespread acceptance, the west coast people of Japanese descent were subjected throughout the course of the war to a mass probing and surveillance process which was almost certainly without parallel in American history. Whether the results achieved justified the tremendous expenditure of governmental effort and the large cost in mental anguish of so many people, the reader can best judge for himself.

The FBI Raids

The effort to separate the potentially dangerous individuals from the bulk of the Japanese American population started within a few hours after the announcement of the attack at Pearl Harbor. Using records which had been built up over a period of years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation moved in almost immediately on some of the leading members of the alien Japanese population in the west coast region and took them into custody. On December 11 Attorney General Biddle announced that over 1,200 Japanese aliens had already been arrested and that the roundup of other suspects was continuing.

This process continued through the early weeks of 1942 and was carried forward on a much lower scale of intensity throughout the balance of the war. According to an announcement made by the Department of Justice in early 1946, nearly 5,500 Japanese alien residents of the United States were picked up for questioning at one time or another. The great majority of these people were apprehended well before the issuance of the mass exclusion orders and before the creation of the War Relocation Authority. Some were held only for brief periods of questioning and almost immediately released; others were kept at so-called "detention stations" for periods ranging from a

few weeks to several months; and a little over half of the total group picked up was transferred to internment camps which were administered for a few months by the Army and placed under jurisdiction of the Department of Justice in the early summer of 1942. Throughout the wartime period the Department of Justice was constantly sifting the internees—releasing outright those whose records contained no substantial elements of potential danger, paroling others with the stipulation that they should report regularly to a "sponsor" who had indicated a willingness to vouch for their good behavior, and retaining in custody those whose records indicated that they might conceivably endanger the national security or disrupt the war program.

The First Segregation Proposals

Even though the Department of Justice had culled out the presumably most suspect members of the alien Japanese population on the west coast before the evacuation started, it was quite clear that this fact alone would not satisfy the general public regarding the loyalty and good intentions of the remainder of the Japanese American population. Shortly after Lt. Comdr. K. D. Ringle of the Office of Naval Intelligence came to WRA on detail, in May of 1942, he strongly urged the agency to conduct a segregation program. Such a program was needed, he stressed, "first and foremost, to protect the country from disloyal acts, and second, to protect the evacuees from thoughtless or misguided acts of violence on the part of Caucasian Americans."

> On the basis of logic and reason, [Commander Ringle continued] two classes of persons may be potentially dangerous to the internal peace and security of the United States and to its war effort. The first are those aliens born in Japan who have retained sufficient of their Japanese ideology and patriotism so that they are in spirit loyal citizens of the Japanese Empire. The second—who may well be children of the first—are those Americans of Japanese ancestry who have spent sufficient time during their formative years in Japan so that they are in all probability citizens of the Japanese Empire in spirit despite their legal American citizenship.

The procedure recommended by Commander Ringle for carrying out the segregation program was based on the assumption that the overwhelming majority of "disloyal" evacuees would be found among the Kibei and their alien parents. Under his proposal, all Kibei who had 3 or more years of schooling in Japan after the age of 13—and the parents of all such Kibei—would be called up before administrative boards at each of the centers and called upon to declare and demonstrate where their national sympathies lay. "A reversal of the commonly accepted legal procedure must be exercised for the best interests of the United States," Commander Ringle indicated, "with persons considered guilty unless proven innocent."

This recommendation, which was made to WRA a few weeks before Director Eisenhower left the agency, was the subject of considerable discussion and argument throughout the summer months. It would have had certain obvious advantages. Once such a segregation was carried out, the relocation centers would presumably be more harmonious communities and much easier for WRA to manage. At the

same time the Authority would clearly be in a much stronger position to convince the American public of the loyalty of the "unsegregated" elements of the population and to move ahead with its program of relocation in outside communities. Both of these considerations appealed deeply to many staff members.

But the more the agency learned about the actual attitudes of the evacuated people and about the complex of factors which lay behind these attitudes, the more uncertain it became about such a categorical procedure. In the first place, it became increasingly apparent that the mere act of singling out the Kibei, officially, as the most suspect group in the evacuee population would have far-reaching implications. It would greatly intensify the popular stigma which had already been attached to the Kibei and make it much more difficult for even the most loyal among them to effect a satisfactory adjustment to American life. It would deepen the bitterness of the previously embittered and do a grave injustice to the genuinely pro-American and pro-democratic.

Furthermore, WRA discovered, the Kibei approach was by no means a really *effective* way of solving the segregation problem. Not only would it stigmatize some of the loyal and well-intentioned Kibei; it would miss entirely some of the most effective and persistent troublemakers in the evacuee population. The Kibei, WRA gradually learned, were seldom among the leaders of the dissident groups at relocation centers; more often, they were merely the "puppets" or the "front boys" for a small group of older and shrewder manipulators. The real culprits—the organizers, planners, and strategists—were much more likely to be bachelor Issei or middle-aged Nisei who were badly maladjusted in the United States yet skilled enough to remain generally in the background at the relocation centers.

The basic weakness in Commander Ringle's proposal, it now seems to WRA, was that it overstressed some of the more facile generalizations that had been made about the three main groups in the evacuee population and underestimated the importance of basing judgments on a close examination of the background and attitude of the *individual* evacuee. Back in the summer of 1942 WRA's opinions on this subject were not nearly so sharply defined as they are today. But by the time of the San Francisco conference in August, the reaction against a categorical or "Kibei" approach to segregation had already set in. Although the subject of segregation was on the conference agenda, no definite decisions were reached and the whole question was set aside for further study.

The Kibei Meeting at Manzanar

Just a few days before the policy conference began in San Francisco, an evacuee meeting was held about 350 miles away at the Manzanar center which gave WRA further insight into the Kibei problem and provided the first really disturbing evidence of an undercurrent of protest at the relocation centers. This meeting, attended by more than 600 residents of the center and apparently stimulated by the provision of the July 20 tentative leave policy prohibiting the issuance of leave

permits to Kibei, was conducted entirely in Japanese and was featured by highly emotional outbursts of oratory. The discussion focused largely around two Japanese American veterans of World War I—one of them a naively sincere patriot who had been deeply embittered by the evacuation and detention experience and the other a man who boasted openly that he was an FBI informant. The audience was overwhelmingly sympathetic with the dissident veteran while the alleged FBI informant found it necessary, in the words of an eye-witness, to "hustle out of the meeting for his own protection." When the meeting finally reached a climax of clamor which could be heard over most of the center, a WRA staff member intervened and suggested rather pointedly that it be adjourned. The keynote was apparently struck by one member of the audience who exclaimed "I have been in Manchuria, in China, in the South Seas, and now I am in America. This is the stinkiest, rottenest place I have ever been in. * * *" This remark was greeted by loud and long applause.

The Poston Strike

Although the Kibei meeting at Manzanar was regarded by most WRA staff members as only a straw in the wind and a foreshadowing of more serious evacuee protests to come, the agency was not fully prepared for the next outburst when it occurred. On Saturday night, November 14, a group of unidentified evacuees entered the quarters of a Kibei resident at the Colorado River Relocation Center and beat him into unconsciousness. On the following day the internal security force picked up two young men in the center as suspects and held them in detention. Then on Monday morning, the 16th, the FBI in Phoenix was asked by the center staff to send in a couple of agents for a spot investigation.

Meanwhile, the story had been thoroughly spread over Unit One of the Colorado River center and had already aroused some ominous rumblings. As it happened, the beaten Kibei was widely suspected of being an informer and was unpopular on other grounds, while the two suspects were quite generally respected and admired. Against this kind of background, the whole incident soon became the focus for a community-wide expression of all the grievances and resentments that had been piling up since the time of evacuation.

Within a few days after the arrest a committee of seven residents called upon the Project Director to vouch for the good character of the detainees and ask for their release. By this time, however, the "prestige" of the administration and its ability to maintain a well-ordered community seemed to be rather clearly at stake. Consequently, even though the administration realized that the evidence against the two suspects was not very substantial, it felt almost compelled to reject the request rather than run the risk of weakening its position irreparably. Some time later, after the committee members reported this decision back to the community, a crowd of about a thousand residents gathered outside the project jail—for the ostensible purpose of prevent-

ing the removal of the two prisoners from the center—and word was passed throughout the community that there would be a strike of all but the most essential services.

In this situation the administration faced three possible courses of action: (1) it could give in to the evacuees' demand and release the suspects; (2) it could call in the Army troops stationed on the exterior of the center and turn the community over temporarily to military administration; or (3) it could attempt to negotiate with the evacuees and work out a reasonably satisfactory compromise. The first course was rather quickly rejected as wholly impractical and was never seriously urged by any of the leading staff members. The question, therefore, boiled down to a choice between the other two alternatives. Summoning of the troops was most strongly advocated by several staff members and by the representatives of the FBI who had been called into the center in connection with the arrests. Other staff members, however, stood firmly for the third course as the only properly democratic way of meeting the situation. At a rather crucial staff meeting held in the administration building while the crowd was gathered around the project jail, the Acting Project Director heard both sides fully and then decided that the Army would *not* be called in.

Immediately after this decision was reached, the FBI agents refused to take any further part in investigating the disturbance and promptly left the center. After their departure, the administration released one of the two suspects (against whom there was practically no substantial evidence) but prepared to file charges against the other in the county court. Before taking final action, however, the Acting Project Director first sought the advice of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs—the Colorado River center was technically administered by the Office of Indian Affairs at this time—and then ultimately conferred by long distance telephone with the Secretary of the Interior. Pointedly refusing to issue any orders on the question, the Secretary nonetheless expressed his opinion that the matter could probably best be settled by releasing the one remaining prisoner to the custody of the community. On November 23, just 9 days after the original beating incident, an agreement on this basis was reached between the administration and an emergency committee of the residents which had been representing the community after resignation of the temporary council. This brought the incident more or less officially to an end.

The Poston demonstration, which was confined entirely to one of the three communities making up the center, was probably the least serious of the three major incidents which occurred at WRA centers during the life of the program. Although emotions occasionally ran high and the atmosphere was almost constantly tense, there was no physical violence whatever and no destruction of government property. On the whole the incident probably provided a healthy release for pent-up emotions and qualified observers are generally agreed that Poston emerged as a stronger and more stable community after it was over. At the same time, however, it provided the newspapers with a large number of over-simplified stories and headlines about "pro-Axis"

activity at the center, tended to deepen and corroborate the widespread public attitude of suspicion toward the evacuated people, and thus set in motion a train of events which ultimately made segregation of the evacuees into two groups almost inescapable.

The Manzanar Disturbance

Within 2 weeks after the Poston strike, before WRA had fully recovered from its internal effects on administration and its impact on the general public, another, and far more serious, incident of evacuee protest occurred at the Manzanar center. The immediate situation which produced this demonstration was strikingly similar to the situation which had precipitated the Poston strike. An evacuee, suspected of being an FBI informant, was beaten by a group of six masked assailants and one of the more popular residents was arrested as a suspect and held in the project jail. On the afternoon of Sunday, December 6, after the prisoner had been removed from the center to a jail in the nearby town of Independence, a mass meeting of several thousand residents was held in one of the open spaces of the community. The Project Director, who had been on the job only about a week, appeared at the meeting, moved about through the crowd, and finally negotiated with a committee of five evacuees who purported to be the leaders. Under terms of the agreement which was reached after a comparatively short discussion, the Project Director's understanding was that the crowd would immediately be dispersed and that all demonstrations would cease. In return, the Project Director promised that the prisoner would be returned to the center within 2 hours to stand trial by the center administration. In announcing this agreement to the crowd in Japanese, however, one of the spokesmen for the committee (the same dissident war veteran who had figured so prominently in the Kibei meeting in August) is alleged to have distorted the facts rather badly. Although the administration did not realize it at the time, he is supposed to have told the crowd that a substantial victory had been won over the administration and to have called upon all the people present to reassemble at another point on the center later in the afternoon.

When this second gathering occurred, the administration was almost wholly unprepared and immediately summoned the military police stationed outside the center to come in fully prepared to deal with any outbreak of violence that might occur. After an unsuccessful attempt to disperse the crowd by tear gas, the people and the soldiers stood lined up facing each other in an atmosphere of the highest possible tension. At this point an irresponsible evacuee youngster started a parked car, steered it in the direction of one of the machine guns which the military police had mounted and then jumped out. In the confusion that immediately followed, a volley of shots was fired into the crowd and one innocent bystander, a boy of 17, was killed instantly. Ten other members of the crowd were wounded and one of these, a Nisei youngster of 21, died in the hospital a few days later.

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For about a week after this demonstration Manzanar was a sullen and ominously subdued community, under temporary control of the military police, with all but the most vital activities brought to a standstill by a community-wide strike. On the Sunday following the demonstration the Project Director posted copies of a notice throughout the community pointing out that he had kept the terms of his agreement with the negotiating committee on the previous Sunday while the committee had not lived up to its side of the bargain. The notice also emphasized in strong terms that law and order would have to be maintained. The next day, after the military police had left the center proper and resumed their stations on the external boundaries, a committee of four residents met with the Project Director in an attempt to negotiate a settlement. Five days later enough progress had been made so that the strike was called off and the community was subsequently restored to something like a normal basis. By Christmas time the disturbance had been largely forgotten and Manzanar was ready once again to focus on the future.

To a much more pronounced degree than the Poston strike—which was essentially a contest of wills between administrators and administered—the Manzanar disturbance was the result of intense conflict within the evacuee community itself. From the time of the Kibei meeting in August through the fall of 1942, it became apparent that WRA had in this one center some of the most ardent advocates of cooperation with the American Government and some of the most disillusioned and maladjusted members of the whole evacuee population. The cleavage between the two groups, with the bulk of the residents somewhere in the middle, was steadily intensified throughout October and November to the point where a violent clash became virtually inevitable. Like the previous incident at Poston, the Manzanar incident helped to purge the community of some of its tensions and resentments and brought about a greater degree of community stability than the center had known previously. But the public repercussions of this demonstration were even uglier than those which resulted from the incident at Poston—in large part because the incident was misrepresented in the press as a "celebration" of the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack—and it is really remarkable that there were no reverberations in Tokyo. The incident, which might well have been represented to the Japanese governmental authorities as an attempt at mass murder, could easily have touched off a wave of unrestrained brutality at prisoner of war camps and detention stations throughout the Far East. Actually, however, the incident provoked no particular reaction from the Japanese authorities and apparently went almost unnoticed.

The Isolation Center

On the night of December 6, shortly after the demonstration at Manzanar had reached its climax and the crowd had been dispersed, the administration took steps to remove from the center some of the extremists on both sides of the evacuee conflict. A group of 65 out-

spokenly patriotic and pro-administration evacuees, who were believed to be in danger of physical violence, were taken to an abandoned CCC camp in Death Valley. These people continued to live at the Death Valley camp for a period of a few weeks and eventually all of them resettled in normal communities. Simultaneously, 16 of the supposed ringleaders of the demonstration were picked up by the internal security police and transferred to jails in the nearby towns of Lone Pine and Independence. On January 11, 1943, these alleged troublemakers were sent to another abandoned CCC camp near Moab, Utah, which was set up as a temporary isolation center. Meanwhile, WRA, having concluded that some more formal arrangements were needed for removing persistent and chronic troublemakers from relocation centers, was moving ahead with arrangements for establishing an isolation center on the grounds of an inactive Indian boarding school near Leupp, Ariz. The group of Manzanar agitators was transferred from Moab to Leupp in late April, and the new isolation center then began its brief period of operations. The Leupp center continued receiving small contingents of agitators from the relocation centers until the late fall of 1943 when it was closed and its remaining inmates moved to the Tule Lake Segregation Center.

On February 16 the Authority issued a confidential policy statement on the removal of aggravated and incorrigible troublemakers from relocation centers. Under the procedure established, Project Directors were instructed to prepare full dockets on each candidate for isolation and submit these to the Washington office. If the candidate happened to be an alien, the Project Director might recommend his transfer to an internment camp; otherwise, the transfer would have to be either to another relocation center or to the isolation center. Only in exceptional cases of acute emergency at the relocation center were the Project Directors permitted to request oral approval of the National Director to remove a trouble maker immediately. No transfers of this kind were actually made.

Leave Clearance Procedures

Before WRA entered into this highly troubled period at the centers and began to revise its policies to meet the problem represented by recalcitrant elements in the population, the agency had long since started on a large-scale screening program for the primary purpose of determining which residents of the relocation centers might safely be permitted to resettle in wartime and which ones should be held in detention. The Employment Chief indicates in his final report—

> From the very beginning we talked about having the applicants checked or investigated or both by one or more of the intelligence agencies and by our own organization. [The Assistant Chief of the Employment Division] was trying to make arrangements on the west coast with the intelligence agencies. He was going ahead out there at the same time that we were studying the question here. On July 6 he wrote to [the west coast Regional Director] "I have been attempting to make arrangements today with military and naval intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation for checking the names of applicants for individual outside employ-

ment against the files of these organizations," and he goes on to say that Naval intelligence would assist us [as well as] military intelligence, and that San Francisco office of the FBI would not make arrangements without instructions from Washington.

For a time during the summer of 1942 the ONI on the west coast checked on names submitted by the WRA San Francisco office * * * however * * * the final decision on our part [was] to make our intelligence agencies contact [through] the FBI record check in Washington.

Under the basic leave procedures which became effective on October 1, there were two fundamental steps which an evacuee had to take before obtaining indefinite leave from a relocation center. The first was called an application for leave clearance and involved an examination of the evacuee's background and current behavior with reference to the possibility that he might endanger the national security. The second step was the application for an individual leave permit which could be made only after the applicant had obtained leave clearance. It involved a check by WRA on (1) the candidate's prospects for self-support outside the center, (2) the general "receptiveness" of the community where he proposed to resettle, and (3) his willingness to keep the agency informed of changes in employment or address. In actual practice during the summer and fall of 1942, the two steps were generally taken simultaneously but they must be carefully distinguished for a proper understanding of the significance of the subsequent history of the relocation program. It is the first, or leave clearance, step which primarily concerns us here.

As the process of leave clearance was gradually systematized and centralized in the Washington office during the fall of 1942, arrangements were eventually worked out to send individual record forms of the evacuees who applied for leave to the Washington office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The process is described in the final report of the head of the Leave Clearance Section of the Authority. He explains—

This was not an investigation by the FBI of the individual whose name was shown on the form * * * it consisted merely of a check of the FBI files for information relative to the subject. The FBI would return a copy of the [form] with a notation showing either "No Record," "Not Identifiable," or "Not Derogatory." Where information existed, it was placed by the FBI on a dictaphone record. The records were forwarded to the leave section and transcribed. As soon as the information was transcribed, the transcription was reviewed by the head of the leave section and if of sufficient derogatory significance, the project was notified not to issue leave of any kind to the subject.

As explained earlier, the FBI record files on Japanese Americans were represented to WRA as containing all the significant information which had been gathered both by that agency and by the intelligence branches of the Army and the Navy. Thus WRA was able to review rather quickly all the relevant information on an applicant for indefinite leave which had been sent in from the relocation center together with the pre-evacuation record if any had been developed by the investigative agencies of the government.

Contrary to a widespread popular impression, WRA's primary concern in making this check was not to establish positive evidence of

"loyalty" to the United States. Strictly speaking, it is highly questionable whether WRA or any other agency could properly be empowered to detain an individual, even in war time, simply on the grounds that his loyalty might be called into question. (What WRA was concerned about was the presence or absence of any information which might indicate a potential threat to the national security.) Such a threat, of course, is always represented by a person who is basically disloyal to American institutions. It is not by any means true, however, that all people whose loyalties are tenuous, superficial, or wholly lacking constitute such a threat. Hundreds of the older Issei, to be more specific, could scarcely be expected to have any really deep-rooted loyalty to a nation which had denied them the privilege of naturalization and had frequently discriminated against them in many other ways. Beyond a doubt, many of them cherished a sentimental attachment to the Japan of their youth and were emotionally inclined to hope for a Japanese victory—or at least a stalemate—in the war. Yet there were few of them who could be shown, on the basis of definite evidence, to be dangerous. Likewise, among the Nisei and the Kibei there were many individuals whose faith in American democracy had been severely shaken and whose loyalties were, at least temporarily, uncertain. But there were comparatively few among them who could properly be called "dangerous" in any meaningful sense of the term. Finally, there were in this evacuated group of people, as in practically all other groups, a great many individuals to whom the concept of national loyalty was almost meaningless—people who seldom thought at all deeply about the larger issues involved in the war and who approached practically all problems and decisions strictly from the standpoint of personal or family welfare. All these considerations had to be taken into account by WRA in making the rather crucial decision whether an individual evacuee should be entitled to apply for leave from a relocation center and they need to be borne in mind in any evaluation of the leave clearance process.

The Mass Registration

One Sunday morning around the middle of January 1943, a meeting was held in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War in the Pentagon Building in Washington which had long and far-reaching effects on the lives of the Japanese American people. The Director of WRA and two of his principal staff members, who were summoned to the meeting rather hastily with only a vague advance explanation of its purpose, were told after they arrived that the War Department had a plan for helping evacuated people to regain their prewar status in American life. (The Department had decided, the Assistant Secretary said, to form a special all-Nisei combat team of approximately 5,000 members which would be composed of voluntary recruits both from the relocation centers and from the Hawaiian Islands. The Assistant Secretary added (1) that a form questionnaire designed to bring out the background and national leanings of individual Nisei was then being

prepared by the War Department with the help of Naval intelligence experts, (2) that this questionnaire would be presented to all male Nisei of draft age during a special recruitment drive at the relocation centers, and (3) that recruitment teams of four or five officers and men would be sent to each of the centers to handle the recruitment program within the next few weeks. A special board composed of representatives of several branches of the War Department plus one officer from the Office of Naval Intelligence, he added, was being established to evaluate the responses to the questionnaire and determine the eligibility of the individual Nisei registrants for work in war plants.

This was probably the most encouraging piece of news which WRA had heard in its 10-month history. As far back as the preceding July, the Director had been urging the War Department to make the Nisei eligible for Army service and thus give them a chance to demonstrate their loyalty in the most effective possible manner. Although the War Department plan, based as it was on voluntary recruitment rather than ordinary Selective Service, was not exactly what the Director had been seeking, it was the first major break in the War Department's official attitude toward Japanese Americans and an important milestone in the WRA effort to regain status for the evacuated group. The Director and his associates immediately responded enthusiastically to the general outline of the plan and agreed to cooperate fully in carrying it out. On questions of detail, however, the WRA representatives had a number of suggestions. Visualizing the kind of situation that might develop if Army officers and men should go into the relocation centers with no real conception of the delicate balance of emotions which had produced the Poston and Manzanar incidents and which existed to a greater or less degree at all the centers, the Director recommended that one representative from each of the WRA centers should be called into Washington to participate in a training school which the War Department was planning for its own personnel on the recruitment teams. The Director also requested that WRA be given an opportunity to review all the documents, instructions, and other forms that might be used in the registration program. After the Assistant Secretary had agreed to these proposals, the meeting was adjourned with the understanding that details would be worked out by the appropriate branches of the War Department in consultation with the members of the Employment Division of WRA.

At a WRA staff meeting held a few days later the first link was established between recruitment for the combat team and registration for leave clearance purposes. One of WRA's most serious bottle-necks in the relocation program at this time was the slowness of leave clearance on an individual basis. Ordinarily, evacuees at the centers would not apply for leave clearance until they had a job rather definitely lined up and were practically ready to leave the relocation center. Then the process of making out the necessary forms, clearing the cases both at the center and in Washington, and securing the information from the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation would generally take weeks and even months. By the time clearance was finally

obtained, the job had frequently disappeared and the applicants, as well as the employers, were left invariably disgruntled and discouraged. The principal need, obviously, was to handle leave clearance on a mass basis and build up a backlog of cleared cases so that individual leave permits could be issued promptly as job opportunities developed and relocation plans were completed. Since the Army was going to obtain from the male Nisei of draft age the very kind of information which WRA needed for leave clearance, why not broaden the registration program to take in all adult residents at the centers and turn it into a mass leave clearance operation?

This idea, which seemed an inspiration to most staff members at the time, was promptly presented to the War Department, readily accepted by the Assistant Secretary, and soon started on the road to realization. It was agreed that the registration of male Nisei of draft age should be handled by the War Department teams and that the registration of all other center residents should be the responsibility of the WRA. The Authority quickly developed a questionnaire form for the female Nisei and the Issei of both sexes. It was closely patterned after the special Selective Service questionnaire which the War Department had by this time worked out for the male Nisei but altered slightly to fit the other elements in the center population. Due to an unfortunate slip-up, however, representatives from the 10 centers were not summoned into Washington until almost the eleventh hour before the beginning of the school for the recruitment teams. The Assistant Chief of the Employment Division, who made long distance telephone calls to the centers for these arrangements, has indicated that he was instructed by the War Department not to reveal the purpose for which the center staff members were being brought in. Under these circumstances, because of the shortness of time and the inability of the Assistant Employment Chief to explain the importance of the assignment, it was not surprising that some of the Project Directors took the whole matter rather lightly and sent in to Washington not their top staff members but rather those members of their staffs who could most readily be spared from center duties at the moment. It was the most conspicuous example of faulty advance planning in the history of the WRA program and one which had definitely unfortunate results.

On January 28 the Secretary of War announced the plans for the formation of the all-Nisei combat team to the public. By February 6 the recruitment teams were on their way to the 10 relocation centers. And on February 10 the mass registration started.

The method of handling the registration varied somewhat from center to center. But under the usual procedure the members of the recruitment team conducted a series of mass meetings throughout the center at which they recited prepared statements explaining the purpose of the registration and then read a series of "canned" questions and answers. In the majority of cases, questions from the floor were not permitted although it was explained that every effort would be made to answer questions when the residents came in to register individually.

Initial evacuee reactions to this program were for the most part

confused, troubled, and resentful. Attention was focused first on the "segregated" nature of the combat team and the fact that the Nisei volunteers would not be permitted to serve throughout the Army on the same basis as others. But the most serious objection was soon raised about the wording of a question which appeared as No. 28 both on the WRA and on the Selective Service forms. This question, which had been the subject of some argument between WRA and the War Department before the registration started, was regarded by the Army authorities as the heart of the whole registration procedure. It read—

> Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?

To the great majority of the Issei at the centers this question was not only unfair but almost impossible to answer in the affirmative. It called upon them to renounce the only nationality they had, in the face of the known fact that they could not possibly acquire citizenship in the United States. To answer it affirmatively, they claimed, would have made them "men without a country."

Within a few hours after the registration started, the Issei reaction to this question at the Manzanar center was so pronounced that the Assistant Project Director called the Washington office by long distance telephone and asked permission to use a substitute question in the registration of the Issei which would be more acceptable. Although permission was not specifically granted by the Director at this time, the Manzanar center went ahead with its own proposal. Simultaneously the Director decided that the question would have to be changed on the Issei registration forms at all centers. Accordingly, 4 days after the beginning of the registration, instructions were sent to all centers that the question for the Issei should be revised to read—

> Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?

Although the question in this form was acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Issei, a considerable amount of confusion had already been produced and the Manzanar center had gone too far with the development of its own substitute question to use the same wording as the other centers.

The most acute difficulties in the registration program, however, developed at the Tule Lake center. In this community of nearly 16,000 evacuees, there was a strong-minded and resourceful minority, composed mainly of middle-aged Issei and adolescent Kibei, who were determined to prevent the successful operation of the program at almost any cost. Playing on the fears of Issei parents that their children might be used as "cannon fodder" and developing the theme that there was no real place in American life for people of Japanese descent, they persuaded a large part of the center population to abstain entirely from registering. The Project Director and the Army Captain in charge of the recruitment team, acting on the erroneous assumption that refusal to register was a violation of the Selective Service Act, collab-

orated in rounding up 30 or 40 of the more recalcitrant evacuees and isolating them in a special enclosure on the outskirts of the center. This action served to heighten the tension further and for a time it appeared that an incident of the Manzanar or Poston type might develop at any moment. The temporary community council proved wholly ineffective in attempting to deal with this situation and resigned in a body at the height of the crisis. Ultimately, however, some of the wiser heads in the community prevailed and the major resistance to registration was broken. Nevertheless, the final results of the registration at this center were more unsatisfactory than at any other place. Only 59 Tule Lake Nisei volunteered for Army service; 1,238 answered question 28 in the negative; and approximately 3,000 refused to register.

Both the handling and the results of the registration program at the Granada center provide a sharp and refreshing contrast. After the registration had been going forward for only a few days at this center, the Project Director and many of the more responsible residents of the community took stock of the results and found them highly disturbing. Out of approximately 1,200 eligibles, only 31 Nisei had volunteered for Army service and over a hundred had refused to register. Working in close cooperation, the members of the administrative staff and the community council held a series of meetings throughout the center for the purpose of clarifying the significance of the registration program and driving home to the residents what a desperately important issue this was in the life of the Japanese American people. Inside of a week the number of volunteers had risen from 31 to 124 and the number of non-registrants had been reduced from over a hundred to under 35. Eventually the center had 152 volunteers for Army service which was one of the highest totals at the relocation centers. The top figure was at the Minidoka center where there were 308 volunteers.

Considered in the perspective of 3 years of hindsight, the mass registration and Army recruitment program still stands out as one of the most turbulent periods in the history of the War Relocation Authority. From the standpoint of Army recruitment, the program was a moderate success. Over 1,200 Nisei volunteered for Army service at the 10 centers and over 800 of these passed the loyalty tests as well as the physical examinations and eventually formed the original mainland nucleus of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. From the standpoint of leave clearance, the program accomplished its main purpose of providing a backlog of application forms and thus speeding up the whole relocation process. Out of nearly 78,000 center residents who were eligible to register, almost 75,000 eventually filled out the forms and provided WRA with the information it needed in determining their eligibility for relocation. Approximately 6,700 of the registrants answered "no" to the loyalty question; nearly 2,000 qualified their replies in one way or another; a few hundred failed to answer this particular question on the form; and the overwhelming majority—over 65,000—answered with an unqualified affirmative. The results are presented more fully in Table 3 in the Appendix.

The most disappointing feature of the results to WRA staff members was that over 4,000 male Nisei—nearly 22 percent of the male Nisei registrants—answered question 28 with an unqualified negative. By this time WRA had learned some of the highly complex and subtle factors of disillusionment, family pressure, block pressure, and abnormal community environment that lay behind these results. To many people outside WRA, however, a negative answer to question 28 seemed a clear-cut sign of simple disloyalty to the United States and the number of negative answers recorded at the centers was taken as further evidence of the "racial ties that bound the Nisei to the land of their ancestors." Apparently, it never occurred to some of these critics of the Nisei that actual agents of the Japanese government—if there were any in relocation centers—would be the very last people to record a negative answer to a loyalty question in a government-supervised registration program. If there had been no evacuation and no relocation centers there is not much real reason for thinking that more than a handful of Nisei would have given a negative answer in such a registration.

The Japanese American Joint Board

The Japanese American Joint Board was a direct outgrowth of the mass registration program. It was established by the War Department primarily for the purpose of determining the eligibility of individual Nisei at the relocation centers for work in war plants and began its operations in April 1943 after the registration program had been completed at the centers. It consisted of representatives from several branches of the War Department, one officer from the Office of Naval Intelligence, and one WRA representative. A staff member from the Federal Bureau of Investigation sat in on a few of the early meetings but purely in the capacity of "observer."

The most critical question that arose around the operations of the Board was the relation of its functions to WRA's leave clearance process. From the beginning WRA realized that its success in managing relocation centers and carrying forward a resettlement program depended in very large measure on having full and untrammeled control over this procedure. The Authority was willing, the Director indicated, to accept the recommendations of the Board regarding the advisability of granting leave clearance in individual cases but would not agree, under any circumstances, to surrender or modify its final right to approve or deny. Although this point of view was accepted by the Assistant Secretary of War, some other staff members of the War Department and of the Western Defense Command persisted in regarding the Joint Board primarily as an agency for controlling the leave clearance process and only very secondarily as an agency handling war plant clearance. In the last analysis, they succeeded, WRA feels, in distorting the functions of the Board rather badly.

Originally WRA had high hopes that the operations of the Board would greatly strengthen and speed up the relocation program. The Board, WRA contemplated, would quickly review the registration forms

of individual Nisei and perhaps approve as many as half of the total group for war plant clearance. As the Board's program of review ultimately developed, however, it proved to be a distinct disappointment. Although the Authority had been told that the Board could probably complete its processing of all Nisei cases before the end of June, only a minor fraction of the job was actually finished by that time. In fact, the Board continued until the latter part of May 1944, and still had several hundred unprocessed cases on its agenda when it was finally disestablished. Of nearly 39,000 cases which were handled by the Board, nearly 25,000 recommendations were made for leave clearance and over 13,000 recommendations against. In the case of clearance for work in war plants, the War Department eventually insisted that all dockets (even those which had been favorably passed by the Board for leave clearance) should be transferred to San Francisco for checking against the card index files of the Western Defense Command. This policy, which was adopted shortly after arrival of two WDC representatives in Washington, resulted in a retardation of the whole process to the point where it became virtually meaningless. During the entire 15-month history of the Board's operations, less than 500 Nisei were given clearance for work in war plants and not all of these by any means were actually employed in such work.

General DeWitt's Segregation Plan

Although WRA decided at the San Francisco policy conference in August to postpone the question of segregation until the subject could be more carefully studied and thought through, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command did not share this point of view. During the fall of 1942 General DeWitt submitted a number of varied recommendations to the War Department for a segregation program to be carried out at WRA centers. All of these were rejected by the WRA Director. In December after the Director had criticized the "piecemeal" nature of the earlier WDC proposals, General DeWitt sent forward a more comprehensive segregation plan which was transmitted to WRA by the Assistant Secretary of War on December 30.

This plan, phrased in the strangely stilted prose of a typical War Department "directive," was probably the most shocking proposal ever made to WRA by another agency in the history of the program. It called for the segregation, on a designated day and without any advance notification whatever, of (1) all persons who had requested repatriation or expatriation to Japan, (2) all aliens paroled to WRA centers from detention stations or internment camps, (3) all evacuees with "evaluated" police records at the assembly or relocation centers, (4) all persons "listed and evaluated by the intelligence service as potentially dangerous," and (5) all immediate family members of persons in the first four categories who might wish to join them. On the designated day the segregants were to be picked up and transferred as rapidly as possible to units two and three of the Colorado River Relocation Center which would then become the segregation center. All

persons in these two units not designated for segregation would be moved simultaneously to the other centers. The whole program was to be carried out under the general supervision of a Director of Segregation, who was to be appointed jointly by the Secretary of War and the Director of the War Relocation Authority and who was to have virtually unlimited control over relocation center operations until the program had been completed. "Of prime necessity," the plan read, "is the establishment of suitable security measures in order to insure against *probable* rioting and consequent bloodshed. (Italics supplied.) This in turn will compel the temporary suspension of certain normal project operations in order that the paramount objective can be accommodated." More specifically the plan contemplated that on the designated day for the segregation movement: (1) each center would be placed under complete military control; (2) all incoming and outgoing communication at the projects (except for messages essential to the segregation operation) would be stopped; (3) all leaves, furloughs, and visiting privileges would be suspended and all project activities (such as agricultural work) carried on beyond the center limits proper would be called to a halt.

Upon receiving this proposal, the Director of WRA immediately submitted it to several of his principal staff members and asked for their comments. Among the most pointed comments made were those submitted by the head of the Community Analysis Section and by the Solicitor. Pointing out that General DeWitt's proposal would "remove the last vestige of citizenship rights of Japanese Americans," the Community Analysis Head declared that it would "solve none of the present problems of WRA." He added—

> Simply removing thousands of individuals from the present centers to a segregation center does not remove the causes of social disorganization in relocation centers. This disorganization has been brought about by the original evacuation experience, which seriously undermined the family and community organization of the evacuees. Together with this social disorganization there has been produced inevitably a breakdown in the social controls exercised by family and community organization. Added to this have been the serious psychological wounds suffered by the American citizen group, two-thirds of the total. These factors, together with the conditions of center life (families in single rooms, common mess halls, barbed wire fences, etc.), produced social conditions requiring a constructive administration if the evacuee population is not to be completely lost.

The Solicitor's memorandum to the Director on General DeWitt's proposal was even more detailed and more sharply worded. He wrote—

> I believe this segregation plan is thoroughly bad. The entire procedure proposes to treat the evacuees as though they were so many blocks of wood, with complete disregard of the rights and liberties, not to mention the fears and sensibilities, they share with other human beings. If this plan were applied as proposed, I believe it would create widespread consternation and terror among the evacuees. I should hate to be present in one of our relocation centers on the [segregation day] for which this plan provides. I cannot refrain from saying that this document is much more compatible with the Nazi psychology of our enemies than with the democratic psychology we are fighting for. Further, I have the most serious doubts as to the plan's constitutionality if applied to citizens of the United States. * * * The President established the War Relocation Authority to administer the relocation program, after he had already provided that the evacuation program was to be admin-

istered by the Army. Obviously, he felt that a civilian agency was the appropriate agency to administer the program after evacuation itself had been completed. I know of no reason why the Authority should ignore this obvious purpose of the President and call upon the Army to reassume so large a part of the administrative responsibility for relocation activities.

In another part of his memorandum the Solicitor comments specifically on the four main classes of people designated for segregation in General DeWitt's proposal. He pointed out—

The first class includes all who have indicated a desire to accept repatriation. There is considerable reason to believe that many of the evacuees who expressed such a desire did so in the first flush of anger and resentment of evacuation. Many have changed their minds. There is almost no evidence in the case of most of these that they are exercising an undesirable influence in the centers or are making trouble for anybody.

The second group includes all aliens paroled from detention or internment camps. We have been informed by high officers among those administering the alien enemy program that many persons of Japanese ancestry were interned at the beginning of the war unjustifiably and that many of these have since been paroled to relocation centers. * * *

The next group mentioned are evacuees "having an evaluated interior security police record during assembly center or relocation center residence." * * * I believe that many members of such a group may very well need to be segregated—but certainly not under such procedures as are proposed in the present segregation plan.

The next group are those who are listed and evaluated by the intelligence services as "potentially dangerous." The phrase "potentially dangerous" is one that needs to be used with caution. I suspect that the author of the present segregation plan could easily become "potentially dangerous" to the internal security of the United States if he and his family were made the victims of precisely the segregation plan that he has here suggested for more than 60,000 of his fellow citizens. If we do a good job of administering our relocation centers some of the "potentially dangerous" may lose that potential and become good Americans. Some others may become actually dangerous and can then be dealt with on that basis.

Early in January the Director orally informed the Assistant Secretary of War that he had no intention of accepting General DeWitt's proposal.

The Pressure for Segregation

Throughout the fall and winter of 1942 and 1943, however, a great many WRA staff employees, particularly those at the relocation centers, came increasingly to favor some type of segregation program. The Project Directors, struggling with the problem of creating stable communities with populations which seemed to have sharply divergent points of view, were especially outspoken on behalf of such a redistribution of the center populations. Although the isolation center had been established to meet this need, many of the Project Directors felt that a far more drastic solution was required. The problem lay, they argued, not merely in the presence of a few persistent and aggravated trouble-makers at the centers but in the larger portion of the center population which was out of sympathy with America's war aims and bent on a quiet and subtle kind of resistance to all the administration's really important objectives.

The difficulties in the segregation program, as visualized by the Director and some of his principal staff members in Washington, were

three-fold: (1) the tremendous complexity of the classification problem and the consequent danger of doing a grave injustice to hundreds of essentially blameless people, (2) the seriously disrupting effect which such a segregation movement would almost certainly have on a group of people who had already been moved from their homes to assembly centers and then again into relocation centers, and (3) the highly practical problem of finding or building a camp large enough to accommodate the segregated population. By the turn of the year, the Director had decided that all center residents who requested the privilege of moving to Japan should be segregated from the remainder of the center population. Such people, he felt, had indicated their preference for the Japanese way of life and would actually be better adjusted in a community by themselves. During the winter WRA spent a great deal of time searching for camp facilities not currently in use where this particular element of the population in the 10 centers might be brought together. All efforts to find such facilities, however, were fruitless. Furthermore, any thought of building a new center for the segregants was virtually ruled out of consideration by the shortage of building materials.

Starting in late January, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, under the chairmanship of Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky, conducted an investigation of the WRA program to determine whether the functions of the agency should be transferred to the War Department. Such a transfer had been advocated by Senator Mon C. Wallgren of Washington in a bill which had been referred to the Military Affairs Committee. In the course of a hasty field trip to several of the relocation centers, Senator Chandler was quoted in the press as having said that "as many as 60 percent" of the evacuees at one center had been found disloyal. Adding his opinion that the disloyal evacuees stood ready to commit "almost any act for their Emperor," the Senator was also reported to have come out strongly in favor of an immediate segregation program at the centers. In a letter of April 8 to the Director of WRA, Senator Chandler reported that at the hearings conducted by his subcommittee "those interrogated held the opinion that those who answered 'no' to the loyalty question and those otherwise determined to be disloyal should be placed in internment camps." WRA's reply, dated April 13, was tentative and cautious. "It is our opinion," the Acting Director wrote Senator Chandler, "that a separation must be made and we are planning to make one." Just what type of separation and how extensive it would be were not specified.

Throughout this whole period, however, the Authority was constantly studying the segregation problem. In fact, a committee under the chairmanship of the Deputy Director had already considered a number of specific proposals and was beginning to narrow the question down to its essential elements by the time Senator Chandler's subcommittee completed its investigation. Toward the end of May, a meeting of all 10 Project Directors with the National Director and the principal Washington staff members was held in the headquarters office of the agency. At this meeting, the segregation problem was discussed at great

length and a conscientious effort was made to obtain the fullest possible expression of the views of the Project Directors. Although there was considerable difference of opinion about the details of any segregation procedure, all 10 of the Project Directors came out strongly in favor of a segregation program of one kind or another and nearly all urged that it should be put into effect as soon as possible. In the face of this unanimity of opinion, the Director, who still had rather substantial personal misgivings about the wisdom of segregation, felt that he had almost no alternative except to go along. Remarking that he still regarded relocation as "the only civilized way" of separating the two types of evacuees, he nevertheless made segregation the first order of business of the agency and instructed the Deputy Director's committee to sharpen up a workable plan at the earliest possible date.

The Segregation Policy

One of the first decisions the segregation committee had to make was the selection of a segregation center. From the results of the registration program and the volume of repatriation requests, it was clear that this would have to be one of the centers with a comparatively large population capacity. Since the segregants would not be eligible for relocation, it was also plainly desirable that the segregation center should have the necessary facilities and resources for a fairly large-scale evacuee employment program of the type which had originally been planned for all 10 WRA centers. Three of the centers—Gila River, Colorado River, and Tule Lake—met these two requirements in varying degrees. The one major point which ultimately swung the decision to Tule Lake was that this one center had a much larger proportion of the potential segregants already in residence than any of the others. Selection of Tule Lake, in other words, meant the movement of less people in and out, by quite a margin, than would have been the case at either of the two Arizona centers.

In addition, the committee recommended that, once the segregation movements were completed, the segregation center should not have a relocation program and a community government program of the type which had been authorized at the other centers. These recommendations, which were adopted as official policy for the segregation center, helped in large part to give Tule Lake the peculiar character which it subsequently acquired.

While these decisions were being made, the committee was also working to define more precisely the types of people who should be segregated and the procedure that should be followed in making the final determinations. Most of the members of the committee and most other WRA staff officers felt at this time that there should be little or no doubt about the segregation of those who had requested the privilege of moving to Japan. This one group had been singled out for segregation in some of the earliest of the agency's proposals and seemed to present the fewest complications and difficulties.

Under the policy finally adopted, all those who had requested the

privilege of moving to Japan and who had not withdrawn their requests before July 1, 1943, were designated for segregation without further consideration. The second major group of potential segregants included those who had answered "no" to the loyalty question during registration. In contrast to the repatriate group, these persons were given special hearings and an opportunity to reconsider and explain their original answers. Those who satisfied the hearing officers that their original answers were not motivated by actual feelings of disloyalty were recommended for clearance; those who stood by their original answers or failed to convince the hearing officers of the sincerity of their reconsideration were designated for segregation. The third group of segregants took in all those who were not included in the first two groups but who were denied leave clearance by the Director of WRA on the basis of some accumulation of adverse evidence in their records. The fourth group consisted of the immediate family members of the segregants who chose to remain with them.

Profiting by the very nearly disastrous results of inadequate communication and faulty understanding of basic policies and procedures during the registration program, WRA made a special effort to plan the details of the segregation program carefully in advance. The Field Assistant Director normally stationed in Denver was assigned to the Washington office for a period of several weeks to work out the physical details of the movement. He eventually developed a set of plans covering train schedules, personal property transfers, and reception arrangements down to the most minute details. These plans, which resulted in an extremely smooth, almost eventless, mass transfer, were later used as the model for all subsequent large-scale population movements carried out under WRA supervision.

Meanwhile, a number of staff members from Washington having the greatest familiarity with the segregation plan met with representatives from all 10 centers at Denver toward the end of July. At this meeting the policy details of the program were comprehensively discussed, specific questions that might be raised by the evacuees were anticipated, and a considerable amount of explanatory literature, aimed both at the project staffs and at the evacuees, was produced. Practically all center representatives at the meeting expressed great satisfaction with this systematic method of handling, and asserted their confidence that the program could be carried through without serious difficulties at the centers.

The Segregation Movements

This confidence proved to be well founded. Although there were many individual cases of evacuees who felt that they were segregated unjustifiably, the majority of center residents—both segregant and nonsegregant—appeared to understand and appreciate the policy and to welcome the separation process. By early September the hearings for those who had given negative answers to the loyalty question were practically completed at most centers and the job became mainly one of arranging all the multifarious details of a rather large population movement between Tule Lake and the other 9 centers.

The major segregation movements took place over a period of about one month between the middle of September and the middle of October. They involved a total of 33 train trips and the movement of nearly 15,000 evacuees. Of the total number moved, approximately 6,200 were nonsegregant residents of Tule Lake who were distributed among six of the other centers (Manzanar, Colorado River, and Gila River were not among the receiving centers) while the remainder were segregants and their immediate family members moving into Tule Lake. Since this latter movement increased the population of Tule Lake to the limit of its housing capacity, not all of the segregants and their immediate family members could be moved immediately. A group of approximately 1,800 Manzanar residents who had been scheduled for movement to Tule Lake were held at their original center while additional housing was constructed at the segregation center through the winter months. In the early spring of 1944, with several additional blocks of barracks completed, these Manzanar transferees were moved in. Later in the spring the population of Tule Lake was further increased by the arrival of comparatively small contingents from Colorado River, Rohwer, and Jerome.

The Background of the Tule Lake Incident

Because of the comparative smoothness of the main segregation movements, there was a tendency in WRA to assume that both the segregation center and the other 9 centers would be more harmonious communities after the separation had been carried out. Nevertheless, several members of the Washington staff were sent on detail to Tule Lake during the early fall of 1943 to study the peculiar problems of administration there and make specific recommendations. Unfortunately, however, most of these people were caught up in the tremendous physical job of receiving and accommodating the influx from the other centers and there was little time for any really intensive and systematic thinking about the problems that might lie ahead in the administration of Tule Lake.

On October 15—at just about the time when the last of the contingents from other centers were arriving at Tule Lake—an accident occurred which quickly precipitated serious conflict between the administration and a large percentage of the residents. This accident involved a crew of agricultural workers who were being transported from the main residential area to the project farm. A truck in which they were riding was overturned, several of the workers were injured, and one of them subsequently died.

Some of the dissident leaders in the center quickly seized upon this incident and converted it into a major issue. Their complaint, basically, was that they were being called upon to produce food not only for use at Tule Lake but also for use at the other 9 centers. Since most of the people at Tule Lake had expressed a deliberate preference for the Japanese way of life, these leaders argued, they had no significant relationship with the people at the nine other centers and should not be expected to produce for their benefit. This line of argument fell on

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receptive ears among the agricultural workers and a full-scale farm strike immediately became effective.

The administration, faced with the prospect of losing thousands of pounds of potatoes and barley which were badly needed at the other centers, called upon the Washington office to recruit farm workers for the harvest of the Tule Lake crops from the other centers. Such a program was swiftly initiated and several dozen volunteers from the other centers began moving to the Tule Lake farm toward the end of October. These volunteers, significantly, were not quartered in the community with the other Tule Lake residents but were provided with temporary accommodations on the outskirts of the center.

On October 26 a committee of evacuees, purporting to represent the community at large, called upon the Project Director and presented a series of demands, including a demand that all agricultural production on the project farm should be exclusively for the benefit of Tule Lake residents. The members of this committee insisted also that Tule Lake was still a long way from a homogenous community, that its population included not only people who actually preferred the Japanese way of life but a great many "fence-sitters" and a great many others who had chosen the path of segregation merely as a way of avoiding the necessity of relocation. These latter elements, the committeemen contended, should be separated from the genuinely pro-Japanese residents of the community in what they called a "resegregation" movement. Once this move had been made, they insisted that their particular group should be given the responsibility for establishing a community government and insuring a harmonious and cooperative community. They also demanded a number of physical improvements in the center and hinted rather strongly that several key members of the center staff should be discharged for incompetence or dishonesty or both.

The Project Director agreed that agricultural production at Tule Lake in the future should be confined to meeting the needs of that one center but refused to accept any of the committee's other recommendations. Reminding the committee that National WRA policy for the segregation center did not include community government in the ordinary pattern, he stated that an advisory group of the residents would eventually have to be established and that he would consider recommendations made by such a committee. He added, however, that he was not regarding the current committee as a properly representative advisory committee and that the selection of an advisory committee would have to wait until all the incoming residents had been received and the whole community was somewhat better settled down. The committee members indicated rather clearly that they were not satisfied and the meeting was adjourned in a prevailing atmosphere of subdued hostility and tension.

The Events of November 1-4

Six days after this meeting in the Project Director's office, on November 1, the National Director arrived at Tule Lake for a brief tour of

inspection and consultation with the key staff members. Shortly after the lunch hour, a crowd of approximately 5,000 residents, who had been summoned by unauthorized announcements made by evacuees in the mess halls, gathered outside the administration building where the National Director and the Project Director were in conference. Abruptly and without advance consultation a committee, composed mainly of the same men who had visited the Project Director one week earlier, then came into the building and asked for a conference. The National Director, who had agreed to meet with the committee on the following day, pointed this fact out to the committeemen but finally consented to have a discussion with them immediately.

The demands of the committee were basically similar to those which had been presented on October 26. This time, however, the committeemen were considerably less restrained and far more specific in their complaints and accusations. Among other things, they called for the immediate dismissal of the Project Director and several members of his staff. After giving the committeemen a full opportunity to present their case, the National Director told them that he was not prepared to negotiate on the basis of "demands," that the center staff would be ready to entertain recommendations or requests from any properly constituted and representative group of the residents, and that he seriously doubted the representative character of this particular committee. This message was conveyed, both in English and in Japanese, to the crowd assembled outside the building and the whole gathering soon dispersed.

In addition to the meeting in the administration building, one other incident occurred on the afternoon of November 1 at Tule Lake which was later to become an issue of some importance in congressional investigation. Before the meeting was actually under way, it was interrupted by a telephone call from the hospital indicating that a group of young male evacuees had broken into that building, engaged in a heated argument with the chief medical officer, and finally beaten him rather badly. This development, subsequent investigation proved rather definitely, was not part of the elaborate plan which the committeemen and their associates had obviously worked out in advance. Nevertheless, it threatened for a time to disrupt the negotiations in the administration building. But after some initial confusion, it was eventually established that order had been restored in the hospital and that the chief medical officer was not seriously injured. Upon receiving this word, the Director agreed to go ahead with the conference.

For the next 2 days, after the National Director had left the center, the community remained tense but quiet. Then on the night of November 4, with practically no advance warning, violence broke out. A well-organized group of young men, including many who had played a part in assembling and controlling the crowd outside the administration building 3 days earlier, moved into the administrative section of the center armed with clubs and bent on preventing the removal of food from the warehouses to the volunteer harvest workers at the farm. In the melée that followed one Caucasian member of the

internal security staff was injured and a converging movement in the direction of the Project Director's house was started. At this point the troops outside the center were summoned in to restore order and to assume control of the center for an indefinite period. Tule Lake was not restored to civilian supervision until January 14, 1944.

This, in outline, is the essence of what happened at Tule Lake in the most explosive period of its life as a segregation center. The Tule Lake disturbance was unquestionably the biggest news story in the history of the WRA program. It produced an almost bewildering array of misconceptions, distorted reporting, and downright lies. In a later section of this report the incident will be more thoroughly analyzed from the standpoint of its effect on public attitudes and some comparison will be made between the picture of the incident presented to the public by certain newspapers and the actual happenings as revealed by careful documentary study. The main point to note here is that Tule Lake was plunged into an atmosphere of tension, fear, and suspicion before it was more than a month old as a segregation center. It never recovered fully from the profoundly disrupting effect of this initial flareup.

The Progress of Leave Clearance

While the Tule Lake Center was being transformed from an ordinary WRA community into a place of detention dominated by terroristic elements and eventually by military control, the Authority was moving steadily ahead in the other centers in its efforts to single out those members of the evacuee population, over and above the repatriate group and the persistent negativists on the loyalty question, whose records seemed to indicate that they should be denied the right of indefinite leave from the relocation center. As the head of the Leave Clearance Section indicates in his final report, "the WRA had to decide whether it should become a separate investigative agency, duplicating in large measure the work of existing intelligence agencies, or whether it should utilize the records of those agencies. The latter course was chosen."

The mechanics of the leave clearance process revolved largely around the review and analysis of "dockets" containing all the essential information which had been gathered on the individual evacuee. In a substantial majority of cases the dockets included no significantly derogatory information and could be recommended for leave clearance rather promptly. Whenever there were negative items in the docket—including such things as an adverse report from one of the intelligence agencies, negative recommendations from the Japanese American Joint Board, or a combination of personal background factors indicating some possibility of substantial pro-Japanese leanings—the docket was passed on to a special leave clearance review committee. This committee, which began its review work in August 1943, eventually passed judgment on more than 11,000 dockets. As the volume of work grew increasingly heavy and the original members of the committee found themselves frequently diverted by other pressing assignments,

a very large percentage of the Washington staff members of the agency and a considerable number of employees from the centers and the relocation field offices were eventually called upon to take part in the reviewing operations.

In all cases where the review committee felt, and the Director agreed, that further investigation was needed, a notice was sent out to the appropriate center, the applicant's docket was placed in a "stop" file at the center, and arrangements were made for a hearing to be held by a Board composed of several members of the center staff. If the hearing brought out additional information which seemed to indicate that the applicant was not actually a threat to the national security, the Board would recommend the granting of leave clearance to the Project Director who, in turn, would refer the case back to the Washington office with his own recommendations. Out of over 11,000 cases in which hearings were held, approximately 8,600 were eventually granted leave clearance, over 1,400 were denied, and around 1,300 were not finally passed upon. After revocation of the exclusion order and abolition of WRA's leave procedures, this latter group was placed on the same basis as other center residents.

In order to provide a further recourse for those who were denied leave clearance, the Director established a Board of Appeals, to be selected from a panel of prominent citizens outside of WRA, shortly after completion of the main segregation movements. All evacuees who had been denied leave clearance were given the right of appealing to this Board. Although the Board was advisory only and the Director was not compelled to follow its recommendations, he actually did so in all cases. From the time when it started functioning in July of 1944 through the summer and fall of that year, the Board reviewed a total of 19 cases. Twelve of these cases were recommended to the Director for leave clearance, four were recommended for denial, and three resulted in split decisions.

Although the original segregation policy called for the transfer to Tule Lake of all leave clearance denial cases, this was not actually possible because of the limited housing capacity at the segregation center. Only about half of the 1,400 persons denied clearance were ever moved to Tule Lake. A few hundred of those who did go were in the original segregation movements of the early fall of 1943; the others either were transferred as part of the smaller group movements which took place in the spring of 1944 or were moved to the segregation center from time to time on an individual basis.

Tule Lake in 1944

After the Army took over control of the segregation center on the night of November 4, the evacuees who had taken part in the violent events of that evening were immediately rounded up and isolated in a fenced off portion of the center. During the next few days other residents of the center who had not been caught in the administration area on the night of the 4th, but who were suspected of implication in

the incident, were also moved to this isolation section. Meanwhile, WRA, which was merely advising the Army on details of center operations during this period, began an effort to increase the force of non-evacuee internal security officers and started making plans for administration of the center after the Army had relinquished control.

When WRA resumed the management of the segregation center, a little over 2 months after the incident, it was strongly apparent that the community was split into a number of antagonistic and competing factions. Most of the leaders who organized and directed the incidents of early November had subsequently suffered a loss of prestige in the community and were no longer a significant factor to be considered. In their place, however, a number of other evacuees with a proclivity for leadership were attempting to mobilize the feelings of discontent, protest, and resentment which lay constantly simmering under the external calm of the community. Inside of a few weeks after the center had been returned to WRA control, these elements had succeeded in organizing the first of the so-called "patriotic" societies which were to play such a large part in the subsequent life of Tule Lake.

The history of these societies is too complex to be described in detail here. They were almost constantly in the process of reorganizing, changing leadership, coalescing, changing their names, and subdividing. Although they occasionally differed from one another and sometimes suffered internal dissensions in their responses to specific issues of project administration, they were all dedicated fundamentally to what they regarded as the "Japanese way of life" and were generally determined to make the task of the Tule Lake administrative staff as difficult as possible.

To counteract these activities and work toward some semblance of harmony in the community, the administrative staff began in the spring of 1944 an effort to establish good working relationships with some of the more responsible elements of the population. Immediately after the transfer of the center back to civilian control, the biggest problem was to encourage a "back to work" movement by the hundreds of evacuees who had been on strike during the period of Army supervision. A so-called "coordinating committee," including several leaders of the evacuee-managed Business Enterprise Association and a number of other rather widely respected residents, was formed to spearhead this particular drive. By the end of April this group had accomplished the main purpose for which it was organized and was discontinued.

Simultaneously, the administration let it be known that leave clearance hearings of the type held at other centers would be conducted at Tule Lake for those who had been segregated without an actual denial of clearance and who now wished to clear their records. Publication of a mimeographed community newspaper, which had been suspended during the period of Army supervision, was resumed. And a number of the evacuees who had been confined in the isolation area or "stockade" were released and permitted to resume their normal residence in the community. Several of the aliens in the stockade, however, were transferred to internment camps, while a group of about 20 of the more

recalcitrant inmates of the stockade were detained there until the latter part of the summer. In July, after an abortive and exhibitionistic attempt at a hunger strike, the recalcitrants finally agreed to abide by the center regulations and were ultimately released.

During the period of agitation around the stockade issue, it became increasingly apparent that there were two major groupings of the Tule Lake residents. On one side were the members of the patriotic societies and a number of other residents who were sympathetic in varying degrees with their basic aims. On the other was the more stable element in the community represented by the Business Enterprise group, a large number of the block managers, and several of the Issei who functioned more or less in the capacity of elder statesmen. The cleavage between the two groups was brought sharply into focus in early June when the general manager of the Business Enterprise Association was mysteriously murdered. This event, which deepened the atmosphere of terror permeating the community, had the effect of putting the patriotic society group temporarily in the ascendency.

Throughout the fall, however, the main body of the population seemed to be badly vacillating and confused. Although many of the residents deeply resented the obstructive, arrogant tactics of the patriotic societies and were highly annoyed by the early-morning marching and drilling exercises which they sponsored among the more pliant young men, these same residents were fearful of expressing their resentments too openly. Furthermore, many of them were deeply distrustful of the WRA administration and thus inclined to believe that the patriotic societies "might do some good" despite their regrettable excesses. By the middle of December, Tule Lake was ripe for a spell of community-wide hysteria. The residents had been removed from a normal environment for so long and had been subjected to so many disappointments, fears, and frustrations that they were virtually a case study in mass neurosis. In many instances their perspective even on the minor details of daily living was badly distorted. It is scarcely surprising that when they were faced with one of the most solemn decisions of their lives, large numbers of them responded in a way which other Americans, living in a normal environment, find it exceedingly difficult to understand or appreciate.

The Renunciation of Citizenship

On July 1, 1944, the President signed Public Law 405 of the 78th Congress which was an amendment to the Nationality Code of the United States. Under the Code there had been up to that time eight methods under which an American citizen might lose his citizenship. Public Law 405 added a ninth: it provided that a person shall lose his United States citizenship by "making in the United States a formal written renunciation of nationality in such form as may be prescribed by, and before such officer as may be designated by, the Attorney General, whenever the United States shall be in a state of war and the

Attorney General shall approve such renunciation as not contrary to the interests of national defense."

Although this law makes no reference whatever to persons of Japanese descent and is actually applicable to American citizens of any ancestry, it was enacted with the Nisei group, and more particularly the group of recalcitrants at Tule Lake, primarily in mind. During the spring of 1944 a number of bills had been introduced in Congress by members of the California delegation which would have taken away the American citizenship of any Nisei who answered "no" to the loyalty question or who was believed to be disloyal for some other reason. Against this kind of background, Attorney General Biddle had recommended to Congress in the early spring the bill which was finally enacted as Public Law 405. WRA, which at first opposed the bill, later agreed with the Department of Justice that it might have some value as a means of heading off more sweeping legislation of the same type—in the event that such legislation seemed likely to be enacted. As the spring wore on and conditions at Tule Lake became somewhat better stabilized, WRA tended to forget about the bill which by this time was in a comparatively inactive status in the Congress. Around the end of June, however, the bill was suddenly activated and quickly passed.

During the fall a number of conferences were held between the WRA and the Department of Justice in an effort to work out procedures for handling the renunciation applications. In these conferences WRA repeatedly emphasized the abnormal character of the Tule Lake community, the strong tendency of many Nisei in that center to take almost any step as a means of avoiding Selective Service, and the fears of "forced relocation" which had prompted many evacuees to choose the path of segregation. By the time the Department of Justice was ready to begin its renunciation hearings at Tule Lake, the War Department was already well along with its plans to revoke the west coast mass exclusion orders and WRA was putting the final touches on its liquidation program. Although the Director tried to persuade the Department of Justice officials that this was "the worst possible time" to conduct renunciation hearings at the segregation center, the Department went ahead with its plans and sent a team of hearing officers to Tule Lake toward the end of the year.

Almost immediately the center was thrown into an acute state of tension and turmoil. The patriotic societies, seeing an unparalleled opportunity to increase their membership and enhance their prestige in the community, stepped up their early-morning demonstrations to a new pitch, kept the community constantly stirred up with a bewildering series of rumors about impending governmental action, and brought all sorts of pressure to bear on the young Nisei and Kibei to renounce their citizenship. In this campaign they were greatly aided by many of the Issei parents who saw in renunciation a means of holding the family together, avoiding Selective Service for their draft-age sons, and increasing the prospect of an early return to Japan. Although the armies of General MacArthur were by this time well entrenched in the Philippines, many of the more fanatical of the resi-

dents of Tule Lake were firmly convinced that a Japanese victory was imminent and even some of the more balanced and better informed residents were inclined to discount most of the war news as "American propaganda."

During the winter and spring of 1944 and 1945 the Attorney General received approximately 5,700 applications for renunciation of citizenship under the provisions of Public Law 405. Over 95 percent of these came from Tule Lake and the renunciant group soon became an important element in the population of that center. Meanwhile, the WRA administration at Tule Lake had taken a number of steps to reduce the influence of the patriotic societies and introduce some semblance of a normal atmosphere into the community. During the spring the Project Director published a series of regulations prohibiting the wearing of Japanese nationalistic insignia, forbidding participation in nationalistic marching or other demonstrations, and outlawing practically all of the other distinctive activities in which the members of the societies were engaging. As a further step in this direction, arrangements were made with the Department of Justice for transferring some of the most ardent Issei and renunciant members of the societies from Tule Lake to the internment camps near Bismarck, N. D., and Santa Fe, N. M. By the end of the summer approximately 1,200 renunciants had been removed from Tule Lake under this procedure.

The Army's Program of Individual Exclusion and Detention

When the War Department revoked the mass exclusion orders on December 17, 1944, WRA closed its leave clearance operations almost at once. The Western Defense Command, however, continued to exclude a sizeable number of individual evacuees from the proscribed west coast area and designated a number of others for indefinite detention. Although Tule Lake had a larger number of these excludees and detainees than any other WRA center, there were a great many residents of the segregation center who were immediately freed under the Army's regulations to resettle anywhere they liked. Shortly before the revocation announcement the Western Defense Command informed WRA that there would be not more than 5,000 or 6,000 individual excludees and detainees altogether. Actually, however, the total number of people on the various lists originally was nearly 10,000. As the WDC investigated some of these cases more deeply and conducted hearings for some of the detainees, the size of the lists was gradually reduced.

The effect of this program on the Tule Lake center was extremely far-reaching. Although only a minority of the residents were ever actually on the detainee list, the number of people affected—through family ties with detainees—was a substantial majority of the population. On September 4, a few weeks after VJ day, the War Department rescinded all individual exclusion and detention orders and all further control over the movements of the Japanese people in the United States. The Department of Justice, however, continued to exercise its controls over enemy aliens and over the renunciant group.

At this point WRA tried to impress upon the officials of the Department of Justice the importance of clarifying the status of the various people at Tule Lake as rapidly as possible. These officials, however, chose to let the Tule Lake situation rest for a period of several weeks and then let it be known in October that they were making plans to deport as soon as possible practically all renunciants and any family members who might wish to join them. After WRA tried several times unsuccessfully to persuade the Department of Justice that such a step would result in a grave injustice to thousands of basically blameless people, Secretary Ickes eventually brought the question to the attention of Attorney General Clark in a letter of November 1. He wrote—

> I believe that it would be unjust in the extreme to treat all renunciants as a class, without individual differentiation, and to assume that they would all be dangerous to the national security or would otherwise be undesirable aliens. The renunciants fall into two wholly distinct groups and different action is required for each. I understand that it is a regular procedure of the Department of Justice to make administrative investigations through the Immigration and Naturalization Service to establish the facts concerning the legality of and the need for deportation in particular cases before undertaking deportation. Such investigations or hearings are clearly needed in the case of the renunciants, and I recommend most urgently that they be held. Unless they are held, I think that the deportation of the renunciants could in many cases be called seriously into question on the grounds of legality, justice, and plain human decency.

On December 10 the Justice Department officials at the Tule Lake center announced that hearings would be held for all renunciants who did not wish to go to Japan.

Meanwhile, however, the Department had made arrangements for transporting to Japan all alien Japanese and all renunciants who expressed a desire to go voluntarily. On November 25 a group of over 400 "die-hards" from Tule Lake and about a thousand from internment camps—all of them unattached males—embarked from Seattle. On December 29 a much larger sailing of volunteers, including over 3,500 men, women, and children from Tule Lake and around 700 people from the internment camps, took place. The last sailing that included people from WRA centers occurred on February 25 when a group of over 400 from Tule Lake were joined by approximately 200 from internment camps. All told, approximately 8,000 people of Japanese descent, including about 4,700 from WRA centers, have gone to Japan.

Around the middle of December 1945 a great many American newspapers carried a dispatch datelined Uraga, Japan, which indicated what lay at the end of the road for these people who had been through evacuation, life in a relocation center, mass registration, leave clearance or segregation hearings, segregation to Tule Lake, renunciation of their citizenship, and the long ocean voyage to the land of their ancestors. One of the news stories read—

> They were placed in a reception center, consisting of filthy barracks abandoned by the Japanese Army. Their first meal consisted of a small bowl of rice and a pickled apricot. They complained about the food and were told that they were lucky to get it. That thousands of persons were starving in Japan. They didn't like it and they wished they had never come to Japan—but they knew it was too late.

The Management of Centers

The [WRA] Administration's ability to gain the people's confidence depended on its ability to meet their needs—as is the situation with all administrations, anywhere, anytime.

From "The Governing of Men" by Alexander H. Leighton, 1945.

IDEALLY the War Relocation Authority should have had a complete set of operating policies drawn up and ready to go into effect when the first contingent of 54 evacuees arrived at the gates of the Colorado River Relocation Center on May 8, 1942. Actually it was 3 weeks after this date before the agency produced a set of policies which were then frankly labeled by the Director as "tentative, still fairly crude, and subject to immediate change." And it was not until August, when more than half of the evacuee population had been transferred to WRA supervision, that the Authority was able to provide the centers with carefully conceived and really dependable answers to some of the more basic questions of community management.

The chief reason for the delay in producing a reliable set of basic policies lies in the fact that WRA had to start virtually from scratch. It is true, of course, that both the Army and the Civilian Conservation Corps had developed expertness over a period of years in the management of camps and that the Office of Indian Affairs had a considerable background of experience in supervising a racial minority element of the population. But no agency—governmental or private—had ever been called upon before to care for the needs of a tenth of a million men, women, and children who had been uprooted from their homes under a cloud of widespread popular distrust in time of total war. The problems of managing camps under these conditions were so unprecedented, so complex, and so unpredictable that the process of policy formulation continued, at varying levels of intensity, throughout the major part of the agency's active life. Nevertheless, the principal outlines of center management policy were laid down in 1942—in tentative form in a statement issued at the Washington office on May 29 and then, somewhat more thoughtfully and against a brief background of actual operating experience, in an agency conference held at San Francisco in the middle of August.

Evacuee Employment and Compensation

Throughout the entire period of Milton Eisenhower's directorship in the spring of 1942 and for several weeks after he left the agency in June, WRA wrestled almost constantly with the problem of developing

suitable work projects for the evacuated people at or near the relocation centers. This theme runs like a persistent thread through practically all WRA official statements of that period; it accounted for a large share of the agency's 1942 correspondence and dominated nearly every staff meeting from April through October.

There were three primary reasons for this emphasis. In the first place, it was a period of growing manpower shortage—a period when the Nation was buckling down to the biggest production job in its history and when wastage of human skills and energies in any sector of the economy could scarcely be tolerated. Secondly, it was sharply recognized by key WRA staff members that prolonged idleness at the relocation centers would be exceedingly harmful to the evacuees themselves: it would, in all probability, sharpen the frustrations they were already feeling as a result of the evacuation and deepen their sense of isolation from the American scene. The third reason was perhaps most effectively stated by the Deputy Director of the agency in a memorandum written to the new Director on June 18, the day after the latter took office. The Deputy Director asserted—

> The entire future of the Japanese in America is dependent on their deeds during the emergency. If the Japanese assist in the war effort and prove, by constructive deeds, that they are loyal Americans, the public will recognize this fact. WRA does not desire the relocation center to have any more restrictions on it than is necessary, but whether or not Japanese can leave relocation centers during the emergency must depend on public opinion. Cooperation in the Food-for-Freedom Program and in other useful work by the Japanese is essential in the efforts of WRA to secure favorable public opinion for the Japanese.

It was this type of thinking, as summarized by the Deputy Director, which lay behind much of the early WRA emphasis on the little known and largely forgotten institution of the War Relocation Work Corps. The work corps was established, along with WRA itself, in Executive Order No. 9102. It was conceived primarily as an instrument for mobilizing evacuee manpower and for providing WRA with some semblance of control over evacuees who might leave its immediate custody for private employment or other purposes, *if such control should ever be found necessary.* Enlistment in the corps was to be entirely voluntary, but for at least 2 months after March 18, WRA policy contemplated quite clearly that only those evacuees who became members of the corps would be permitted to work either at the centers or anywhere else. Each enlistee would be called upon to agree that he would work wherever and whenever assigned by WRA and for whatever pay might be provided.

The members of the corps, it was felt at that time, would perform many valuable and perhaps dramatic kinds of work. Some of them would develop raw western lands by clearing away the sagebrush, levelling off the hummocks, and building irrigation structures. Others would engage in large-scale food production at a time when one of the Nation's slogans was that "Food will win the war and help to write the peace." Still others would turn out manufactured items—such as tents, camouflage nets, cartridge belts, and perhaps even airplane parts—that were acutely needed by the armed forces. The corps would

be, in short, a sort of wartime equivalent of the Civilian Conservation Corps especially tailored to the needs of the Japanese American group; it would provide the evacuees with a device—at that time the only available device—for proving their loyalty to the United States in a striking way and for regaining the status which they had so largely lost as a result of the evacuation and its aftermath.

The corps had its first test of practical operation on May 16 and 17 when a team of four WRA staff members from the San Francisco office attempted to register a group of evacuees at the Portland Assembly Center as a prerequisite to work in the beet fields of Malheur County around Nyssa. As previously indicated, the sign-up on that occasion was discouragingly small—a total of only 15 men out of the many hundreds in the assembly center. The reasons for this failure are not wholly clear and have been the subject of some disagreement within WRA itself, but they are perhaps best summarized in the final report of the Chief of the Employment Division. He wrote—

> The men from the San Francisco office immediately went into conference with a group of leading evacuees. * * * They met with a stone wall. These evacuees didn't like the work corps. They asked questions which couldn't be answered by the WRA men and they weren't persuaded by the presentation given. * * * The trouble was with the work corps itself. After this trip the condition that had been laid down that the evacuee had to be a member of the corps was forgotten insofar as sugar beet labor recruiting was concerned.

It should be added that this experience virtually dealt the death blow to the work corps as an institution. Although enlistment in the work corps was not formally terminated until December 15, 1942, the corps was, for all practical purposes, ignored not only in beet work recruitment but in center employment procedures as well. Attempts to register evacuees in the corps were made only at the Colorado River center, where the matter was, possibly due to misunderstanding of the instructions, rather seriously mishandled.

The real weakness of the work corps idea lay in a dilemma which was only faintly perceived on May 29 but which became increasingly apparent as the summer wore on—the dilemma of providing sufficient incentives to insure efficient and conscientious work performance within the framework of government-operated centers. Although WRA stressed the value of war-connected work at the centers as a means of demonstrating patriotism and regaining status with the general public, most staff members realized almost from the start that this motive *alone* would not be enough except perhaps in the case of a few of the more idealistic and broader-visioned Nisei. For the great mass of the evacuee population, somewhat more tangible inducements were also plainly needed.

Before WRA was more than a week old, however, events had already demonstrated that the agency's ability to provide such inducements would necessarily have to be sharply limited. On March 23, William Randolph Hearst's Los Angeles *Examiner* picked up a story at the Manzanar center which provided WRA and WCCA with their first major public relations problem. Evacuees at the center, this story asserted, "will be paid much more than the American soldiers fighting the country's battles overseas. * * * Whereas the base pay of the

American private soldier is $21 a month, all of the employable Japanese men and women, alien and citizen alike, will be paid salaries ranging from $50 to $94 a month." The facts were, as Director Eisenhower explained in a letter to the Office of Facts and Figures on March 29, that the Wartime Civil Control Administration "had considered this scale, among others, as gross wages, with deductions for room and board which would bring it into line with Army pay." Actually no final decision had been reached on the wage question. But the damage had been done and a storm of protest was aroused which quickly reached the halls of Congress. Before the month of March was out, Director Eisenhower wrote to Representative Leland Ford (chairman of an informal group of west coast congressmen who had taken it upon themselves to check up on every phase of the handling of the evacuation) assuring him that the maximum rate of pay for evacuees working on public projects would not under any circumstances exceed the minimum rate of pay for the American soldier. This policy, laid down under pressure of public misunderstanding at a time when WRA had a total staff of less than a dozen people, was to last throughout the entire life of the center management program. Although the main reason for the policy's adoption was later removed in June 1942, when Congress raised the minimum pay of the soldier from $21 to $50 a month, WRA never saw fit to follow suit. By the time pay increases became an issue at the centers, the agency had long since determined to make relocation its most important objective and was inclined to reject any change which might have the effect of keeping people tied to the centers.

By May 29, however, the agency had devised a somewhat ingenious formula for stimulating work performance at the relocation centers without making heavy demands on the Treasury and without running the risk of outraging west coast public and congressional opinion. Each relocation center, according to a bulletin of information for evacuees issued at about this time, was to be a "partnership enterprise" between the War Relocation Authority and the members of the work corps. WRA would furnish the basic essentials of living and would try to develop the greatest possible number of work opportunities. The members of the corps, for their part, would work toward three main objectives: first, to provide for the living requirements of the whole evacuee community to the greatest possible extent; second, to develop the land under WRA jurisdiction in the vicinity of the centers and improve its productive value; and third, to produce a supply of agricultural and manufactured goods surplus to center needs for sale on the open market. "A full accounting will be kept," the May 29 policy statement declared, "of maintenance costs [on the one hand] and income [from the agricultural and manufacturing enterprises, on the other], and appraisals will be made of the increases in capital values [such as land and structures]. At the end of each financial year, if the balance sheet shows a profit, *this profit will be paid to members of the works corps in the form of increased cash advances.*" (Emphasis as indicated in original document.) Meanwhile, these "cash advances"

(it can now be seen why they were not called "wages") were established at $12 a month for unskilled labor and "persons undergoing vocational training," $16 a month for skilled labor and the more responsible clerical and community service jobs, and $19 a month for highly skilled and professional employees. All center residents who were eligible to join the work corps but who chose not to enlist, "and thus [signified their refusal] to contribute to community production," would be charged at the rate of $20 a month—to cover the costs of food, shelter, medical care, and education—for themselves and each of their dependents. This charge, the policy statement explained, was being imposed upon the non-productive members of the population "in fairness to the community as a whole (whose ultimate earnings will depend on the volume and type of production)."

Just before leaving the agency on June 16, Director Eisenhower indicated in a final memorandum to his assistant that he "would now eliminate charges except for persons engaging in private employment at prevailing wages." The concept of the relocation center as a productive and profit-making partnership enterprise between WRA and the work corps members, however, remained prominent in the thinking of some staff members well into the summer months. The new Director, who was somewhat sceptical of the feasibility of this plan from the start, found himself questioning it with increasing concern on his first field trip to the centers. The possibilities for a productive agricultural enterprise, he soon perceived, were far greater at some of the centers than they were at the others. Tule Lake, for example, had a large acreage of highly fertile land which needed only irrigation works to produce an abundance of root crops and grains far beyond the needs of the resident population, while Central Utah, located on a tract of unyielding, alkali soil, could never hope to achieve even remotely comparable results in production. Quite clearly, the residents of Tule Lake would be favored and those of Central Utah would be penalized under this profit-sharing scheme, not because of any difference in enterprise or industriousness, but simply by the accidents of geography. Furthermore, the whole scheme seemed to involve an uncommonly complicated system of accounting and a real danger of arousing protests of "unfair competition" from private agricultural and industrial producers. By the time of the San Francisco policy conference in mid-August, the "partnership" idea had been dropped entirely from the official thinking of the agency and was never again seriously considered.

In its place the San Francisco conferees substituted a plan of straight compensation at the rate of $12, $16, or $19 a month for work actually performed at the centers under WRA sponsorship. Food, shelter, medical care, and education, they decided, were to be furnished without charge to all evacuees who were "not free to leave the centers." (In practice, WRA never made charges for subsistence of *any* center residents except those who were temporarily employed in privately sponsored industries at prevailing wages.) In addition to these two basic provisions, the August policy statement on evacuee employment covered a wide range of related topics:

1. It provided for the payment of cash allowances at rates varying from $2 to $3.75 a month to cover the cost of clothing for each employed evacuee and each of his or her dependents. These allowances were to be over and above the standard compensation of $12, $16, or $19 a month.

2. It specified that all evacuees assigned to jobs at the relocation centers should be considered as automatically enrolled in the work corps without the necessity of signing an enlistment form.

3. It stipulated that unemployment compensation payments, at rates ranging from $1.50 to $4.75 a month, should be paid to each employable evacuee (and each dependent) who was out of work through no fault of his own.

4. It provided for the establishment at each center of (a) an Order of Merit among members of the work corps to stimulate good working habits and (b) a Fair Practice Committee, composed of work corps members, to consider and adjust complaints from the evacuee workers about employment conditions, working regulations, or individual rates of compensation.

5. It specified that evacuees working on privately sponsored projects at the centers for prevailing wages should actually receive only the standard center rates of compensation (i.e. $12, $16, or $19 a month) and that the balance of the wages paid by the employer should be deposited in a trust fund to be administered for the benefit of the whole community.

Several of the detailed provisions in this policy statement soon proved unworkable or cumbersome in operation and eventually had to be greatly modified or abandoned entirely. The general framework, however, was sound enough to meet the problem satisfactorily and remained in effect as long as the centers continued in operation.

In the meantime, while this policy statement was being thought through and formulated in the summer of 1942, several thousand evacuees had already been put to work at the relocation centers. On September 30 the total number of evacuees reported on the pay roll for all operating centers was approximately 33,000 out of nearly 86,000 people in residence. At each center the first contingent of evacuees to arrive was a small group of able-bodied Nisei who volunteered to leave the assembly centers earlier and prepare the WRA communities for the main influx of the residents. Quite naturally, many of these volunteers gained especially desirable positions at the relocation centers and served as agents for the administrative staff in recruiting among the evacuees who followed. Since the pressure to feed the population, to put some degree of finish on the raw community, and to provide the other basic essentials of living was generally enormous in the first few weeks at each center, recruitment of evacuees was usually handled on a highly informal basis and personnel management practices of the ordinary type were conspicuous by their absence. Gradually, however, evacuee employment offices were established at each of the centers and some degree of system and centralized control over recruitment and assignment was introduced. By the beginning of 1943 a

definite effort was being made at all centers to classify available workers in accordance with their background and training and to make assignments which were reasonably consistent with the individual's preferences and qualifications.

The first real weakness in the August policy statement that showed up in operations at the centers was the emphasis of that document on WRA's obligation to provide jobs for all able-bodied adult evacuee residents who expressed a desire to work. This emphasis, which lay behind the provisions for unemployment compensation, was natural at a time when WRA was just taking its first shaky steps toward a resettlement program and still thinking in terms of relocating only 10,000 to 20,000 evacuees outside the centers. But it did lead, almost inevitably, to a number of glaring abuses—a great deal of overstaffing on evacuee jobs at some of the centers, creation of a large number of "boondoggling" positions, and encouragement of inertia and slack working habits among a large percentage of the evacuee population. By the late spring of 1943, with work opportunities for evacuees developing in almost all sections of the country and the resettlement program finally moving into high gear, WRA decided that the time had come to tighten up on center employment procedures. Unemployment compensation was eliminated except for those evacuees who had actually been assigned to jobs and were unable to report for work because of illness. All centers were ordered to reduce their evacuee payrolls by 30 percent within 90 days after July 1. Evacuee jobs were classified as "essential" or "desirable" and those which failed to fit into either category were eliminated wherever possible.

As WRA frankly anticipated, these measures aroused a considerable amount of evacuee opposition and protest at the centers and—it must be admitted—were not administered everywhere with uniform wisdom and efficiency. At one center, for example, the total pay roll cuts were put into effect within a week instead of being spaced out over a span of 3 months, as the Washington office had specified, and there were several other cases where the reductions were made somewhat arbitrarily and with only a minimum of advance consultation with the affected workers. Nevertheless, the policy did have a generally beneficial effect. It gradually eliminated the most flagrant weaknesses in the employment program at the centers; it encouraged more widespread evacuee thinking about the possibilities of resettlement; and it drove home an effective and early warning that WRA was wholly sincere in its determination to close the centers at the earliest feasible date.

This does not mean, however, that evacuee employment problems at the centers disappeared after the summer of 1943. As a matter of fact, WRA was never wholly free of such problems at any time in its 4-year history of center operations.

Labor difficulties of many types were constantly cropping up at the centers. In some cases these were nothing more than minor grievance meetings of workers assigned to comparatively unpleasant jobs such as coal hauling or garbage handling, but in a number of instances the issues went to the very root of the whole center employment program

and resulted in strikes or walkouts of almost community-wide proportions. The record at some centers in this field of management was much better than at others, but no center was able to avoid labor troubles entirely.

There was also the perennial problem of encouraging efficiency and conscientiousness among evacuee workers at the centers. Like almost any community, each relocation center had its share of idealistic workers who took intense personal pride in their accomplishments and worked hard regardless of the monetary rewards, its share of "deadbeats" who merely wished to "get by" with the least expenditure of time and effort, and its share of ordinary people who were capable of good work performance but saw no reason to exert themselves unduly when the cash incentive was less than a dollar a day. Although WRA was greatly impressed in the beginning by the unquestioned reputation for energy and efficiency which the people of Japanese descent had built up as workers on the Pacific coast over a period of 25 years, it soon learned that these habits were not necessarily carried over into the economically constricted environment of government-operated centers. It also learned the futility of a naked appeal to the patriotic motives of a group of people who had been abruptly uprooted from their homes by the government and told, in effect, that they were not so desirable as other members of the west coast population. The wonder is, really, that WRA obtained as much efficiency from evacuee workers at the centers as it did. There are those who feel that it would not have been possible with any other element of the population similarly uprooted and similarly deprived of normal economic inducements.

Finally, there was the paradox—the inherent contradiction—that lay in the very nature of the WRA program as it eventually developed. On the one hand, WRA was constantly striving for the greatest possible economy, efficiency, and community service in the operation of relocation centers; on the other hand, it was after November of 1942 encouraging the most energetic, most skillful, and best adjusted evacuee workers, with every device at its command, to leave the centers and resettle in ordinary American communities. Wherever there was a conflict between these two objectives, the policy of the National Director was unmistakably clear. Except in the most extreme cases of center urgency, all such conflicts should always and unquestioningly be resolved in favor of relocation. The results of this policy began to appear at the centers around the middle of 1943 when the relocation program first started gathering really significant momentum. They were felt much earlier in some branches of center work—such as hospital operation and newspaper publication, with their high percentage of skilled and eminently "relocatable" workers—than they were in others. But sooner or later the relocation-induced manpower shortage affected every phase of center activity in some degree or other. It reached its climax in the late fall of 1945 when practically all of the remaining center residents were busy with personal preparations for relocation and outside workers had to be hired temporarily for even some of the most essential of center operations. Through all of this, however, there were

apparently very few cases where evacuee workers were actually encouraged by their immediate supervisors to postpone relocation in favor of project activities. At any rate, not one case of this kind ever came to the attention of the Washington office in the whole period of center operations.

Community Government

The idea that evacuee residents at the relocation centers should play an active and influential part in shaping the contours of community life prevailed in WRA almost from the beginning of the program. Most of the top staff members, drawing on their previous experience with the Department of Agriculture or the Indian Service, were deeply convinced that some measure of resident participation in management was essential not only as a matter of human decency but as the most practical way of insuring cooperation and mutual understanding between administrators and administered. The May 29 policy statement reflects this feeling on almost every page. "WRA offers cooperation, not paternalism, to evacuees," it says in one place; and in another it calls upon center officials to place "the greatest possible reliance on the evacuees in the administration of community affairs." Although Director Eisenhower and his principal advisers were somewhat pessimistic at this time about the possibilities for free movement of evacuees outside the centers, they were firmly determined that life within the centers should be as far from the concentration camp pattern and as nearly normal as it was possible to make it.

In line with this thinking, the Authority began around the first of May to draw up a comprehensive plan of evacuee municipal government for the relocation centers. This tentative document, which was circulated within the Authority around the middle of the month, elicited two distinct reactions. One group of staff members criticized the plan as "too elaborate" and as "impositionist" in concept. Instead of handing the evacuees a tailor-made plan complete in every last detail, they contended, WRA would be better advised to let the impulse for evacuee government grow up spontaneously at the centers in accordance with the felt needs and desires of the residents. Another group of staff members, however, argued that such a passive course might well lead to confusion at some of the centers and complete inaction at the others. Stressing that the evacuated people as a group were almost wholly inexperienced in the functioning of the American democratic process, they held that WRA should provide stimulus and guidance in order to foster the formation of community governments and be sure that they were soundly based. The tentative plan, these staff members added, was not intended to be "rammed down the evacuees' throats" but merely to supply a concrete focus for evacuee thinking and discussion.

The course actually adopted was somewhere between these two points of view. The agency decided that it could not afford to sit back and wait indefinitely for evacuee initiative in the development of community government at the centers, but it was also determined that the

evacuees should be furnished with a somewhat more generalized framework of governmental plans in place of the first-drawn highly detailed document. A very rough outline for temporary government at the centers was included in the May 29 policy statement, and a somewhat more finished (but still generalized) plan was sent out to all operating centers exactly 1 week later.

This latter [June 5] memorandum to the centers on community government was admittedly a stop-gap. Its main purpose was to authorize the establishment of some form of representative body which could serve as liaison between the administration and the community at large while WRA was exploring the complicated question of evacuee government more thoroughly and thoughtfully. It gave the voting privilege to all center residents who were *eligible* for membership in the work corps—i.e., all those over 16 years of age—regardless of whether they had actually enlisted. It restricted the holding of elective office, however, to American citizens beyond the age of 21. It provided for the election of a temporary community council composed of one representative from each occupied block and for the selection by the council of (a) an executive committee to advise with the Project Director and (b) a judicial committee to cooperate with the administration in the maintenance of public peace and order. Each Project Director was called upon to arrange for an election at the earliest practicable date and was cautioned not to wait until all blocks were fully occupied.

Although the June 5 memorandum indicated, somewhat optimistically, that a more definite policy covering a long-range governmental organization for the centers would be announced "in the near future," such a statement was not actually issued until August 24 as a direct outgrowth of the San Francisco policy conference. Throughout the summer and at the San Francisco conference, the discussions of community government revolved largely around three major issues: (1) the minimum age for voting; (2) whether membership on the community council and other governmental bodies should be confined to American citizens; and (3) the precise scope of activity and authority that should be assigned to the evacuee governmental group.

On the question of minimum voting age, the San Francisco conferees were rather sharply divided between those who favored the general American requirement of 21 years and those who wanted to go down to the age of 16 in order to include all residents eligible for membership in the work corps. The policy adopted was an almost exact mathematical compromise: it provided that "all persons 18 years or over shall be eligible to vote."

Although there were a few staff members at San Francisco who favored placing the Issei and the Nisei on an equal footing in eligibility to hold office, the overwhelming sentiment of the conferees was against such a policy. The reasons for this feeling were rather clearly set forth by the Director in a letter of October 6 to a group of residents at the Gila River center who had protested against the exclusion of the Issei from the community council. He indicated—

* * * we believe that the citizenship status * * * of the evacuees who were born in the United States needs to be given special recognition. The fact that * * * all persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from the west coast * * * has caused some of the citizen evacuees to wonder what value their citizenship has. We regret that fact very much. We understand, also, that a few among the alien evacuees have been taunting the young Nisei with this fact, and have stated that the citizenship of the Nisei was valueless. It is our intention, therefore, to help make up for this fact, as much as possible, by giving special recognition to the citizenship status of the Nisei. * * *

A second consideration had a great deal to do with our decision. In general, the Nisei are much more Americanized than are the Issei. * * * We are of the opinion that if the Nisei alone are eligible for membership in the community council, the general character of the action taken by the * * * council will be more in keeping with American institutions and practices.

As finally adopted, the August 24 policy statement followed the June 5 memorandum in restricting elective office to the American citizens but provided for some degree of Issei participation in the government by making all residents equally eligible for appointive positions.

The third question, by far the most complex and controversial, really consisted of two distinct parts: (1) what types of functions could appropriately be delegated to the evacuee governmental bodies; and (2) what limits, if any, should be placed on the exercise of these functions.

Although one small group of staff members during the summer had favored turning practically all phases of community management over to the residents after an interim period of Federal supervision to insure stability, this point of view never gained widespread support at the San Francisco conference. Most of the conferees started with the assumption that WRA, as the responsible custodian of Federal funds appropriated by the Congress, would necessarily have to retain complete control over the purchasing of supplies and materials, the disbursing of funds, and the other strictly administrative phases of center operations. In order that the agency might make a proper accounting of its administration to the Congress and the Executive, it was essential, they felt, that certain standards and basic policies be established and followed at each and every center without variation. But this still left a fairly wide field of potential activity for the evacuee representative groups.

There were two functions which the majority of conferees felt the evacuee representatives could most effectively perform: (1) to serve as a two-way channel of communication between the administration and the community at large; and (2) to adopt and enforce ordinances and regulations in the interest of community welfare and security. The principal instrument for the performance of the first function was to be the community council composed ordinarily of one representative from each residential block and specifically empowered by the August 24 policy statement to present resolutions to the Project Director on "questions affecting the welfare of the residents." Each council member, it was anticipated, would be constantly seeking to learn the views of his block constituents, representing their specialized needs and desires before the whole community and the administration, and bringing back to them the explanations of WRA policies and regulations as well

as the limitations within which the administration necessarily had to operate. This was potentially an exceedingly rich function and it is regrettable that most of the evacuees who displayed an early interest in community government focused their attentions so largely on the regulatory aspects of government in their planning and discussions.

It was in connection with this second function—the adoption and enforcement of ordinances—that the question of limitations on the powers of the evacuee government came sharply to the forefront. In essence, this function involved an exercise of the police power by certain selected residents of the relocation centers over the community as a whole. Quite clearly, such power had been conferred on the War Relocation Authority by the President in Executive Order No. 9102. But whether the Authority could delegate it, without limitations, to one group of the residents at each center was a highly debatable question. After studying a number of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the delegation of regulatory power, the attorneys of WRA concluded that the agency could hand over to representative groups at the centers a *substantial part* of the power to "supervise the activities" of evacuees which had been given to the Director by Executive Order No. 9102 but that such delegation could *not* be made *without reservations.* As two of WRA's attorneys indicated in an article written for a university law review in the spring of 1946:

> There must be some final authority retained by administrative officials representing the general public interest to approve or veto the rules or orders privately formulated. The rules or orders must in the last analysis be those of the official body.

Because of this and other considerations, the conferees at San Francisco placed definite limitations on the regulatory and law enforcement powers of the evacuee government at the centers. In the August 24 policy statement the ordinance-making powers of the community council were defined to include only offenses which were not classified as felonies under the laws of the State in which the particular center was located, and each Project Director was authorized to set aside any ordinance of the council which was in excess of its prescribed functions or in conflict with State or Federal regulations. To handle enforcement of community council ordinances, the policy statement provided for the establishment at each center of a judicial commission to be composed of not less than three members. All decisions of this commission were subject to review by the Project Director and could be vetoed by him at any time within 24 hours of submission. As a final limitation, the policy framers also stipulated in the August 24 statement that the "authority herein conferred in the field of community evacuee government is in addition to, and not in substitution for, the functions and responsibilities of the Project Director in administering the relocation center."

Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of evacuees at the centers never had even the faintest awareness of the administrative and legal realities that tempered this particular policy statement and lay behind the several restrictions and limitations which it set forth in such bald language. To some of them it seemed a mere shadow of what a policy

on evacuee government at the centers should have been, a further piece of evidence that they were not trusted by the Federal Government, and an example of bad faith on the part of the War Relocation Authority. This last charge was based on the fact that several WRA staff members had loosely used the term "self-government" to describe community government at the centers in their early discussions and that this term had become firmly implanted in the minds of many center residents. "Is this real self-government," the charter-framing group of evacuees at the Heart Mountain Center asked somewhat pointedly, "or is it only so-called self-government? If it is going to be real self-government, then it is O.K. If it is going to be a self-government in name only, then we do not want it."

The Heart Mountain group finally concluded, in answer to its own questions, that "it is far better for the evacuees to leave the final responsibility of the center management to the WRA staff, while specifying in written documents evacuees' right to have limited voice in the management." But the questions which they had voiced lingered on in the minds of many residents at the centers long after the community councils were elected and had become a recognized part of relocation center life. Due to circumstances which were unavoidable and inherent in the whole situation, the concept of community government at the centers got off to a rather inauspicious start and never succeeded entirely in surmounting this initial heavy handicap.

Nevertheless, the August 24 policy statement did stimulate evacuees at nearly all centers to start thinking in terms of community government and brought about the first actual participation for many of these people in the internal functioning of the democratic process. By the end of 1942 temporary councils had been elected in accordance with the June 5 memorandum at 8 of the 10 centers; organization commissions to draw up a long-range charter for community government had been established at seven; and a so-called "permanent" community council had already been elected at one.

The center with the most interesting history of community government in 1942 was Colorado River. At this 3-unit relocation community on the Indian lands of western Arizona, a group of residents from the first four occupied blocks had met in a barrack mess hall to discuss community government plans back in the middle of May while the Washington office was drawing up the first attempt at an official policy statement on the subject. Although the efforts of these early arrivers to form a governmental structure were brought abruptly to a halt by the receipt of the June 5 memorandum with its Issei "exclusion" provision, temporary councils were elected under the provisions of that memorandum during the summer at all three of the basic units of the center and eventually combined into one advisory and liaison group for the residents. After functioning with considerable success throughout the early fall, this all-Nisei council, comprising only a few members who had passed the age of 30, came face to face in mid-November with the most serious crisis in the history of the WRA program up to that time. This was a community-wide protest meeting and general strike in

Unit One of the center which lasted for nearly a week and threatened several times to erupt into violence. The way in which the council tried to meet this crisis and the reasons why it failed have been analyzed rather fully in Alexander Leighton's book "The Governing of Men"—a book which throws a great deal of valuable light on the early history of the Colorado River center. The important thing to note here is that the Poston council resigned in a body during the height of the strike and that the situation then had to be met by direct action of the administrative group. While this incident was for many reasons not a fair test of a community council in action, it is significant that after the mass resignation at Colorado River many WRA staff members found it increasingly difficult to be optimistic about the future role of evacuee government at the relocation centers.

In December, after an even more serious crisis at the Manzanar center which pointed up the wide split in thinking between the Issei and the Nisei in that relocation community, WRA decided that the time had come to reexamine the whole concept of evacuee participation in center operations. In a confidential memorandum addressed to all Project Directors, the National Director pointed out that WRA was under no obligation to provide for community government at the centers, outlined an alternative plan under which evacuee committees with purely advisory functions might be established, and asked for the frank reactions of the center administrative staffs to the plan of evacuee government on the basis of their experience to date. The Director's purpose, it should be added, was not to encourage an abandonment of the previous policy on community government but merely to let the center officials know that this policy was not fixed or final and that the question could be approached with a completely open mind.

Two of the Project Directors—at Manzanar and Minidoka—were highly critical of the August 24 document and sceptical about the possibilities for effective evacuee action within the narrow framework of limitations which had been imposed. It would be far better, they argued, to drop all pretense of community "government" and move over to a strictly advisory and liaison type of representative body. Many of the more thoughtful evacuees at Manzanar, the director of that center indicated, were inclined to the view that "it is silly for mature men to spend their time playing with dolls."

This cynical attitude on the question, however, was not shared by the majority of the Project Directors. While recognizing the shortcomings of the August 24 plan, they were nonetheless reluctant to give up the idea of community government entirely. Several of them stressed that such a move would be interpreted by many of the evacuees as "another WRA broken promise." A few indicated that community government at the centers had not yet had a fair trial and that its potentialities for constructive action were extremely far-reaching. One expressed the opinion that the August 24 document was basically sound and merely needed to be given a "more liberal" interpretation. None of them suggested that the answer might lie in giving the community councils a broader grant of power.

One aspect of the August 24 policy which was unanimously criticized, however, was the provision excluding the Issei from membership in the community councils. Although some Project Directors were more outspoken on this point than others, they all favored the adoption of a procedure which would insure at least some measure of Issei participation. The case against the Issei exclusion provision was summed up perhaps most cogently in a letter from one of the staff members at Gila River. He wrote:

> The Issei refuse to accept the administration's opinion that citizens alone can hold office. They feel that citizenship status is irrelevant in a relocation center and since all Japanese were * * * treated in a similar manner, all should be entitled to hold office. Had Issei been permitted to hold office, much of the present unrest would have been obviated, the Issei stated. Issei participation would have enabled them to direct their energies into productive, loyal channels.
>
> Nisei felt that the present organization tends to intensify the growing cleavage between [the Issei and the Nisei]. This cleavage is so significant that at times all issues are decided within the community solely on that basis without reference to substance. While some Nisei are of the opinion that the intensification of the cleavage is an inevitable aspect [of the whole relocation center situation], the majority feel that problems facing the community can best be worked out through joint effort.

Impressed by this unanimity of opinion and by the further fact that many of the most capable and reliable Nisei leaders would doubtless soon be leaving the centers for relocation, the National Director decided in January that the policy on community government should be broadened at once to permit Issei membership on the councils. Before a revision could be issued, however, the mass registration program for leave clearance began absorbing the attention of nearly all staff members at the centers, and it was decided to hold all policy changes temporarily in abeyance. As a result, the Issei exclusion provision, which had been so widely criticized in December, was not formally abolished until April 19, 1943.

This revision removed one of the most serious of evacuee grievances toward the August 24 policy, brought a leaven of maturity and seasoned judgment into several of the community councils, and gave new impetus to the whole community government movement at the centers. At the same time, however, it created many problems. Although the Issei as a group were undoubtedly less rash and more politically adroit than many of the Nisei, they were also inclined to be far more critical of the basic resettlement aims of the WRA program and far less sensitive to the rather exacting demands of a somewhat ill-informed American public opinion. Under leadership of the Issei, some of the community councils were much more of a hindrance than an aid in the effectuation of the relocation program and a frequent source of embarrassment to WRA in its efforts to regain status for the evacuated people. By midspring of 1943, with Nisei leaving the centers in steadily increasing numbers, WRA had almost no choice in its decision to permit the inclusion of Issei on the community councils. Yet it would be a mistake to call the earlier policy entirely short-sighted; later events proved, on numerous occasions, that there was good justification for its original

adoption and some reason for regretting that it had to be discontinued.

The basic unit for political action at practically all centers was the "block" which consisted ordinarily of 12 residential barracks grouped around a common mess hall, bath-and-laundry building, and recreation barracks. Inevitably, the 250 or so people who lived in a block came to have common interests, close associations with one another, and ultimately some degree of group unity feeling. In some cases this was carried so far that decisions reached by a majority of the block residents were considered more or less binding on all the individual members, even to the point of influencing their behavior on such serious questions as the mass registration for leave clearance or the later renunciation of American citizenship at Tule Lake. Time and again it was demonstrated at the centers that the cohesiveness of the block was a factor which could scarcely be overestimated in the shaping of community life.

Although WRA was somewhat slow to recognize fully just how pervasive and powerful block loyalties could be, it did have at least some conception of their importance almost from the beginning of the program. This awareness was manifested in the provisions which were made at all centers for the highly important position of block manager. In contrast to the community council members, the block managers were generally appointed by the Project Director (usually after some consultation with the residents), paid for the performance of their duties, and regarded as agents of the administration rather than representatives freely chosen by the people. They had three major functions: (1) to see that the everyday needs of the residents for such things as brooms, soap, and light bulbs were met as fully and promptly as possible; (2) to supervise the general maintenance of the block's grounds and structures; and (3) to bring to the attention of the block residents the official announcements and regulations issued by the administration. At most centers the majority of block managers were Issei and several of them were among the most influential residents of their particular relocation communities.

The functions of the block managers in the field of communication between staff and residents were, of course, closely related to those of the community councilors in the same field, and the distinction between the two types of officers was not always clearly understood by the residents or even by all the members of the center staffs. At Manzanar an assembly of elected block managers which functioned somewhat in the manner of a community council was established quite early in the center's history and was never replaced by an evacuee government in the pattern of the August 24 policy statement. At Minidoka, where efforts to establish an evacuee government had a particularly stormy early history and a "permanent" council was not elected until the early months of 1944, the block managers were also used throughout most of 1943 as the only real liaison between residents and staff. At the other centers the relative importance of the councilmen and the block managers in the administrative picture varied

greatly with the preferences of the individual Project Director and the highly intricate interplay of human personality around the specific issues of the moment.

Yet at all centers (including Tule Lake even after it became a segregation center) evacuee representative bodies of one kind or another functioned throughout the major period of project operations. With varying degrees of skill and success, these councils and committees dealt with almost every important phase of center life—labor relations, the hospital, food supplies, registration for leave clearance, planning for segregation movements, enlistment in the Army, resettlement planning, community ceremonies, and finally the details of center liquidation. Generally speaking, their activities in the field of staff-resident communications were much more significant and extensive than their more strictly legislative functions; and it is probably true that they never had a real chance to fulfill the exceedingly bright hopes which some WRA staff members had cherished for them in the very early days. They did, however, provide a unique experiment in democratic practice which merits thoughtful study and analysis by political science specialists. The story is told more fully in a monograph issued by the War Relocation Authority under the title "Community Government in War Relocation Centers."

Internal Security

As suggested in the preceding chapter, the problem of internal security—or maintenance of law and order—was one of the most difficult and exacting aspects of the job of managing relocation centers. It was the one phase of center management which aroused the most comment and criticism from congressional committees investigating the WRA program—the one phase in which the Army officials of the Western Defense Command exhibited a rather persistent and intense interest. It was, quite probably, the kind of job which could not have been carried out under any kind of policy without arousing a rather widespread degree of dissatisfaction.

In approaching this problem originally, WRA started with the basic assumption that maintenance of internal security at the centers would be primarily in the hands of the evacuee community government. "Internal security," the May 29 policy statement indicated, "will at first be the administrative responsibility of the Project Manager, but as soon as possible, the war-duration project government, established by the residents, will include arrangements for maintaining law and order. * * * Each community will establish procedures for dealing with violations of the law and will subject offenders to arrest, trial, and punishment." The thought, rather clearly, was that the evacuees at each center would take over this particular responsibility, either wholly or in very large part, immediately after an acceptable and stable community government had been established.

During the summer, as WRA became increasingly aware of the complexity of the center management job and the hazards of relying too

heavily on evacuee initiative, the thinking of top staff members receded slightly from this May 29 position. The policy statement adopted at the San Francisco conference in August began with the flat assertion that "internal security is a responsibility of the Project Director" and went on to authorize the appointment of a non-evacuee internal security chief at each relocation center. It also provided, however, for the organization of an internal security force to be recruited from the resident population, made this force responsible for the arrest of all offenders, and specifically prohibited the administration at any center from establishing an intelligence or investigative unit. Project Directors who felt that investigations of subversive activities were needed at their centers were instructed to call upon the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Throughout the fall and early winter, as organization of stable community governments at the centers lagged far behind the anticipations of the more optimistic staff members and as signs of evacuee unrest burst forth first at Colorado River and then at Manzanar, WRA came increasingly to the conviction that it would have to take over a far larger share of the responsibility for center internal security than it had originally planned to assume. In a series of three policy statements issued around the middle of February 1943, the agency spelled out in considerable detail (1) the procedure to be followed in organizing an evacuee police force at the centers, (2) the rules to govern the making of arrests, and (3) the types of offenses that might be punished by disciplinary action of the Project Director.

Of the three statements, the last was undoubtedly the most important. It was, in essence, a recognition of the fact that offenses might be committed against the peace and security of relocation centers which were not felonies under State or Federal law and which were not covered by the ordinances of the community council and would thus have to be dealt with by direct administrative action. It listed 34 types of such offenses and specifically authorized the Project Director to conduct trials of suspected offenders and impose suitable punishments. It prohibited the Project Director from trying cases covered by ordinances of the community council (reserving this function for the evacuee judicial commission), gave him some latitude on the question of referring offenders to police authorities outside the center, and authorized him to arrange for the rental of jail space at a nearby community instead of establishing an administrative jail at the center.

The statement on organization of center police forces went considerably beyond the August internal security policy by providing for additional nonevacuee police officers at all centers, setting up rather exacting qualifications for the evacuee policemen, and specifying the duties and responsibilities of the center chief of police much more fully. The procedure on arrests was framed in line with general police practice governing the issuance of warrants and stipulated that no center resident could be arrested without a warrant from the Project Director unless caught in the act of committing a proscribed offense by a member of the internal security force.

In the meantime, while these changes in the basic internal security policies were being worked out, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had been sent out, following a WRA request in December 1942, to study the law enforcement problem at the centers and make specific recommendations. His report, submitted to WRA around the middle of March, was not exactly what the Authority had anticipated. It contained 146 recommendations and covered almost every phase of project operations from the conduct of WRA staff meetings to the organization of the hospitals and mess halls. On the more technical aspects of the organization and management of police work at the centers, the recommendations were extremely helpful and have proved to be entirely workable in practice. Most of them were incorporated into WRA's internal security procedures during the first 6 months of 1943.

The problems of WRA in the field of internal security at the centers were both more simple and more complex than those of the ordinary police department in a city of 10,000 to 15,000 population. They were more simple because WRA was dealing with a group of people who had achieved a high degree of intra-group discipline and had established a noteworthy record for law-abiding behavior in the prewar period. They were more complex because these same people had been scrutinized, questioned, and picked up for questioning to the point where they had almost developed a mass neurosis on the subject of investigations and "informers" even before they entered WRA centers and because they had been set aside from the general population on the basis of fears and suspicions which most of them regarded as groundless and irrational. With this kind of background, it was hardly surprising that contempt for recognized authority—both governmental and parental—should break out among the adolescent groups at relocation centers to a degree that was absolutely unprecedented in the Japanese American population; that gangs should be formed for the specific purpose of "taking care of" informers or even residents who were suspected of being "too close" to the administration; and that the appearance of any FBI officers at a center should produce a serious state of community-wide anxiety and tension. These problems were particularly acute and significant at Tule Lake after it became a segregation center, but they existed in some degree at every one of the WRA communities. The only real solution for them, WRA has always felt, lay in removing the evacuated people from the abnormal, highly charged atmosphere of the centers and restoring them to an environment where their ordinary law-abiding and cooperative impulses could reassert themselves.

On the whole, however, the crime record at relocation centers compared quite favorably with that of the ordinary American community of similar size. In fact, a 1944 survey of comparative crime rates in the two types of communities indicated that the law was being broken during that period about three times as frequently in ordinary cities as it was in relocation centers. The centers had their share of gamblers, thieves, prostitutes, gangsters, and even murderers. But these lawless

Irrigation work at Tule Lake

elements were certainly no more typical of the community at large than they are in the average small city. The great majority of center residents were a psychologically bruised, badly puzzled, and frequently apathetic group of people. But during their stay at the centers they continued their previous practices of religious worship, tried to achieve some semblance of order and dignity in their broken lives, and frequently showed an almost pathetic eagerness to hold their families together and to work back toward their prewar social and economic status. They bore little resemblance to the sly, ruthless, Emperor-worshipping fanatics which some sensational newspaper and magazine writers, such as Ray Richards and James R. Young of the Hearst Enterprises, persisted in creating as the prototype of relation center residents.

But then, neither Mr. Richards nor Mr. Young ever bothered to visit a relocation center.

Agriculture

"It is highly desirable," Milton Eisenhower told the conferees at Salt Lake City on April 7, 1942, "that at each of these [center] locations there be opportunities for the evacuees to produce their own food and also for sale if possible. * * * It will reduce the cost of this whole undertaking and it will help produce food for the Army."

At this time WRA did not know exactly how many of the evacuees had agricultural experience. But the Director was sure that the number was substantial and was completely convinced that food production would have to be a major element in the evacuee employment program at the centers. Practically all the centers were selected with an eye to their agricultural potentialities and a few were originally planned as extremely broad-scale farming enterprises. At Colorado River there was talk during the early months of ultimately bringing perhaps as many as 90,000 acres into production through irrigation works, and both Arkansas centers were selected primarily because of the high hopes which Milton Eisenhower had for the development of agricultural enterprises on the flat, fertile lands of the lower Mississippi Delta.

Like so many of WRA's early plans, those for agriculture at the relocation centers were modified in late 1942 and early 1943 as the program emphasis shifted to "outside" relocation. Yet the principle of maximum production for use *within* the centers remained a keynote of the WRA center management policy until December 18, 1944, when the west coast general exclusion orders were revoked and the agency announced its plans for final liquidation of the program. "The primary aim" of the agricultural program at the centers, the May 29 policy statement declared, "will be to make each relocation community as nearly self-sufficient as possible from an agricultural standpoint and to use the surplus products of the heavy-producing centers as a supplement in those areas where food production is insufficient. Foods produced by the evacuees over and above the needs of all the projects * * * will be used in the national Food-for-Freedom program."

Nine months later, when the first really comprehensive statement on agricultural policy for the centers was issued on February 15, 1943, the

situation had changed rather substantially. Because of the heavy exodus of able-bodied young men into the beet fields during the summer and early fall of 1942, agricultural production had started on a significant scale only at Tule Lake and Gila River—the two centers which had sizable acreages of land readily available for planting. At Colorado River the early hopes for large-scale development had been almost completely frustrated by a summer of nearly intolerable desert heat, the difficulties of obtaining essential equipment, and the prolonged hospitalization of the man who had been chosen as the supervisor of farming operations. Elsewhere the plans for agricultural production were still largely on paper, and were being steadily revised downward in the light of the decision to push for "all out" relocation. The February 15 agricultural policy statement reflects some of the changes in WRA thinking brought about by these several developments. The main difference from the May 29 statement is that this time the language about production for outside use is significantly more guarded and the emphasis on production for intra-center consumption is considerably more pronounced. The statement begins—

> It is the policy of the Authority to produce as large a percentage as possible of the crop and livestock products needed for the feeding of the evacuees. If land and labor in addition to that needed in the production of subsistence crops and livestock products are available, they should be used in the production of commodities needed in the war effort.

Meanwhile, WRA's thinking had also shifted on one particular phase of agricultural policy which had become the focus for some localized (but nonetheless intense) public agitation. In a tentative policy statement issued in June 1942, the Authority indicated that dairies would not "ordinarily" be established at the centers "because of (1) the indefinite period of occupation of a center, (2) State and local sanitary requirements and other regulations, and (3) the lack of experience in dairying on the part of the evacuees." The door was left slightly ajar, however, by the additional statement that a dairy might be approved by the Washington office "if it is found that supplies of fluid milk cannot be secured within satisfactory shipping distance to meet the minimum requirements" at any particular center. In the early fall an acute milk shortage developed in the vicinity of Phoenix, Ariz., and was soon linked up in the popular mind with the nearby Gila River center. Although most of the milk for this center was actually purchased from a dairyman who claimed that he had never sold his product to any considerable extent on the Phoenix market, practically all of the city's milk difficulties were attributed to the "inordinate" requirements of the "Jap camp." After messages of protest had been received from the mayor of Phoenix and from both Arizona Senators, WRA decided that it was the better part of wisdom to permit the establishment of a dairy at Gila River in spite of all the hazards and difficulties. An average herd of about 100 cows was maintained throughout the major part of the life of the project and consistently supplied about half of the milk needs of the resident population. The only other attempt at dairying in the WRA program—at the

Granada center in Colorado—was cut short after a few months of operation by an outbreak of Bangs disease which wiped out the major part of the small herd; the few remaining healthy cows were transferred in early 1943 to Gila River.

Production of vegetables at the centers ranged from a low of about 150,000 pounds at the short-lived Jerome center in Arkansas to nearly 30 million pounds at Tule Lake. Production for all centers over the whole period of operations was approximately 110 million pounds with an estimated gross value of about $3,750,000. Of this amount, approximately $74,000 worth was sold on the open market; roughly $3,650,000 worth was consumed by the center population; and the balance was lost through spoilage or faulty shipment between centers. Practically all centers had facilities for storing root crops and canning other types of vegetables, and small dehydration plants were maintained at Gila River, Granada, and Manzanar.

Forage crops were produced at all centers in quantities ranging from about 100,000 pounds at Jerome to nearly 19 million pounds at Granada. The total for all centers was approximately 46,500,000 pounds with an estimated gross value of $850,000. Only a comparatively small portion of this was sold on the outside market.

All centers had hog farms of varying size and all except Jerome maintained some type of poultry projects. Altogether they produced nearly eight million pounds of pork valued at almost $1,500,000, around 135,000 chickens with meat valued at nearly $200,000, and 740,000 dozen eggs valued at $270,000. A moderate-sized flock of turkeys was maintained at the Central Utah center for several months in 1943 but was abandoned in early 1944 with a production of about $6,500 worth of meat. Herds of beef cattle were maintained at Central Utah, Gila River, Granada, and Manzanar. All told, they produced about 3,500,000 pounds of beef valued at approximately $750,000.

Over the total period of center operations, the evacuee residents consumed roughly 50 million dollars worth of food. Of this total, approximately $6,800,000 worth, or roughly 14 percent, was produced on the center farm lands by the evacuees themselves. Although the farm program at the centers never came up to the high hopes of its original sponsors, it was definitely a sound investment for the government and a valuable means of preserving the initiative and self-respect of the evacuated people during their enforced exile from their homes and their normal occupations.

Industry

With the possible exception of community government, there was probably no phase of relocation center operations which involved so many administrative complications and produced so many frustrated hopes in the early days of the WRA program as industrial enterprises. As indicated in an earlier chapter, the problem of establishing such enterprises on a workable basis at the centers was exceedingly difficult and eventually became one of the factors in the decision to make relocation outside the centers the first order of WRA business. It was

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also a problem which absorbed a very large share of WRA attentions and energies during the first 8 or 9 months of the program.

The early thinking on this subject was rather clearly set forth by Milton Eisenhower in his talk before the conference of western governors and governors' representatives held at Salt Lake City on April 7, 1942. He told the conferees—

> We are looking for manufacturing opportunities of two types: (1) those opportunities which might be created by the Government and (2) perhaps, the relocation of private industry. In the first category, as one example, if the evacuees were now located at these new points and were ready to go to work, we could get a contract to produce camouflage nets for the Army, involving a great deal of hand labor, involving the kinds of skills that the Japanese would have great aptitude for, and one thing that the fishermen pulled off the sea with no place to fish might be particularly good at doing. Such work as this involving a maximum of hand labor and a minimum of machinery will not only be good for this country but it will be very good for the Japanese who want, many of them, to show their loyalty to this country. This will give them an opportunity to do so. There are industries on the Pacific coast which depended almost wholly on Japanese labor and now feel that they will not have an opportunity to continue in business. * * * I think these industries should relocate adjacent to [WRA] centers. I am not sure that we should not issue an open invitation to industry throughout the country, industry being threatened with inability to get labor, but we don't want Japanese labor to displace normal labor.

No blanket invitation of this kind was ever issued, but WRA did spend a great deal of time during the spring and summer of 1942 exploring a wide range of potential manufacturing enterprises for the relocation centers. As Director Eisenhower indicated at Salt Lake City, the Authority was thinking at this time in terms of both government-sponsored and privately sponsored enterprises for the centers. It was also thinking about two general types of manufactured products—(1) items such as camouflage nets, cartridge belts, tents, and optical lenses which were needed by the armed forces; and (2) articles like work clothing, school furniture, mattresses, and Japanese-type foods which were needed at the relocation centers. As the industrial program finally worked out at the centers, the second type proved much more important than the first.

The May 29 policy statement mentioned both kinds of industrial enterprises and stipulated that "in keeping with the provisions of the Geneva Convention" only citizen evacuees should be permitted to work on the production of goods for the armed forces. A few weeks after this statement was issued the first industrial enterprise—a camouflage net factory under direct supervision of the Army Corps of Engineers—began operations at the Manzanar Relocation Center. The work, which was acutely needed by the Army at the time, involved weaving small pieces of colored cloth into a net according to a camouflage pattern and required only a moderate amount of equipment. Under the plan of compensation which was worked out to meet the peculiar conditions at WRA centers, each worker was paid at the standard rate of $16 a month (plus clothing allowances) for garnishing a basic quota of 1,000 square feet of net per day. When the worker had finished this amount, he was free for the day. As Milton Eisenhower had predicted at Salt Lake City, many of the evacuees proved to be highly adept at the net-

garnishing work and were soon completing their daily quota long before the close of business at other center operations—some of them even before the lunch hour. This led to a great deal of ill-feeling among the other center workers (who had to put in a full 8-hour day) and eventually contributed in some measure to the center-wide protest demonstration in December 1942. The Manzanar net factory was discontinued at the time of this incident and was never reinstituted.

Meanwhile, WRA had issued its first really comprehensive policy statement on industrial enterprises at the centers. This statement, which was shaped up at the San Francisco conference and reduced to final form on September 18, was a rather complicated document. It authorized four different kinds of enterprises at the centers: (1) WRA-sponsored enterprises to meet the operating needs of the particular center, (2) WRA-sponsored enterprises established at one or two of the centers to meet the needs of all 10 for a particular kind of item, (3) evacuee-sponsored production enterprises to be managed on a cooperative basis, and (4) privately sponsored and privately managed industries to be established on or near the centers. The policy statement provided that the latter type of enterprises could be established only if the sponsor held a war contract and was willing to pay prevailing wages and stipulated that enterprises of both the third and fourth types could not be initiated until center officials had obtained the express approval of the National Director.

During the fall plans were developed for a number of industrial enterprises which never materialized—including a tent factory for Tule Lake and a lens-grinding plant and pottery establishment for Heart Mountain—and camouflage net factories were actually established at the two centers in Arizona. In contrast to the Manzanar net factory, those at Colorado River and Gila River were operated by a private contractor and set up to pay prevailing wages for a full 8-hour day. In accordance with WRA policy, the difference between the amount paid by the contractor for the standard production of 1,000 square feet per worker per day (approximately $125 a month) and the amount actually received by the individual worker ($16 a month) was deposited in a general fund for the benefit of the community at large. In order to stimulate production, however, it was decided that the individual workers should receive a bonus (at the prevailing rate of $4.80 per thousand square feet) for all the net they garnished over and above the standard amount. Under this plan some of the more skilled evacuees were soon pocketing as much as $17 and $18 a day in a community where most people received the same amount for a full month of work. The repercussions were even more pronounced than they had been under the Manzanar plan and both net factories were discontinued when they completed their initial contracts in May of 1943.

These two short-lived net factories were the only private enterprises ever actually established at relocation centers. Under the revised industrial policy determined in October and formally issued on January 26, 1943, it was specifically stipulated that "all industries, except those operated privately under previous commitments, shall be operated as

WRA projects." This policy statement also (1) prohibited the establishment of evacuee-sponsored production enterprises, (2) specified that all industrial workers (except those in the net factories) would be paid at the standard WRA rates, and (3) emphasized that preference should be given to "those types of enterprises which offer the greatest opportunities for vocational training for the evacuees." Industrial enterprises at the centers, in other words, were no longer regarded merely as an end in themselves but also as a means of preparing center residents for relocation and employment in ordinary communities. This policy remained in effect without substantial change until the end of the program.

The great bulk of the enterprises actually established at the centers were of the "internal consumption" type, operated to meet the needs of community management or of the individual center residents rather than to produce goods for the outside market. They included garment factories at Manzanar, Heart Mountain, and Minidoka; cabinet shops at Tule Lake, Manzanar, and Heart Mountain; sawmills at Heart Mountain and Jerome; a mattress factory at Manzanar; a bakery at Tule Lake; carpentry and furniture repair shops and food processing plants (specializing in Japanese-type foods) at all centers.

In addition, there were also three enterprises at the centers, aside from the net factories, which worked on war contracts for the armed forces. Two of these—a silk-screen poster shop at Granada and a model-warship factory at Gila River—made important contributions to the personnel training program of the Navy Department. The Granada shop produced about a quarter of a million posters presenting some of the simplest and most fundamental aspects of naval training in vivid, graphic form; the Gila River factory turned out over 800 model warships, ranging from a few inches to several feet in length, which were used to train naval personnel in the identification of various major types of Allied and Axis vessels. The third "war contract" industry was a smaller silk-screen shop at the Heart Mountain center which worked mainly on orders for the relocation centers but also turned out a few thousand training posters for the Navy.

Mess Operations

"This is to inform you," a resident of Huntington Park, Calif., wrote to the Office of Price Administration in Washington in late October 1942, "there is not a pound of smoked ham or bacon in any of our groceries or markets. Why? I am reliably informed that government trucks have just returned from a trip through Nevada and Arizona with *six tons* of ham and bacon for the *Japs* in Manzanar where they are interned for the duration * * * we haul ham and bacon in to them while none of us can *buy* it at any price. It makes one's blood boil and some of us feel like taking a tommy gun and cleaning that lot."

During this period a great many people in California and in the immediate vicinity of the 10 relocation centers were being "reliably" informed that practically all their food problems were caused by WRA

"pampering" of the evacuees in centers. And a very considerable proportion of them were venting their anger in letters to the Nation's Capital. The letter quoted above is by no means an extreme specimen; many of them were unprintable.

Actually WRA at this time was bending over backwards in its feeding of the evacuees and was even consciously failing to live up to the strict provisions of the Geneva Convention. If the terms of that Convention had been followed literally, the evacuees at centers would have had the same rations as American soldiers in training and would thus have been considerably better fed than the average civilian. But

"Mess operations"

despite some urging from the State Department, such a feeding policy was never seriously considered for the relocation centers. For a population composed of men, women, and children of all ages—many of them small in stature and living largely sedentary lives—the rations of the American soldier in active physical training would obviously have been excessive and wasteful. Furthermore, WRA's position on this, as on all similar questions, was that evacuees were entitled to the same treatment as other American citizens and other residents of non-Japanese descent—no more and no less.

The references to food in the May 29 policy statement were brief but basic. "Food served at community mess," it stipulated, "should provide an adequate diet at a cost less than the cost of rations provided to the United States Army. Special diets prescribed by competent medical authorities for [individual members of the evacuee population such as pregnant and nursing women] should always be supplied. Foods rationed to the whole American people will usually be available to evacuees in the same ratio as to the general public." These three provisions remained in effect without modification to the very end of the program.

The policy statement on mess operations adopted at the San Francisco conference, however, was considerably more explicit. It provided for the purchasing of staple foods for relocation centers through designated depots of the Quartermaster Corps of the Army, expressly prohibited the purchase of "fancy grades" of food for the relocation centers, and stipulated that the menus for the centers should be based on a ration costing no more than 45 cents per person per day. It also contained a number of other detailed provisions covering the preparation of menus, the functions of the chief project steward, the training of cooks for the mess halls, and the establishment of special facilities to furnish food needed by the babies.

On January 29, 1943, after several months of intense (and mainly groundless) public criticism of the feeding policies at the relocation centers, WRA issued an even more elaborately specific procedural statement on mess operations. All centers were advised that "at no time shall evacuees' food have higher specifications than or exceed in quantity what the civil population may obtain in the open market." They were also called upon (1) to see that all rationing regulations were strictly observed, (2) to submit their planned menus for each 30-day period to the Washington office for advance approval, and (3) to assume definite responsibility for accurately informing the public in the vicinity of the centers about WRA feeding policies and procedures.

Despite these precautions, public misunderstanding and criticism of the mess program at the centers continued through the spring of 1943 and was greatly intensified during June and July as a result of the "investigation" of the WRA program by a subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities. Meanwhile, however, several newspaper writers, who had taken the trouble to visit the centers and check up first-hand on the facts of the case, were beginning to counteract the wild rumors, the exaggerated accounts, and the deliberate, purposeful misrepresentations with a somewhat more responsible type of reporting. In the period immediately following the House subcommittee investigations, WRA made a special effort to present the truth about its mess operations and other phases of the program to the public through every available channel of mass communication. By the fall of 1943 the agitation concerning this particular phase of the program had virtually subsided and never again became a really important issue.

Business Enterprises

As soon as it became clearly apparent, after the Salt Lake City meeting in April of 1942, that WRA would have to operate full-scale communities with as many as 16,000 or 18,000 residents, the agency started devoting some of its attention to the problem of the retail shops and services that would obviously be needed at each of the centers. Three possible plans of operation were considered: (1) management of the shops by WRA; (2) granting of concessions to private entrepreneurs; and (3) management of the shops by the residents on a consumer cooperative basis. The third plan, which appealed to the majority of staff members as the most practical and democratic approach, was given additional impetus on May 11 when Representative Jerry Voorhis of California wrote to Director Eisenhower suggesting that the establishment of cooperatives at the centers "would be a very fine thing." Two weeks later the May 29 policy statement declared that the residents of relocation centers should be encouraged by local WRA officials "to organize on the projects their own [consumer] enterprises which will be operated on a non-profit cooperative plan. It added that WRA would provide "instruction and guidance" to the evacuees in organizing and managing these enterprises "according to the recognized principles and methods of the cooperative movement" and that the Authority would consider applications for loans from any of the center cooperatives which were appropriately organized and managed.

In his opening address to the San Francisco policy conference in August, Director Myer touched briefly on the problem of consumer enterprises at the centers and indicated his preference for some type of evacuee management rather than any plan of private concessions or government operation. The policy statement which emerged from the conference and was signed on August 25 went the full distance in this direction. It not only authorized consumer cooperative enterprises at the centers but expressly prohibited the establishment of consumer enterprises of any other type. More specifically, it provided for the organization of one community-wide enterprise association at each center; set up definite standards of organization, membership participation, merchandising, pricing, and dividend distribution; stipulated that the accounts of each association should be audited periodically by WRA; and specified the requirements that would have to be met before a loan could be granted by the Authority to an enterprise association. To meet the needs of the residents during the period before an evacuee-managed enterprise association could be established, it authorized the establishment of temporary enterprises to be managed directly by the center administration.

Although only one evacuee-managed enterprise association (at Manzanar) was established before the end of 1942, the volume of business handled by the temporary enterprises—nearly three-quarters of a million dollars gross in the month of December alone—was considerably in excess of WRA expectations. On December 22 a revised policy statement was issued which required each enterprise association to

reimburse WRA for the salaries and allowances paid to all employees of the temporary enterprises retroactively from the time of their establishment and stipulated that the associations should pay rent for the use of WRA building space and equipment. This policy was adopted in line with WRA's conviction that the enterprises should be strictly the responsibility of the evacuated people and that the government's role should be primarily advisory and consultative. If the evacuees were to manage their own enterprises, WRA reasoned, they should be expected to assume the obligations of a normal independent business in an ordinary community and should not expect special financial favors or concessions from the Authority. Many of the evacuees, however, saw the matter in a somewhat different light. The temporary enterprises, they argued, were none of their business and it was wrong to saddle them with the cost of salaries over a period of several months before their association was established. While few of them disagreed with the principle of paying rent on WRA buildings, many contended that the rental rates which had been established were arbitrary and excessive. Upon further examination, and after a strong complaint by the Project Director of the Rohwer center, WRA reexamined its rental rates and revised them sharply downward in a supplementary policy statement of February 26, 1943. In the meantime, however, the cooperative movement at two or three of the centers had suffered something of a setback and the leaders of this movement had considerable difficulty in rekindling the enthusiasm and support of the community at large.

Nevertheless, by the end of June, enterprise associations of one kind or another had been established at all 10 centers. Eventually all of them were operated on consumer cooperative principles except the one at Heart Mountain. At this center a combination of internal disputes among evacuee factions, general unwillingness on the part of many residents to assume responsibility for any phase of management, and disaffection with WRA over the original rental rates led to a prolonged debate among the residents over the wisdom of establishing a cooperative enterprise association. In January a trust association was formed purely as an interim device to manage the enterprises until a cooperative association could be established. But after the residents voted down the cooperative plan by a margin of nearly two to one in May, the trust association emerged in a much stronger position and continued to control and manage the enterprises until the close of the project. The main difference between this plan and the cooperative set-up at the other centers was that at Heart Mountain the community at large had a slightly less active voice in the formulation of management policies. Patronage dividends or refunds, however, were a feature of the consumer enterprise program at all 10 centers.

Over the whole period of center operations the nine cooperative enterprise associations and the one trust operated a total of 270 individual enterprises ranging all the way from single-employee watch repair shops to moderate-sized department stores stocking a wide variety of merchandise and employing many dozens of persons. Altogether they

handled $21,890,167.56 worth of business, paid out $2,298,820.20 in refunds or dividends, and provided employment and work experience in cooperative methods of management to over 7,000 center residents.

Although WRA contemplated that some of the enterprises might need loans to acquire their initial stocks of merchandise and meet early operating expenses, no such loans were actually made. Most of the enterprises experienced little or no difficulty in obtaining ample stocks of merchandise on credit and in building up sound working capital in extremely short order. On the whole, the enterprises were very ably managed and a highly profitable venture for everyone directly concerned.

Other Phases of Center Management

By the end of 1942 WRA had abandoned almost entirely its earlier notion that the relocation centers could gradually be transformed into some approximation of "normal" communities and was squarely facing the fact that a large degree of "abnormality" was an inherent element in the whole pattern of center life. At the same time, however, the agency recognized a definite obligation to make center life as decent and tolerable as it could be made within the framework of the established policies and of all the inevitable disruptions, shortages, and limitations.

Education through the high-school level was provided at all centers—with one short interruption at Tule Lake after it became a segregation center—from the fall term of 1942 through the spring term of 1945. During this 3-year period over 30,000 students passed through the center school system and more than 7,000 of them eventually emerged as graduates of the center high schools. The bulk of the remainder transferred to regular public schools after relocation. At all centers the teacher qualifications, the curriculum content, and the methods of instruction were developed in close consultation with the State educational authorities and in line with the recognized standards of the State. Eventually, all the center school systems except the one at Tule Lake were accredited by the State authorities and pupils were able to transfer to schools outside the centers, ordinarily, without loss of credit.

Medical care was also furnished to all center residents without cost as part of the regular WRA "subsistence." Hospitals with an average capacity of about 200 beds were maintained at all centers and were almost invariably an important—and sometimes a controversial—element in the life of the community. Although reasonably well equipped, they were consistently handicapped by a severe shortage of qualified nursing personnel and by the Army's "theater of operations" layout, with extremely long corridors, which were not at all suited to efficient hospital management under relocation center conditions. The only centers which experienced epidemics were Jerome and Central Utah where there were about 900 and 1,100 influenza patients, respectively, in December of 1943 and January of 1944—at a time when influenza was reaching epidemic proportions over large sections of the country. In general, the health record at the centers was quite comparable with

"Community activities"

that in normal communities of similar size. The one noteworthy exception was the rather high incidence of peptic ulcers at practically all centers—a condition which was most frequently attributed to the extreme nervous tension of many of the residents and the generally frustrated and unsettled state of their minds.

Welfare services of the type available in ordinary cities were provided for the residents of the centers without adequate means of support, the physically handicapped, and the orphaned Japanese American children. A special Children's Village was maintained at the Manzanar center for the youngsters who were evacuated by the Army from west coast orphan asylums and was always one of the "show places" of the community. Out of approximately 100 children who were maintained in the Village at one time or another, 14 were returned to institutions, 2 were discharged upon reaching the age of 18, and the remainder were all placed in private homes either with relatives, foster parents, or county boarders.

The fire protection record at the centers was really remarkable. In view of the highly inflammable nature of the original construction, the extremely dry climate at several of the centers, the severe shortage of fire fighting equipment, and the almost total lack of experienced fire fighters among the evacuated people, an exceedingly heavy amount of fire damage might well have been anticipated. Actually, however, the centers compared very advantageously with ordinary cities of similar size in this type of community protection and two of them—Heart Mountain and Granada—won first and second places, respectively, in the State-wide fire protection competitions of 1944 in Wyoming and Colorado.

Complete freedom of religious worship (except for the practice of State Shintoism, the one Japanese sect which actually involves worship of the Emperor) and the fullest possible freedom of expression were guaranteed to the evacuees in the May 29 policy statement and were strictly maintained as national policies of the agency throughout the life of the program. All centers had both Buddhist and Christian churches and all had community newspapers published in both English and Japanese. Three of these newspapers—at Manzanar, Minidoka, and Heart Mountain—were managed by the enterprise associations and published in printed form. The others were all mimeographed and WRA-sponsored but produced by evacuee staffs with a minimum of supervision and no actual exercise of censorship.

The somewhat loosely named "community activities" program at the centers embraced all the recreational, athletic, and other organized leisure-time activities of the residents. Under early WRA policies this program was organized and conducted so as to emphasize at all times and in every way possible the identification of the Japanese American residents with the larger American community. National organizations such as the YMCA, YWCA, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and Campfire Girls played an active part in the community activities program at the centers and also helped many of the Nisei members in solving the problems of adjustment which were faced after relocation. Although

there were sharp differences in recreational preferences between the Issei and the Nisei—based partly on the difference between Japanese and American culture and partly on the difference in age—baseball proved to be a common denominator. At some centers there were as many as 100 teams active at one time, ranging in age from youngsters in the lower grades to Issei in their sixties. In fact, if relocation center experience is any criterion, the American national pastime of baseball, which is also tremendously popular in Japan, may well prove to be one of the most effective bridges between the two types of civilization.

The Fight for Status

The anti-Japanese campaign has collapsed and only once in a while does it give a small dying quiver. The WRA and a number of people who had no close interest in the Japanese race seem about equally responsible for finishing it off and giving the rest of the country an example of what can be done for a minority.

From an article by William L. Worden in the *Saturday Evening Post,* May 4, 1946.

BY EARLY summer of 1942 the 70,000 west coast Nisei had reached what was probably the lowest status that any group of American citizens of comparable size has ever experienced. They had been removed from their homes by Army fiat. They had been placed in government-operated camps surrounded by troops and watchtowers. They had lost, temporarily at least, practically all freedom of movement and practically all opportunities of engaging in private employment and earning anything more than a subsistence livelihood. On June 17, they were officially declared, "except as may be authorized in special cases," unacceptable for service in the armed forces.

Almost from the beginning WRA had taken the position that an important part of its job was to counteract the unreasoning prejudice which had been built up against persons of Japanese descent—an unreasoning prejudice which was in part the cause and in part the result of this loss of status—and to aid them in regaining their rightful places in American life. As the agency learned more about the Nisei and their background during the spring and summer of 1942, this conviction was greatly strengthened and reenforced. The Director perceived, soon after his appointment, that the most important key to the regaining of status was the opportunity for service with the armed forces. Starting in July of 1942, he began pressing this point home to the Assistant Secretary of War and other officials of the War Department on almost every available occasion.

Recruitment for Military Intelligence

At about this same time the War Department began a program to recruit some American citizens of Japanese descent as "exceptional cases" under the meaning of its June 17 directive. The Military Intelligence Service, realizing that men skilled in the Japanese language would be vitally needed in the Pacific war, had established a school for this purpose at Camp Savage, Minn. During September and October recruiting officers were sent out to all WRA centers in an effort to enlist volunteers among the male citizens at the centers who

had a good working knowledge of the Japanese language and could be trained into something approaching expert knowledge in a comparatively brief course. Ironically, the great majority of the evacuees at the centers who were able to meet these qualifications were Kibei, members of the very group which had been singled out by Commander Ringle, General DeWitt, and others as the most disaffected element of the Japanese American population. By the end of the year a total of 167 young American citizens from WRA centers had met the necessary requirements and were either already enrolled or in the process of being enrolled in the Camp Savage school. Ironically again, the largest number of these volunteers came from Tule Lake.

Formation of the Combat Team

While the Director of WRA was at the Gila River center in the fall of 1942 during the period of language school recruitment, he overheard one Nisei telling another that "nobody but a damned Kibei can get into this man's Army." Upon returning to Washington, the Director repeated this story to the Assistant Secretary of War and used it to illustrate the point that large numbers of Nisei who most earnestly wanted to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States were being somewhat arbitrarily denied the opportunity to do so. The Assistant Secretary, plainly impressed and generally sympathetic with the idea of Nisei service, promised to redouble his efforts to achieve some kind of change in the War Department's policy.

The plan which the Assistant Secretary eventually devised and which was outlined to the Director and two of his staff members at the Sunday morning meeting in mid-January of 1943 was only a partial achievement of the goal which the Director had been seeking. But it was definitely a step in the right direction. It was based on the premise that Americans of Japanese ancestry should have at least the opportunity of volunteering for military service and that their accomplishments could be most effectively spotlighted and brought to the attention of the American public if they served in an all-Nisei unit. Although many Nisei at the centers were unable to accept this latter point during the mass registration program, subsequent events have proved its soundness beyond all possibility of doubt.

The all-Nisei combat team was finally pulled together in the late spring of 1943. Although volunteering at the relocation centers fell considerably below the hopes of both the War Department and WRA, the response in Hawaii—where there had been no mass evacuation and no confinement of Nisei in government-operated centers—was more than enough to make up the complement needed for the combat team. In April a group of approximately 5,000 Nisei volunteers, including a few from the mainland who had not been in relocation centers, went into training at Camp Shelby, Miss. Over a year later, on a morning in May 1944, shrouded in a veil of military secrecy, these troops filed up the gangplank of an Army transport at Hampton Roads, Va., bound for southern Italy. They arrived in Naples on May 28.

Public Attitudes in 1942

Once the people of Japanese descent were moved out of the west coast area and into assembly or relocation centers, the "near-hysteria" which had been generated around them during the early months of 1942 gradually died down. Throughout the summer and early fall most of the news stories about the evacuees which appeared in the west coast press were reasonably objective and dealt mainly with conditions of life at the assembly and relocation centers. In the immediate vicinity of nearly all centers, however, there was a considerable amount of public uneasiness about these little understood people who had been torn from their homes and placed in camps by Army order.

People in the nearby communities tended to regard the "Jap camps" with mingled feelings of suspicion and fear, usually referred to the inmates as "internees" or even "prisoners of war," and were inclined to blame most of the wartime shortages which were so keenly affecting their own lives on the "excessive" requirements of the centers. Trucks which passed through these communities loaded with food, building materials, and all the other various items of equipment and supply consigned to the centers were nearly always noticed by some of the townspeople and their contents were frequently multiplied many times over as the story passed from mouth to mouth. Residents of the local communities who worked for contractors on the construction of the centers and watched the arrival of the early contingents of evacuees were constantly spreading hair-raising stories about the things that were taking place in the "Jap camps" and about the "subversive" character of the residents.

After the few local flareups around the food issue during the fall of 1942 which have already been discussed, the problem of strained relations with nearby communities reached a high point in January. Shortly after the turn of the year a correspondent for the Memphis *Commercial Appeal* stationed in Little Rock, Ark., made a quick trip to the Jerome center and emerged with a series of stories of mismanagement, waste, and evacuee arrogance which were based largely on interviews with members of the contractor's crew who had worked on the construction of the center. These stories, which were published not only by the *Commercial Appeal* but by many other Scripps-Howard newspapers throughout the country, added considerable fuel to the fire of Nation-wide public indignation which had already been lit by the Poston and Manzanar incidents. By the time Senator Chandler's subcommittee started its investigations, WRA was already definitely on the defensive and, instead of trying to build favorable public attitudes toward the evacuated people, was concentrating its energies mainly on counteracting the extremely critical temper of public opinion which had already been developed.

The Senate Investigation

One of the prominent officials of the American Legion once boasted to the executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee

that he was largely responsible for stimulating both the Chandler committee and the Dies committee to investigate the WRA program. Whether or not this statement is accurate, it is obvious that the anti-oriental forces on the west coast, including the California State Department of the Legion, were enthusiastic supporters of the investigation and actively cooperated with the committee members and staff employees in carrying it out. These groups, which had apparently assumed that their major objective was gained once the evacuation was ordered and accomplished, seem to have become gradually aware during the fall of 1942 that the fate of the Japanese American people was being guided by an agency which did not wholly share their prejudices and purposes. Their strategy, rather clearly, was first to discredit the WRA in the eyes of the American people and then urge the transfer of its program to the War Department.

The War Department, which had its hands full with other responsibilities, was not especially receptive to this idea. After Senator Wallgren had introduced his bill aimed at transferring WRA responsibilities to the War Department and Senator Chandler's subcommittee had been appointed to investigate the question, several high officials of the War Department made it quite clear that they would oppose the bill vigorously. This development tended to circumscribe the activities of Senator Chandler's committee rather sharply and is probably largely responsible for the somewhat indecisive result of its investigations.

After making a highly publicized tour through several of the relocation centers in California, Arizona, and Arkansas and issuing a series of headline-making statements to the press, Senator Chandler returned to Washington late in March. In his letter of April 8 to the Director of WRA, Senator Chandler indicated that the subcommittee had come to three tentative conclusions:

(1) Testimony seemed to reveal that in the opinion of those interviewed the draft law should apply to all Japanese Americans just the same as to other citizens and residents of the United States;

(2) Opinion was apparently unanimous that all of the loyal, able-bodied Japanese should be gotten out to work at the earliest possible time in areas where they will be accepted and where the Army considers it safe for them to go;

(3) Those interrogated held the opinion that those who answered "no" to the loyalty question and those otherwise determined to be disloyal should be placed in internment camps.

The last of these three conclusions has already been dealt with in a previous section of this report; the first two were wholly consistent with WRA attitudes and policies. In early May the subcommittee issued a formal report of its investigation and reiterated these three conclusions which Senator Chandler had tentatively submitted to the Director on April 8.

The Heart Mountain Food Stories

In early 1943 the publisher of the Denver *Post*, one of the most influential newspapers in the Rocky Mountain region, told the chief

of WRA's Reports Division that he regarded all the people of Japanese descent as "enemies of the United States" and that he had every intention of guiding the editorial and reportorial policies of his paper in accordance with that fundamental thesis. On May 23 the *Post* provided concrete evidence that its publisher meant what he had said. Under the headline "Food Is Hoarded for Japs in U. S. While Americans in Nippon Are Tortured," the *Post* on that day ran the first of a series of feature stories by its sports editor, Jack Carberry, dealing with the food inventories and other phases of project administration at the Heart Mountain center in Wyoming.

Due to a combination of excessive purchasing by the Quartermaster Depot of the Army and some bad planning by certain members of the Heart Mountain staff, the stock of canned goods and processed foods on hand in the center at this time was unquestionably far above the needs of the center population; in fact, the supply of some of these commodities would have been sufficient to meet the requirements of the center for a period of approximately 3 years. All these foods, however, had been purchased in strict conformity with the rationing regulations for "institutional users" and were easily transferable to other centers without noticeable loss or wastage. The main trouble with Jack Carberry's articles was not that they were inaccurate—although in many particulars they were—but that they were very plainly motivated by a desire to present certain facts as extravagantly and infuriatingly as possible. In the first of the stories, for example, Carberry pointed out that the center had $12,000 worth of prepared baby food on hand with "five babies in the camp hospital." No mention was made of the fact that there were dozens of babies in the center which had outgrown the hospital age. In the second story, headlined "America's Jap 'Guests' Refuse to Work but Nips Enslave Yankees," Carberry reported that the director of the National Beet Growers Association wrote WRA suggesting "drastic measures such as restricting diet" to force evacuees to leave the centers and that WRA's reply merely "made excuses for the failure of the Japanese to accept the high-paying offers." These few quotations are amply indicative of the type of reporting that went into the whole series of seven articles.

The Costello Subcommittee

Before WRA had any chance whatever to recover from the effects of the *Commercial Appeal's* stories, the Chandler committee investigations, and the Denver *Post* food articles, the agency was under fire from another group which made all its previous attackers seem restrained and almost objective by comparison. On May 12 two men who identified themselves as "investigators for the Dies committee" appeared without warning at the Manzanar center and immediately began an intensive questioning of the Project Director and some of his principal staff members. Although WRA did not realize it at the time, the special committee of the House of Representatives on Un-American Activities under the chairmanship of Representative Martin

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Dies had decided to investigate the WRA program and had appointed a special 3-man subcommittee for this purpose. Many months later WRA learned that the investigation was undertaken largely on the instigation of Representative J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey.

The 3 men making up the subcommittee which investigated the WRA program were Representative John M. Costello of California, serving as chairman; Representative Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota; and Representative Herman P. Eberharter of Pennsylvania. In contrast to the procedure followed by the Chandler committee, the Costello subcommittee conducted its field investigation and aired its charges thoroughly in the press before giving the Director of WRA an opportunity to present the facts. Shortly after the arrival of the two investigators at Manzanar, Representative Thomas, a member of the full committee but not of the subcommittee, made a trip to the west coast for the rather obvious purpose of setting the stage for the hearings. In a press conference held at Los Angeles, Representative Thomas accused WRA of pampering and overfeeding the evacuees, declared that the committee had evidence pointing to the existence of an organized division of the Japanese Army on the west coast before Pearl Harbor, and called for an immediate termination of "WRA's policy of releasing disloyal Japs." The only release policy which should be followed, he added, was one of exchanging evacuees in the relocation centers for American citizens in the hands of the Japanese.

On June 8 the three members of the subcommittee began a series of hearings in Los Angeles which stretched over a period of 9 days and which were featured primarily by the testimony of several present and former members of the staff at the Colorado River center. All of the former Poston employees who were questioned had been discharged by the WRA for incompetence and one of them has been characterized by Dr. Alexander Leighton, a staff member at Poston and a trained psychiatrist, in terms that leave little doubt about his being a psychotic personality. This last witness was quoted in the press far more fully than any of the others. He described the Poston incident of the preceding November in terms which made it appear like an Axis-inspired uprising, talked darkly about caches of food buried in the desert for the use of Japanese paratroopers, declared there were "over 1,000 Japanese soldiers and Japanese officers" in the Poston population, and described the "poor simpleton, cowering Caucasian employees standing around like whipped children" during the climax of the incident. The testimony of the Assistant Project Director at Poston and the other active officials of the center was rather briefly and inadequately reported by most of the west coast newspapers.

While all this was going on, WRA made its first acquaintance with Ray Richards, a special reporter for the Hearst newspapers stationed in Washington apparently for the primary purpose of exciting the American public to the highest possible pitch of indignation against the evacuated population. Beginning around the middle of May, Richards began pouring forth a steady volume of daily stories based on "information" obtained from the headquarters of the Dies commit-

tee. All of these stories were spectacular, and many of them attempted to build up the interest of the readers and focus attention on the committee's investigation by hinting at "even more sensational revelations" to come. During the same period statements from members of the committee's staff, particularly its chief investigator, Robert E. Stripling, were also being rather regularly and fully reported by a number of other newspapers and were being carried, in somewhat briefer versions and a little more spasmodically, by the major wire services. Other members of the committee—notably Representative Thomas, Chairman Dies, and Acting Chairman Joe Starnes of Alabama—were also being quoted at frequent intervals and always in flamboyant terms. By the time the subcommittee returned to Washington toward the end of June, the WRA program and the evacuated people had become, for the first time, unmistakably an issue of Nationwide interest.

Starting on July 6, the Director of WRA was finally given an opportunity to tell the members of the subcommittee about the aims and policies of WRA and the procedures which the agency was actually following in "releasing" people from the relocation centers. Although WRA had previously been reluctant to talk about the international implications of its program—because of fear that this would tend to intensify the public confusion regarding the true status of the evacuees—the agency had been goaded by this time to the point where such restraint seemed meaningless. At the very first opportunity during the hearing of July 6, the Director flatly accused staff employees and members of the committee of stirring up groundless public antagonism and advocating repressive policies which might well result in reprisals against American prisoners in the hands of the Japanese. He went on to refute several of the committee's more flagrant accusations—a refutation of all of the scores of charges which had appeared in the press would have required literally months of intensive effort—and called for a recognition of the American principles which the committee was presumably interested in fostering.

After all this turbulence, the report issued by the committee on September 30 was surprisingly mild. It rehearsed some of the more nebulous and less spectacular charges which had appeared in the press during the course of the investigations and concluded with three recommendations:

1. That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese in the relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.

2. That a Board composed of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various intelligence agencies of the Federal Government be constituted with full powers to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications.

3. That the War Relocation Authority inaugurate a thorough-going program of Americanization for those Japanese who remain in the centers.

These recommendations had the concurrence of all the members of the full committee except Representative Eberharter. In a minority report submitted at the same time, Representative Eberharter stated,

"I can not avoid the conclusion that the report of the majority is prejudiced and that most of its statements are not proven." Proceeding to comment on the report of the majority point by point, the dissenting Congressman agreed with his colleagues that a segregation program should be carried out, but declared his conviction that WRA's preclearance investigation of evacuees and its efforts to foster Americanization at the relocation centers were entirely adequate and well executed. He wrote—

> Our Constitution does not distinguish between citizens of Japanese ancestry, or of German or Italian ancestry, and citizens of English, Dutch, Russian, or Norwegian ancestry. Loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry have the same rights as any other loyal American citizens. I believe the government was entirely right, therefore, in permitting free movement from the west coast so long as that was possible, and then in providing relocation centers when that proved necessary. The whole point of the program is to help loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry, and the law-abiding aliens, to leave the relocation centers after investigation, and become established in normal life. * * * It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive Order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority carry on unhampered by unfair criticism.

The Repercussions of the Tule Lake Incident

After enduring this relentless drumfire of criticism and spotlighting of its activities through the first half of 1943, WRA was given a welcome respite of a few months. Throughout the summer and the early fall most newspapers, except for those controlled by William Randolph Hearst, concentrated their attention on the war news and other stories, giving comparatively little space to the evacuees and the WRA program. When the next major news break on the program came, however, it proved to be one of the severest tests the agency ever faced.

On November 2, the day after the committee meeting in the administration building at Tule Lake, newspapers in almost every section of the country carried stories indicating that the Director and the members of the project staff had been "held as prisoners by an unruly mob of Japanese" and implying that a mass murder of the Caucasian employees at the center had been only narrowly averted. Three days later, after the outbreak of November 4 and the movement of troops into the center, one of the papers in the Nation's Capital, nearly 3,000 miles away, devoted its front-page banner headline to the Tule Lake situation and played it up far more importantly than the war news of the day. Practically all west coast papers featured the Tule Lake story equally prominently and most of them gave it a generous amount of space in their editorial columns.

What actually happened at Tule Lake between November 1 and November 4 has been rather fully described in the WRA semi-annual report for the period ending December 31, 1943, and will not be discussed here in detail. It was, admittedly, a tense and serious situation

and it did involve a number of center residents who were unquestionably not loyal to the United States. But the events which took place were not anywhere near as violent or dangerous as they were commonly represented in the press. The crowd which gathered outside the administration building on the afternoon of November 1 was, except for a few restless youngsters, extremely orderly and well disciplined. It was a somewhat anxious crowd, and rather clearly unfriendly to the Tule Lake administrative staff but by no means "an unruly mob." Although many stories were published that large numbers of the evacuees were armed with clubs and knives and that some of them attempted to set fire to the administration building, not one bit of evidence has ever been found to support these charges. It is true that the chief medical officer was beaten up and that some of the other members of the center staff were restrained by evacuee "sentinels" in their efforts to leave or enter the administration building. But subsequent investigation has put both of these events in a somewhat less sinister perspective than that provided by the sensational news stories of the period. The clash between the chief medical officer and the evacuee group was, quite clearly, "one of those things" which happened purely on the spur of the moment; although the point has never been finally settled, best evidence seems to indicate that the chief medical officer actually struck the first blow. The restraining of the movements of various staff members, on the other hand, does seem to have been part of a preconceived plan. But the purpose of this plan, it now appears plain, was not to molest any of the administrative staff but merely to concentrate all attentions on the administration building while the negotiations were in progress. No member of the staff except the chief medical officer was harmed or injured in any way.

The chief difficulty arose from the fact that at this rather critical period WRA's communications with the general public broke down rather badly. The reports officer at Tule Lake, who was charged with the responsibility of providing information to the press and the public, had (for wholly extraneous reasons) submitted his resignation shortly before the incident of November 1 and was completely inactive during the period of the demonstration and its aftermath. The National Director, the Field Assistant Director from the San Francisco office, and the top members of the center staff were all so fully occupied with the problems of restoring order to the severely disrupted community and revivifying the morale of a nerve-shattered administrative staff that they entirely neglected to provide a comprehensive statement of the events of November 1 to the press. In response to telephone calls from a few San Francisco reporters the National Director did answer specific questions, denying flatly statements which he knew to be untrue and indicating that others would have to be "further checked." This kind of answer had to be given because the events of November 1 had been so complicated and excitement had run so high that it was literally impossible to establish the accuracy or inaccuracy of many of the stories which were being repeated, without making a careful investigation, questioning eye-witnesses, and sifting all the evidence.

To many newspapermen, however, these answers seemed, at the very best, evasive and at the worst, deliberately dishonest. When the reports officer in the San Francisco office suggested on November 2 to a group of reporters that the stories going around about the Tule Lake incident were highly exaggerated and might well be the "work of Nazi agents," whatever reputation the agency had established for dealing honestly with the press was most seriously jeopardized. This statement by the San Francisco reports officer, it should be added, was made strictly on his own initiative and without authorization or approval of his administrative and technical supervisors. Its impact on the assembled reporters can readily be imagined. When violence broke out on the evening of November 4 and the troops moved in, some of the west coast newspapers which had been playing down the Tule Lake story thought that they had been deliberately deceived by WRA and that "the Hearst papers had been right all along."

The San Francisco *Chronicle,* which had made a scrupulous effort to treat the WRA program objectively, lashed out at the agency on November 5 in an editorial which called the top administrators "phonies" and "bad public servants." The editorial declared—

> These WRA officials have convicted themselves by denying what could not be denied. We probably owe these Japanese a reward for bringing it to light. It is now made obvious that these are bad public servants, and from this showing it must be apparent that they have been serving the public badly all along. They do not belong in a job like this. They are examples of two-bit men pitch-forked by bureaucracy into four-dollar jobs. * * *
>
> We have no hope for WRA. So long as it has charge, we may expect trouble with the disloyal Japanese who want to raise hell. Very early, WRA showed its phony quality by considering its job to be "welfare" and "uplift" work in the camps, instead of confining itself to its proper function of keeping these Japanese fed, clothed, sanitarily housed and in order. These "workers" were a joke to the amiably disposed internees, but to the vicious ones WRA became only an object of contempt, an invitation to trouble. Now that the bad Japanese have been concentrated at Tule Lake, they have lost little time in showing up WRA.

In the minds of WRA staff members, this particular editorial has always represented the low point of WRA's relations with the public and press. It was accompanied by a cartoon which depicted WRA as a slick side-show barker turning his back on an obvious riot at Tule Lake and telling the assembled reporters "It's either pingpong, boys—or Nazi propaganda."

Legislative Investigations of the Segregation Center

Almost immediately after the incident of November 4, the Tule Lake center became the focus of a whole series of investigations by members of both the California State Legislature and the Congress. A committee of the State Legislature under the chairmanship of Assemblyman Hugh Donnelly went to the nearby village of Tulelake and questioned a number of center employees who had proved particularly unreliable during the crisis and had subsequently resigned. The Project Director and Field Assistant Director at San Francisco were given an opportunity to testify only after they had requested it and were handled much more

summarily than the ex-employees whose flagrant charges and misstatements of fact were readily accepted by most of the committeemen and widely publicized in the west coast press.

Meanwhile, Representative Clair Engle, whose district in California included the Tule Lake center, made a hurried trip to the area in an effort to learn first-hand about the incident. Upon finding that he could not enter the center because the Army was rigidly controlling all ingress and egress at this period, he confined himself, by his own statement, to sitting in on the Donnelly committee hearings in the village of Tulelake. After returning to Washington, Representative Engle immediately began urging a full-dress investigation of the WRA administration and the transfer of its whole program to the War Department.

Shortly after the National Director returned to Washington from his field trip on November 10, he issued a statement to the press explaining what had happened at Tule Lake and providing factual information on some of the principal charges that were being circulated. At this point it should be explained that the Washington office had been attempting for nearly 2 weeks to issue such a statement but had been seriously hampered in doing so by the tight control which the Army authorities had imposed upon all communications in and out of the center. The Director's statement of November 13 represented a careful effort to tell the story of an extraordinarily complicated event as accurately as it could be told at that time. But it came too late to head off the widespread public criticism of the agency's activities.

In the midst of this rather crucial situation WRA suffered another setback in prestige which nearly proved fatal. This was the widely known "bathtub incident." Early in December the Cleveland area office issued a newsletter for circulation among evacuees in the centers entitled "Midwest Frontiers." The first issue of this publication carried an article by the district relocation officer in Columbus on farming opportunities for evacuees in Ohio and the other North Central States. Designed mainly to persuade the evacuees that there were good relocation opportunities in the farming sections of the region, the article also mentioned, somewhat incidentally, some of the contributions that the evacuees might make to better rural living in the Middle West. In this connection, the writer was indiscreet enough to cite the widely known habits of cleanliness among the evacuees and to point out that many midwestern farm homes lacked the elementary convenience of a bathtub. This passage was spotted by a sharp-eyed reporter and soon built into a news story of national proportions. Inside of 48 hours WRA was condemned or ridiculed editorially by at least a dozen prominent eastern or midwestern newspapers, denounced by fully a score of Congressmen from the same sections of the country, and was being quietly, but nonetheless severely criticized for bad judgment within the executive branch of the government. The "bathtub incident" has frequently been treated rather light-heartedly by writers and commentators on the WRA program; and there is no denying that, in retrospect, it does have its humorous side. But to the agency at this particular period, it was rather grim business.

Before the "bathtub incident" had really reached its height, the Director was called upon for intense questioning by three congressional groups in fairly rapid succession—the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, the unofficial group made up of the House members from the three Pacific Coast States, and finally the Costello subcommittee. Representative Engle appeared before all three of these groups, charged WRA with extremely bad management, and demanded an immediate and drastic change in the program for "handling the Japanese." After representatives of the War Department had made it clear once again that they opposed the transfer of the program to their jurisdiction, the Costello subcommittee began exploring the possibility of having the program shifted to the Department of Justice. During this period Representative Engle circulated a petition among the members of the west coast delegation calling for the immediate removal of the National Director, and Ray Richards used the news columns of the Hearst papers to hammer away at this particular theme with every device at his command. After Attorney General Biddle had told the members of the west coast delegation that they were "playing with fire" and representatives of the State Department had stressed the grave international complications that might result from transferring the WRA program to military control, however, this particular campaign began to lose some of its urgency.

The Costello subcommittee, following the pattern of the previous summer, produced both a majority and a minority report on the Tule Lake situation. The majority report was comparatively brief, heavily interlarded with charges that had been made before the Donnelly committee, and topped off by four recommendations:

1. That Dillon S. Myer and Ray R. Best be removed from the present positions as National Director and Tule Lake Project Director, respectively, because of their evident inability to cope with the problem of disloyal Japanese.

2. That the Tule Lake center and the disloyal Japanese segregated there be placed under the jurisdiction and administrative control of the Department of Justice.

3. That a report be submitted to the Congress at an early date listing the Japanese responsible for the attack on [the chief medical officer] on November 1, 1943, and those Japanese guilty of inciting the riot which occurred the same day and also what disciplinary or legal action has been instituted against such persons.

4. That the duty of policing all Japanese relocation and segregation centers be carried out by Caucasians and in sufficient strength so as to guarantee protection to the lives and property of all persons residing therein.

Representative Eberharter, who appeared once again as the dissenting member of the subcommittee, took sharp exception to all four of the recommendations and characterized the investigation as "a painful parody on fair-minded and constructive congressional inquiry." His description of the investigating techniques employed by the majority members is especially noteworthy. He wrote—

An onlooker would have concluded that the committee was acting in the role of prosecuting attorney rather than as judge or as Grand Jury. It seemed that every opportunity was pounced upon to ferret out minor flaws, and to get abundant publicity on the wildest allegations. Testimony of discharged or disgruntled former employees received close attention and, in my opinion, was given undue credence.

The cross-examination to which the War Relocation Authority officials [were] subjected did not add to the dignity or prestige of the proceedings. No effort was made to learn or understand the problems and policies of the War Relocation Authority from the highest officials of the agency until after a large portion of the public mind had been thoroughly poisoned by sensational charges, none of which (of any moment) were subsequently proven. It is not too difficult to distort the true function of a congressional investigation.

The Effort to Rebuild Public Confidence

On February 16, 1944, the War Relocation Authority was transferred, upon recommendation of Attorney General Biddle, by Executive Order to the Department of the Interior. The reason given at the time was that the move was made in the interest of reducing the number of independent agencies in the executive branch of the Government. Although this was undoubtedly a motive, it is significant that Attorney General Biddle, in his letter recommending the transfer, pointed to the need of placing the agency within the structure of a Cabinet Department as a means of helping it to build better public relations.

About this time two factors began to work toward the establishment of somewhat healthier public attitudes toward the evacuated people. The first of these was the gradual dispersal of several thousand Nisei across a wide area of the Middle West and the eastern seaboard through the relocation program, and the consequent realization by a growing number of Americans that the evacuees were not quite such monsters as they had been depicted. The second was the increasing publicization of the activities of Japanese American troops in combat. This latter development was particularly striking and dramatic.

Shortly after the transfer of the War Relocation Authority to the Department of the Interior, Secretary Ickes called upon the War Department to fulfill the commitments it had made to the evacuees at the time of the mass registration and bring the full spotlight of publicity on the Nisei units. The War Department readily agreed and soon found that it had excellent subject matter for such publicization. The first Japanese American unit to arrive in Italy was the 100th Infantry Battalion built originally around a prewar Nisei National Guard unit in Hawaii and composed mainly of Nisei volunteers from the Islands. After a training period, first at Camp McCoy, Wisc., and then at Camp Shelby, Miss., the 100th Battalion embarked for southern Europe from an east coast port in the early fall of 1943. By the time the combat team from Camp Shelby arrived in Italy in the spring of 1944, the 100th Battalion had already spent many months in the thick of combat, had suffered extremely heavy casualties, and had won the praise of practically all officers and men associated with it. In order to provide the combat team with a leaven of seasoned troops, the 100th Infantry was incorporated into the larger unit which was then made up of three battalions—the 100th, the second, and the third. This reconstituted unit then began a slow, bloody march up the peninsula of Italy which stands out as one of the many memorable military exploits of World War II.

By January 20, 1944, the officials of the War Department had already

been so deeply impressed by the spirit and determination of these troops that they had decided to begin recruiting Nisei for the Army through the regular Selective Service procedures. In a public announcement of this change in policy, the War Department paid tribute both to the "excellent showing" of the combat team in training and to the "outstanding record achieved by the 100th Battalion." Reinstitution of Selective Service for Nisei was a definite achievement—a long step forward in the effort to win popular and official recognition of the rights of the evacuees. At the relocation centers, however, it precipitated another conflict between the residents and the administrative staff and another period of badly strained relations.

At the Heart Mountain center, where the reaction against Selective Service was particularly strong and outspoken, a total of 85 Nisei held out indefinitely against the draft and were eventually convicted in Federal court for failure to comply with the provisions of the Selective Service Act. At other centers there were similar, but less turbulent, protests. The general tenor of these protests was that the Nisei had been deprived of many of the rights of their citizenship and that these rights should be fully restored before the group could properly be called upon to assume the serious obligation of serving in the Army. Although there was a certain amount of undeniable logic in this contention, WRA attempted to point out that this line of reasoning was likely to prove highly ineffective with a still-unconvinced American public and that it actually meant "putting the cart before the horse." After the initial upsurges of protest and bitterness had spent themselves, the community council leaders and the more stable element in the Issei population at most centers eventually came to accept the WRA position and began to urge that Army service by the Nisei offered the most practical opportunity for demonstrating loyalty and gradually winning back the full citizenship rights that were being sought. As the draft continued throughout 1944 and the original resistance steadily melted away, a large number of replacements for the 442nd combat team were eventually recruited from relocation centers and an increasing number of evacuee families came to feel—some of them undoubtedly for the first time—a deeply personal stake in American democracy and in the success of the American war effort.

Meanwhile, the 442nd combat team, which went into battle in June of 1944, was continuing along the path of military achievement which had been blazed earlier by the 100th Infantry Battalion. Both the record of the unit as a whole and the achievements of many of its individual members stand comparison with the very best that the American Army produced in the European Theatre. Sufficient evidence of this is provided in the fact that the combat team, with a normal complement of around 5,000 men, suffered a total of 4,430 casualties (including 569 killed in action) and received over a thousand unit or individual citations, decorations, and awards.

During the summer of 1944, while this record was gradually being built up and brought to the attention of the American public, WRA began a systematic effort to counteract the blanket charges that had

been circulated about the Japanese American people and to win acceptance for those who were resettling from the relocation centers. Operating largely through the field offices which had been established in principal cities in the East and Middle West and working in close cooperation with church groups and other private agencies interested in racial tolerance, the agency attempted to focus public attention on the really essential issues of the program and on the military record of the Nisei soldiers. Although the Authority had been carrying on a public information program since its very earliest days, this was the first real opportunity it had had to move forward on a positive basis. Throughout the first 2 years of operation there had been no really impressive and concrete evidence of Nisei loyalty to the United States which the agency could use in convincing a confused and skeptical public, and no real opportunity to plan and carry through a genuinely effective program. The time and energies of the agency's information staff had been very nearly exhausted in an effort to keep pace with the wild allegations and to provide essential information for the numerous congressional investigations.

By early fall of 1944 it was no longer fashionable over most areas of the country to fling irresponsible accusations at the Japanese American people and to demand further restrictions on their liberties. Although Representative Engle was calling in early September for an investigation of WRA's "propaganda" activities, a large number of national magazines and newspapers in cities away from the west coast were at the same time coming to a somewhat belated recognition that a serious injustice had been done to thousands of innocent people when the evacuation was ordered and were demanding fair play for these victims of a peculiar wartime situation. An editorial which appeared in the Omaha *World Herald* on October 22 is more or less typical of a point of view which was gaining increasingly wider acceptance among fair-minded journalists. The editorial began—

> It is always open season among certain of the populace on the west coast to bait Japanese Americans—the loyal along with the disloyal and the doubtful.
>
> Hence, it was not surprising that this newspaper recently received the letter it did from H. J. McClatchy of San Francisco, who signed himself as executive secretary of the California Joint Immigration Committee.
>
> Japan, he recalled, boasted of its shameful success at Pearl Harbor by issuing a commemorative postage stamp on the first anniversary. Mr. McClatchy was indignant, as any normal American would be. From that beginning, the letter went on to propose "enactment of legislation canceling the American citizenship of all who claim its privilege, yet, under the dual citizenship theory, owe their first allegiance to an overseas government." * * *
>
> The Californian's proposal would * * * give the Nisei baiters on the west coast a handy brush with which to smear all Japanese Americans—loyal and disloyal alike. It would provide a further argument with which to bar from the Pacific Coast a sizable group of American citizens who were slapped into concentration camps at the outbreak of war. That move may have been justifiable from a military viewpoint, but continuation of the ban after the war's end would be an entirely different matter.
>
> The best answer to the McClatchy proposal comes from Cassino, where the 100th Infantry Battalion, composed of Japanese Americans, carved a permanent niche for itself in American military annals. * * *

Neither the west coast nor the Nation is big enough, Mr. McClatchy, to hold both democracy and bigotry. Let's give ALL loyal Americans a fair shake. Existing laws can deal adequately with the disloyal.

It seems a little regrettable that this attitude could not have been expressed in the spring of 1942 and that so much Nisei blood had to be shed on the battlefields of Italy before it could gain widespread acceptance.

The Drive for Repeal of Exclusion

On March 11, 1943, when the WRA program was just 1 week short of being a year old, the Director sent a confidential letter to the Secretary of War which was one of the important milestones in the history of the agency. After reviewing the progress of the WRA program up to that time and outlining some of the major problems which the Authority faced, the Director indicated that there were three possible courses which could be followed in the future: (1) a further continuation of the program, already started, to relocate as many as possible of the evacuees in communities outside the west coast area; (2) immediate and complete repeal of all exclusion orders and restoration to the evacuated people of their normal civil rights; or (3) partial repeal of the exclusion orders under a plan which would permit immediate return to the evacuated area by Nisei certified as eligible for war plant work, Japanese American veterans of the first World War, and immediate family members of Nisei currently in service. Rejecting the first course as an unwarranted continuation of restrictions upon people whose loyalties had been rather fully tested and passing over the second as a long-time goal rather than an immediate objective, the Director strongly urged adoption of the third course—or, as it was called in the letter, Plan C.

In a reply dated May 10 Secretary Stimson pointed out that the War Department had been deeply impressed by "a serious deterioration in evacuee morale." He continued—

This unsatisfactory development appears to be the result in large measure of the activities of a vicious, well-organized, pro-Japanese minority group to be found at each relocation project. Through agitation and by violence, these groups gained control of many aspects of internal project administration, so much so that it became disadvantageous, and sometimes dangerous, to express loyalty to the United States. The fact that these groups were permitted to remain in power not only shook the confidence of the loyal ones in their government, but also effectively stifled the expression of pro-American sentiment. It has been, and remains, the opinion of the War Department, already frequently expressed to you, that much trouble could have been avoided if these troublemakers had been removed from the relocation centers and placed in rigorous confinement. * * *

The importance which the War Department attaches to segregation renders premature any consideration of relaxing the restrictions in force in the Western Defense Command against persons of Japanese ancestry, as suggested in your Plans B and C. The War Department, however, is not necessarily committed to a policy of maintaining these restrictions for the duration of the war. The question can easily be reconsidered after the results of segregation have been observed.

In the meantime, the War Department will continue to do all it can to assist the War Relocation Authority in the permanent resettlement of all persons of Japanese ancestry loyal to the United States, so that their services may be profitably utilized

in the war effort. In this connection, the reinstitution of general Selective Service procedures is being actively considered. * * * Similarly, the operations of the Japanese American Joint Board, initiated by the War Department, will clear the way to the employment of many loyal Japanese Americans in war industry.

As previously noted, general Selective Service procedures for the Nisei were not reinstituted until about 8 months after this letter was written and the total number of Nisei cleared for work in war plants by the Joint Board at any time was less than 500. Ample comment on the other aspects of Secretary Stimson's letter was provided in a reply which the Director sent to the Secretary on June 8. The Director wrote—

I feel it is only fair to point out that if segregation could have been accomplished by the War Relocation Authority during 1942 and the early part of this year as easily as your letter implies, it could also have been accomplished by the War Department during the evacuation period. Substantially all the information about individual evacuees actually available to the War Relocation Authority prior to registration was available to the Army at the time of evacuation and later. If mass segregation on a fair and individual basis is so simple that the War Relocation Authority is to be criticized for not accomplishing it, it is difficult to see why a wholesale evacuation of all the persons of Japanese descent was ever necessary. * * *

Until the registration was effectuated, the War Relocation Authority had no adequate basis for conducting a large scale segregation program based upon the examination of individual cases. The Japanese American population was turned over to the War Relocation Authority progressively from May to November 1942. No basic records were supplied the Authority by the Army. We were denied the privilege of securing questionnaires from evacuees while they remained in assembly centers. We had no access to the intelligence records of the period prior to evacuation. We had no information about the individuals in our custody except that which was developed during the course of managing the centers.

* * * I think it is elementary that the influence of agitators in any group of people depends more upon the receptivity of the group than upon the skill and energy of the agitators. The disloyal group, in my judgment, would have relatively little influence upon the majority of the Japanese American population if they were not already badly demoralized as a result of the treatment they have received. * * * The real cause of bad evacuee morale is evacuation and all the losses, insecurity, and frustration it entailed, plus the continual "drum drum" of certain harbingers of hate and fear whose expressions appear in the public press or are broadcast over the radio. A segregation program which imposes additional restrictions on the disloyal, without removing the restrictions and reestablishing the rights of the loyal, will not accomplish very much in improvement of morale.

[However] I agree, that, in view of the importance which has been attached to segregation by the War Department and by other agencies and individuals who are guided by the War Department position in this matter, public acceptance of the loyal evacuees will no doubt be facilitated by a program of segregation.

By the spring of 1944, with segregation fully accomplished and a Japanese attack on the west coast no longer a substantial possibility, the Secretary of War finally joined with Secretary Ickes and Attorney General Biddle in urging revocation of the mass exclusion orders. The proposal was postponed, however, by the President with the promise that it would have his further consideration and probable approval at a later date. It was not until almost the very end of the year that all the details had been worked out and the involuntary exile of the Japanese American people could be brought officially to an end. During the late summer and early fall, however, the Western Defense Command adopted an increasingly liberal policy in granting permits

to individual evacuees who applied for the privilege of returning to the coast. By December 17 there were probably nearly 2,000 Japanese Americans already in the exclusion area—about half of them people who had been granted exemptions by the Western Defense Command at the time of the original evacuation and the most of the remainder persons who had received individual permits in 1944.

The Hardening of the West Coast Opposition

Throughout the fall of 1944, as an increasing number of Japanese faces began to appear on the streets of west coast communities, there was a distinct resurgence of ill feeling against the evacuated people and against the War Relocation Authority. Since the War Department persistently rejected all WRA suggestions that it make a public statement about its "individual permit" policy, a great many west coast citizens were deeply convinced that the WRA was indulging in a deliberate policy of "infiltrating" the evacuees back into the coastal areas in defiance of military orders. Since the Authority could not counter these charges without revealing a policy which the War Department insisted upon keeping secret, this antipathy grew steadily more outspoken and more vehement.

As early as September, the return of a Nisei girl to a junior college in Pasadena stirred up a storm of protest which had the citizens of that community divided into two sharply opposing camps and which was reported in the newspapers over wide sections of the country. Although the opposition to the Nisei girl's return was considerably diminished when it became known that she was there with the full approval of the War Department, the incident was a significant manifestation of a rather widespread popular feeling which was later to take on far more dangerous and vicious proportions. In late November, just a few weeks before revocation of the exclusion orders, an American Legion Post in Hood River, Ore., added fuel to the fire by erasing the names of 16 Nisei servicemen from the community honor roll. This incident, which aroused the indignation of fair-minded people in almost every section of the country and was editorially condemned by dozens of newspapers, was eventually repudiated many months later by the national officials of the American Legion and even by the notoriously anti-evacuee California Department. Before this happy result had been accomplished, however, a great deal of racial venom had been poured forth and a large number of returning evacuees had spent many troubled hours.

Since the revocation of the exclusion orders did not result in an immediate mass influx of evacuees back to the coastal areas, the whole region was comparatively calm for a period of several weeks. Beginning in late January, however, and building up to a climax toward the end of spring, the anti-evacuee elements of the west coast population employed practically every weapon short of lynching and murder to keep the people of Japanese descent from returning to the area. Early

arrivers in many west coast communities were greeted with hostile signs in store windows and were bluntly told that they were not welcome. In some communities they found it almost impossible, for a time, to obtain service in retail stores. Many of the people still at the centers received letters from their old neighbors and "friends" warning them not to come back and telling them that it was "for their own good" to remain in relocation centers. Some of the returned evacuees were recipients of threatening and anonymous telephone calls while others were visited by delegations of townspeople who warned them to "clear out" at the earliest opportunity. Some of those who lived in the more isolated rural sections were visited by a more sinister type of caller—night-riding hoodlums who made their sentiments known with the language of a shotgun.

By May 14 these incidents had reached such proportions that Secretary Ickes issued a public statement denouncing the perpetrators and demanding more effective protection for the returning evacuees. In the announcement he indicated that 24 incidents of violence or open intimidation had been recorded—15 shooting attacks, 1 attempted dynamiting, 3 arson cases, and 5 threatening visits. The Secretary declared—

> In the absence of vigorous local law enforcement a pattern of planned terrorism by hoodlums has developed. It is a matter of national concern because this lawless minority, whose actions are condemned by the decent citizens who make up an overwhelming majority of west coast residents, seems determined to employ its Nazi storm trooper tactics against loyal Japanese Americans and law-abiding Japanese aliens in spite of the state laws and constitutional safeguards designed to protect the lives and property of all of the people of this country. With VE day achieved and the Nation turning its full strength to the defeat of Japan, west coast law enforcement officials must be on their guard to see that the terrorists, cloaking themselves in false pariotism, do not attempt new outrages against loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry. Many of the evacuees' Nisei sons are fighting the Japanese enemy in the Philippines, at Okinawa, and in other Pacific combat areas. They are far more in the American tradition than the race-baiters fighting a private war safely at home.

Two weeks later, when a rancher near Fresno confessed to shooting at the home of a returned evacuee family and was promptly given a suspended sentence by the local Justice of the Peace, Secretary Ickes took occasion to lash out at the ineffectiveness of California law enforcement once again. Criticizing the Justice of the Peace as a "disgrace to the bench" for his "trivial handling of the case," the Secretary declared that "law and disorder" had replaced the ideal of law and order in many sections of California. By this time over 40 newspaper writers in various sections of the country, including nine in California, had commented editorially on the Secretary's earlier remarks and had demanded that the racial terrorists of California be brought under effective control.

A few weeks before the Fresno shooting incident, another example of terrorism occurred in the southern part of California which was eventually to have an even more dramatic and somewhat happier conclusion. On the night of May 4 a group of men paid a visit to Mary Masuda, an evacuee girl who had just a short time previously returned to her home at Talbert, Calif., from the Gila River center. These callers made it quite clear that Miss Masuda's presence in the com-

munity was not desired and that there was every possibility of her suffering physical injury if she persisted in remaining. The girl, whose brother had been killed in action some months earlier with the 442nd combat team in Italy, was nearly hysterical and left the community a few days later. The incident, however, succeeded in arousing not only Nation-wide interest—but what was perhaps more immediately important—the active sympathy of some of the more democratic-minded elements in Talbert and in the nearby community of Santa Ana. This growth of local interest in the case made it possible for Miss Masuda to return from Gila River a few weeks later almost unnoticed and

Nisei on the road to Rome

planted a seed which was to have its full flowering only after the war against Japan had been won and the last of the relocation centers had been closed.

Throughout this period WRA was constantly seeking to keep the spotlight of national attention focused on the racial terrorism in California and also working actively with the law enforcement officials and the good will groups within the State. One of the agency's most difficult problems was to convince many of the Californians that the people of Japanese descent had proved their loyalty beyond any reasonable doubt

and that they should be entitled to resume their former occupations and their former positions in the community life. From many highly reliable sources, the Authority knew that Nisei soldiers had performed outstanding service not only in the European Theatre but against the Japanese enemy as well. The men who had passed through the Military Intelligence Service Language School, which was located first at Camp Savage and then later at Fort Snelling, both in Minnesota, had proved their value in almost every major Pacific campaign from Guadalcanal through Iwo Jima. Although they had not ordinarily served in active combat and thus had not suffered casualties comparable to those of the 442nd combat team, their patriotism and devotion to duty had been just as clearly and effectively demonstrated. Because of "security" considerations, however, the War Department persistently refused to sanction any publicization of these activities and would not even approve any references to them by WRA in speeches or releases of any kind.

As far back as September 16, 1944, the Washington *Post*, having heard about the record of Nisei in the Pacific, took occasion to comment editorially on this policy of the War Department. The *Post* editorial writer stated—

> The War Department's expressed reason for its silence about such exploits is that the men's families, if still in Japan, might suffer reprisals from the Japanese. It seems to us a curious explanation. In many cases, the families of these men are not in the hands of the enemy at all but in the hands of an agency of the United States Government. They are "detained" in "relocation centers" because the War Department lacks sufficient faith in American democracy to permit them to return to their homes. And in other cases, the caution strikes us as excessive; it is not applied to men whose families may be subject to Nazi reprisals in Lithuania or Czechoslovakia or Norway. The Nisei have made a magnificent record in this war. Their fellow Americans ought to hear about it—if only to assure their families better treatment here at home.

The Army Speakers

Shortly before VJ day, the cumulative effects of all the efforts which WRA and cooperating agencies and groups had made to combat racial terrorism in California began to make themselves felt. Although the terrorism did not disappear completely, the incidents showed a marked decline, both in frequency and seriousness, as compared with the previous spring. One factor in achieving this result was the insistence of the top law enforcement officials of the state that the rights of the returning evacuees must be protected. Another was the west coast speakers' program sponsored by the War Department.

The original impetus for this program came from Capt. George H. Grandstaff, a Californian and staff officer with the 100th Infantry Battalion. Writing to the War Department on June 15 from his home in Arcadia, Calif., Captain Grandstaff, who was on furlough at the time, expressed his reasons for wanting to undertake a speaking assignment. He wrote—

> As one of the few white officers who have served with the Japanese American 100th Battalion for some two and a half years, my main interest is to see that the

splendid work they have done in combat is called to the attention of the people of the Pacific coast in order that Japanese Americans who desire to return here may receive fair treatment. The thought in * * * [my] mind * * * was that a white officer who had lived in California most of his life could emphasize their splendid combat record as no Japanese American could. Racial prejudice would not enter the minds of an audience where I am concerned.

A few weeks later Captain Grandstaff was assigned to WRA for a 30-day tour of duty in the Pacific coast area. He was the first of five such officers who performed such assignments between midsummer and the end of the year 1945. The others were Capt. Thomas E. Crowley, Capt. Arthur W. Munch, and Lt. Roger W. Smith—all of the 442nd combat team—and Lt. Col. Wallace H. Moore from the Pacific Theatre of Operations.

These men went into communities all over the west coast region, concentrating particularly on the rural areas where prejudice seemed to be heaviest, and brought the story of Nisei loyalty and valor directly to the people. They spoke in school auditoriums, before service club luncheons, and at a few community-wide gatherings. They talked individually with respected and influential members of the community—chiefs of police, sheriffs, local editors, and other prominent citizens.

The officer from the Pacific Theatre, Lieutenant Colonel Moore, was the last one assigned to this duty and was particularly effective because of the nature of his background. A Californian and a member of the faculty on military leave from the University of California, Colonel Moore had supervised the activities of several groups of the Nisei graduates of the language school from the time when a small group of them was landed on Guadalcanal throughout the balance of the Pacific war. Since the War Department had by this time modified its previous policy of uncommunicativeness about the activities of the Nisei in the Pacific, Colonel Moore was able to tell this particular phase of the Japanese American war record fully and convincingly. The impact of his presentation was demonstrated at meeting after meeting where members of the audience went out of their way to tell him, after the speech was over, that he had thrown new light on the Japanese American problem and profoundly influenced their previous attitudes.

Beyond a doubt, Lieutenant Colonel Moore and the combat team speakers were among the most effective allies which WRA had in its 3-year campaign to regain status for the evacuated people. Although they certainly did not succeed in entirely eliminating anti-Nisei prejudice from the west coast region, they unquestionably dealt it one of the heaviest and most crippling blows which it has suffered since its birth in the early 1900's.

The Masuda Presentation

The climax to these activities occurred one day after the fourth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, in the southern California community of Santa Ana. In midsummer WRA had learned that Staff Sergeant Kazuo Masuda, the brother of the girl who had been temporarily frightened away from her home in Talbert in the spring, had

won a Distinguished Service Cross which was to be awarded posthumously to some member of the family. Sensing an opportunity to focus Nation-wide public attention both on west coast terrorism and on the service record of the Nisei, WRA worked closely with the War Department to make this presentation ceremony a particularly noteworthy occasion. When Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell was quoted in the press on October 11 as advocating the formation of a "Pickax Club" to protect Nisei soldiers from "barfly commandos," the Authority immediately decided that he would be the ideal officer to award the Masuda medal. In early December General Stilwell flew across the country from Washington to Orange County, Calif., especially for the ceremony. The presentation ceremony was vividly described in a Los Angeles *Times* story of December 9.

The four-star general presented the medal in no pretentious ceremony. There was no fanfare. Instead, he went to the farm cottage near Santa Ana where the soldier's parents, George and Tamae Masuda, live and there, after reading the citation, he conferred the military decoration on the Nisei's sister, Mary.

A crowd of neighbors and Orange County civic leaders had gathered on the bare lawn by the time the official party drove up to the unpainted Masuda cottage. They parted to make way for the general.

Stilwell led the way to the front porch where members of the Masuda family were waiting. At the bottom of the steps he raised his hand in salute to the family, and Pfc. Masao Masuda, 29-year-old Ft. Snelling soldier soon to go overseas, returned the gesture.

Then [General Stilwell's aide] read the citation. It told how Staff Sgt. Kazuo Masuda had walked through 200 yards of enemy fire and single-handed had set up an improvised mortar position to pour 20 rounds of ammunition into the enemy. It also told how he gave his own life to save the lives of men he was leading on a night patrol into heavily mined enemy territory.

"I've seen a good deal of the Nisei in service and never yet have I found one of them who didn't do his duty right up to the handle," said Stilwell, addressing Mary Masuda. "The Distinguished Service Cross in itself is a small thing, but since it stands for gallantry in action, I hope you and your family will remember that Sergeant Masuda, in winning it, has also won the respect and admiration of all real Americans."

Then he pinned the medal on the soldier's 34-year old sister, who in turn gave it to her mother. "In accepting this distinction for my brother," said Miss Masuda struggling to keep back the tears, "I know that he would want me to say that he was only doing his duty as a soldier of our beloved country."

This scene was, in a sense, a real culmination and a full fruition of a fight which had been carried on by WRA and hundreds of democratic-minded people throughout the country for nearly 4 years. It provided a sharp and deeply encouraging contrast to the events at the Tule Lake center on the night of November 4, 1943, when a small group of well-organized and power-hungry men came perilously close to achieving the permanent mass disinheritance of the Japanese American minority.

The Resettlement Program

ALTHOUGH WRA made it possible for citizen evacuees to leave the relocation centers as early as July 1942 and set forth relocation as its main objective before the year was out, the actual movement of evacuees out of the centers to take up residence in normal communities did not take on significant proportions until the spring of 1943. Throughout the fall of 1942 the relocation program was, in the words of the chief of the Employment Division, on a "retail" basis. Each application for indefinite leave was processed individually both at the relocation center and in the Washington office. In many cases, weeks and even months went by between the time an evacuee first submitted his application and the time he was finally able to depart from the center. The Authority's efforts to find employment opportunities for the evacuated people were handled mainly by the chief of the Employment Division himself and a few members of his immediate staff. Contacts were made on a somewhat informal basis and letters were sent to the various relocation centers advising them that an employer had been located who would be willing to consider employment of evacuees. From that point on, the negotiations were between any evacuee who might be interested and the employer. Inevitably, under these procedures the tempo of relocation movement from the centers was extremely slow and effected only a minor reduction in the center populations. By the end of 1942 less than 700 evacuees had left the centers on indefinite leave.

The Field Offices

When the Director called the chief of the Employment Division into the San Francisco office in late November to discuss the speeding up of relocation activities, one of the important steps he mentioned was the need for establishing field offices throughout the sections of the country where WRA expected substantial numbers of evacuees to be relocated. These offices, the Director felt, could handle much more closely and systematically the kind of contact work with employers which the Employment Division had been doing somewhat informally. They could provide a check on public attitudes toward the evacuated people and work toward improving them. And they could furnish a variety of services which the incoming evacuees would need in becoming settled in their new localities.

The first field office was established in Chicago on January 4, 1943, and was set up originally to supervise relocation activities throughout a large part of the Middle West. Inside of a few weeks additional

offices had been opened in Cleveland, Kansas City, Salt Lake City, and Denver. Before the spring was out an office had been established in New York City to supervise relocation in the East and another in Little Rock, Ark., to cover the South.

These were the main field offices—called "area" offices—established in the spring of 1943 to supervise relocation activities over rather broad geographic areas. In addition, the Authority also opened during this same period about 35 subordinate or "district" field offices to perform the same type of functions in a rather specific locality. Each of the district offices was under the supervision of one of the area offices, and all the area offices in turn were responsible to the chief of the Employment Division in Washington. As this network of field stations was gradually geared up to an operating peak in the late spring of 1943, the Authority was in a position, for the first time, to move directly towards its major goal of restoring a substantial number of the evacuated people to private life outside the west coast exclusion zone.

Procedural Changes in the Spring of 1943

Although the establishment of the field offices helped greatly to speed up the transition of the evacuated people back to normal communities, it was only one of several steps which had to be taken before resettlement could move into high gear.

One of the most acute problems which the Authority faced during the first several months of the relocation program was the extreme slowness of leave clearance. When the Japanese American Joint Board was proposed in early 1943, WRA saw this as a possible answer to the problem. Before many weeks had passed, however, it became apparent that the Board would insist on a rather elaborate method of checking on each individual evacuee and that speedy clearances to keep pace with the tempo of employment opportunities through this medium would not be practical.

Once the mass registration program was under way at the centers and the essential data for leave clearance were being gathered on all adult residents, it became possible to adopt several badly needed changes in the whole leave machinery. Although the function of granting leave clearance was retained in the Washington office, the somewhat less important step of granting an indefinite leave permit to an evacuee who had already been given clearance was decentralized in early March when the Project Directors were given the authority to issue leave permits in cleared cases subject only to a quick check with the appropriate field office on the question of community acceptance. The center staffs were made responsible for communicating with the appropriate field office and for deciding whether the applicant had adequate means of support outside the center.

During this same period a great deal of discussion was going on in the Washington office of the Authority regarding the advisability of providing relocating evacuees with some type of financial assistance. The Director and several members of the staff were at first inclined to

oppose such a move for several reasons. In the first place, they felt that there might be difficulty in obtaining congressional approval for such assistance. Secondly, they were impressed by what came to be one of the Authority's prime dilemmas: the fact that if WRA increased its assistance in order to speed up the tempo of relocation, many of the center residents might well reason that still further concessions were in the offing and thus decide to sit tight in order to reap the full benefit of all concessions that might eventually be made. Finally, it was apparent that if financial assistance were granted, the evacuees who had already responded to WRA's urging and had relocated without such assistance would have ample grounds for complaining of unfair treatment.

On the other side of the question, several staff members, particularly the officer in charge of agricultural relocation, argued vigorously that some form of carefully controlled financial assistance was due in simple justice to a group of people who had been torn from their homes by government order and that such assistance was the most important single key to a really broad-scale relocation movement. As reports from the centers tended to confirm this latter point of view, the Authority revised its procedures and authorized the granting of certain limited types of financial assistance to the resettling evacuees. After March 20, 1943, transportation was provided from the center to the point of relocation; additional grants were made in cases of actual need to cover the cost of subsistence while traveling; and still further grants were made to tide needy evacuees over a period of approximately 30 days while they were getting settled in their new localities.

As the great volume of leave clearance dockets poured into the Washington office during and after the mass registration program at the centers, the Authority took a further step to accelerate the progress of relocation. At first WRA had hoped that it would be possible for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to expand its staff and make the necessary check of the intelligence files on all these thousands of cases inside of a few weeks. As it became gradually apparent that this was not going to be done and that the FBI check would be a comparatively slow process, the Authority sought other means of getting around the difficulty. Realizing that in a great majority of cases the FBI check did not reveal any information which would justify denial of leave clearance and that most of the questionable cases could be spotted in advance by the center officials, the Authority in early April authorized the Project Directors to issue permits in advance of leave clearance in cases where an investigation at the center seemed to warrant it. In order to provide a safeguard against the issuance of leave to evacuees whose record might be readily questioned by authorities outside the centers, the new policy was made inapplicable in the case of certain evacuees such as those who had requested repatriation or expatriation, those who had been paroled to WRA centers from internment camps, and a few other similar categories. It was recognized, of course, that this procedure involved some degree of risk and that a person might be released who would later turn out to have a questionable record with the intelligence agencies. In such case, however, the Authority had the

power of revoking the leave and calling the evacuee back to the center, or it could adopt the alternative course of calling the case to the attention of appropriate law enforcement officials so that the person could be given careful surveillance. And, in any event, the benefits which would be involved in such a procedural step in accelerated relocation rather clearly outweighed the small amount of risk that was entailed. As matters developed, the step proved to be well justified. It was one of the most important contributory factors to a greatly increased relocation movement.

Relocation in 1943

As a result of all these changes, the volume of relocation mounted steadily during the first 3 months of 1943, soared sharply upward in April and May, and dropped off slightly in June. By the half-year mark over 9,000 evacuees had left the centers to establish residence outside and by the end of the year this figure had risen to over 17,000.

The great majority of those who left the centers in 1943 were Nisei between the ages of 18 and 30. In a rather typical situation a Nisei son or daughter would go out on indefinite leave leaving Issei parents and other family members behind in the center. This movement tended to alter the composition of the center populations rather gradually but quite distinctly. Before the summer was well advanced, the very old and the very young were beginning to loom with increasing prominence in the centers. The more vigorous, more alert, more thoroughly Americanized members of the community were beginning to thin out; the more cautious, the more timid, and the least well adjusted to American life, who had previously occupied a kind of background role at the centers, began to move steadily into the foreground. It became inescapably apparent that the winnowing effects of the relocation program were going to make the relocation centers somewhat harder places to manage and that the relocation effort itself would become increasingly difficult as time went on.

From the standpoint of geographical distribution, the relocation movement of 1943 found its primary emphasis in the North Central States and the intermountain region. The great metropolis of Chicago—with its millions of people, its many employment opportunities, and its comparative lack of anti-oriental feeling—soon proved to be the favorite relocation spot and remained so throughout the history of the program. Both Denver and Salt Lake City also attracted large numbers of resettlers for a number of different reasons. In the first place, these two intermountain communities both had small but reasonably well established Japanese populations in the prewar period which provided a nucleus for further settlement. During the period of voluntary migration in February and March of 1942, they both received an influx of several hundred additional people of Japanese descent from the west coast region. And, finally, many of the evacuees who went out on seasonal leave to the beet fields during 1942 and 1943 eventually gravitated into Salt Lake City or Denver and found year-round jobs. Aside

Return to private life

from these three major "relocation cities," the resettling evacuees were rather widely and more or less evenly distributed throughout the Middle West and the intermountain states. Relocation in the South was extremely limited partially because WRA did little at this time to encourage it and partially because very few of the evacuees seemed to look upon it as a favorable region for resettlement. Their reasons apparently were a fear of racial discrimination and the somewhat more limited economic opportunities of the region as compared with the North Central and the Eastern States.

Although there were a great many economic opportunities for the evacuees in the east coast region, resettlement in this section of the country was rather sharply limited in 1943 because of War Department attitudes. As far back as the summer of 1942, the War Department had made it clear that it did not favor any large volume of resettlement in the Atlantic seaboard area and had added that it would insist on rather definite limitations. WRA first proposed establishment of a numerical quota for resettlement in the Eastern Defense Command—with the thought that the question might be reexamined once the quota limit was reached. After this idea was rejected, the Authority agreed, somewhat reluctantly, not to give any evacuee a leave permit for relocation in the Eastern Defense Command unless the case had been cleared by the War Department. Shortly after establishment of the Joint Board, the Assistant Secretary of War advised the Commanding General of the Eastern Defense Command that Joint Board clearance would be tantamount to War Department approval of an evacuee for resettlement in the east coast region. For a period of several months WRA tried to operate under this system but found it increasingly complicated and burdensome. One of the difficulties lay in the fact that Joint Board clearance came to be an extremely slow process which in many cases involved a check of the evacuee's record with the Western Defense Command in San Francisco. Another drawback was that the Joint Board was set up to handle clearance only of citizen evacuees and there were a number of Issei who wanted to relocate in the eastern seaboard States. The final point, as WRA pointed out on numerous occasions, was that the procedure was at best only partially effective. Although WRA might withhold the granting of a leave permit for movement directly into the Eastern Defense Command, there was nothing whatever to prevent an evacuee from resettling first in some other community and then moving on into the eastern area. On December 14, 1943, the Director notified the War Department that WRA had decided to lift all special restrictions on relocation in the Eastern Defense Command (except for those cases where the Joint Board recommended denial of leave clearance) and would thereafter grant leave permits for resettlement in that area on the same basis as in other sections of the country.

The seasonal tempo of the relocation movement in 1943 showed a rather distinct pattern which had considerable significance for WRA's future relocation planning. The volume of movement rose sharply during the spring from a monthly total of 395 in January to a peak of 3,108 in May. In June and July, when the WRA program and the

evacuated people were under severe attack in the press and by a congressional subcommittee, the movement slowed down noticeably. It began to rise again, however, through August and September, and then dropped off gradually during the remaining months of the year as cold weather began to set in. During the entire 4-year history of the program November and December were almost invariably lowest months for relocation while the peaks were usually either at the end of the spring or the end of the summer.

One development that helped in some degree to stimulate the increased tempo of relocation in the fall of 1943 was the initiation of the "community invitation" plan in August. By this time it had become quite clear that there were many cities throughout the country where job opportunities were plentiful and varied and where the original WRA requirement of a specific job prospect for the resettler was virtually academic. Consequently, the agency authorized its field offices on August 5 to designate certain communities as open to the evacuees on an "invitation" basis and simultaneously authorized the centers to grant leave permits for relocation in such communities regardless of whether the applicant had a specific job prospect—provided, of course, that he had leave clearance and met the other requirements. This plan had the definite advantage of affording the resettler an opportunity to meet with potential employers face to face and to "shop around" in a search for jobs. A very large share of the relocation in late 1943 and throughout 1944 was carried out on a community invitation basis.

Seasonal Leave

By early spring of 1943 the movement of seasonal workers into the beet fields of the agricultural West, which had played such a prominent part in paving the way for the resettlement program in 1942, was under way once again. In contrast to the 1942 procedure, the seasonal leave program in 1943 was operated exclusively by WRA without any participation by the Army. The evacuees were given leave permits of specific duration and were required to return to the appropriate relocation center when the permit expired. The field offices were made responsible for designating the areas where evacuees might work on seasonal leave permits and were also called upon to handle some phases of the negotiations with potential employers. Actual recruitment of the evacuee workers, however, was handled either by the employers themselves or by the labor committees of the agricultural extension service in the western States. Seasonal leave permits were not granted to evacuees who had requested repatriation or expatriation, those who had been denied leave clearance, and those who had failed to answer question 28 (the "loyalty" question) in the mass registration with an unqualified affirmative.

Because a large number of potential seasonal workers left the centers in 1943 for resettlement purposes and because several hundred others left to join the armed forces, the number of evacuees employed in seasonal work was somewhat lower than the previous year. It reached

a peak at the end of November when slightly less than 8,000 were reported absent from the centers on seasonal leave. Of this number, probably as many as 50 or 60 percent elected to remain outside the centers and converted their permits to an indefinite leave basis without returning. To an even greater extent than in 1942, the seasonal leave program, by removing the evacuees from the secluded environment of the centers and giving them an opportunity to see that life "on the outside" was not nearly so bad as many of them had imagined, proved to be a definite aid to the relocation program.

The Local Resettlement Committees

From the very beginning of the relocation program WRA realized that it would definitely need the assistance of citizen groups in various localities in order to gain public acceptance and assist the evacuees in making adjustments in their new communities. The Employment Chief wrote in his final report, referring to the early fall of 1942—

> It appeared to me quite possible that we could locate a small but effective group of people who were deeply interested in the problems growing out of the evacuation and were willing to give their support to doing something practical to solve them. It seemed fruitless to try to convince the whole population of the rightness and the necessity of a relocation program. It could be conceded that a majority of the people in any community would not understand the problem or sympathize with the way out that we were taking. * * * It appeared to me that the most practicable way to relocate these people was to find the few sympathetic people in the community who were willing to put in their time and energy. In the larger places these people could most likely form a committee to coordinate their activities. As we saw the relocation machinery early in August 1942, it looked as if WRA would do a minimum in the way of field work. We would spend most of our energy on locating interested people, advising on the organization of committees, providing educational material on evacuation and relocation, and supplying local sponsors with information about the occupational background of evacuees who wanted to relocate.

Although this line of thinking was developed at a time when the Authority was contemplating a rather small-scale relocation program and had not yet considered the possibility of establishing field offices, it continued to play a large part in the planning and programming of the agency even after the field offices had been established. The first resettlement committee was organized in Minneapolis in the fall of 1942. After the turn of the year and the establishment of field offices in a rather large number of midwestern communities, the growth of these local committees proceeded rapidly. By the end of 1943 a total of 26 had been established from Salt Lake City on the West to Washington, D. C. on the East.

In most cases the original organizing impetus for the local committees was provided by the active church people whose efforts were stimulated and guided by Mr. George Rundquist, a traveling representative of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America assigned specifically to Japanese American resettlement work. The committees, however, were by no means strictly religious organizations. Although built usually around a nucleus of active and social-minded

church members, they generally took in civic leaders, representatives of organizations such as the YMCA and the YWCA, and a considerable number of people without any particular organizational affiliations.

The first job of most committees was to help create favorable public sentiment toward the incoming evacuees. This was done by personal contact with some of the key officials and important citizens of the community, by sponsoring meetings at which WRA officials might explain the nature and purpose of the program, and by a variety of public information devices. As the Employment Chief has indicated, the original objective was not necessarily to gain unanimous support for the relocation program but merely to see that some of the leading citizens in the community were properly informed so that they would evaluate correctly any developments that might occur or any protests that might arise after the evacuated people started moving in.

The second, and equally important, phase of the work of the local committees was to help the incoming evacuees in making necessary adjustments. In the early period of the relocation program, throughout the spring of 1943, this sometimes involved contact work with potential employers. But before long, in most cases, the actual securing of a job was one of the least difficult of the problems which the relocating evacuee faced. One of the toughest problems over very large sections of the country was to find adequate housing. The local committees helped to alleviate this in a number of different ways. In several communities they established boarding houses known as "hostels" where incoming evacuees could find board and room at a nominal rate for a limited period while they were seeking more permanent quarters. In many cities the local committees also did a considerable amount of contact work with local housing authorities and with property owners in an effort to gain entry for the evacuees and to advise the resettlers where vacancies could be found. A few committees even went so far as to establish rather comprehensive housing registries and made some efforts to keep them constantly current. In the majority of cases, however, this type of work had to be done by the WRA field offices with some advice and assistance from the cooperating groups.

The committees were also helpful in assisting evacuee families to get their children properly placed in school, in facilitating the efforts of breadwinners to become members of local labor unions, and in helping the evacuees to become generally well adjusted in the social life of the community. As might be expected, the performance of these committees varied considerably from one community to the next and even from time to time as the membership shifted. Some of them did an excellent job and even performed functions which WRA normally regarded as its own responsibility while others spent a major part of their time in internal discussions and were very largely ineffective in providing actual assistance to evacuees. On the whole, however, the committees did a good job and provided assistance in the relocation program at a time when it was desperately needed, especially during the early days when a large part of the public harbored feelings of hostility or suspicion towards all people of Japanese descent.

Relocation Work at the Centers

Time and again throughout the history of the WRA program, staff members of the agency have found people astonished to learn that one of the Authority's main problems has been to *persuade* the evacuees to leave the relocation centers. Most newspaper reporters, magazine writers, and interested citizens, approaching the program for the first time, have assumed that the evacuated people were extremely unhappy about the environment of relocation centers and practically "crowding at the gates" to return to private life. Actually, nothing could be much further from the truth. Except for a few thousand highly Americanized and well adjusted Nisei who were anxious to leave the relocation center environment at the earliest possible date in 1942, the great majority of the evacuated people have been slow, cautious, and markedly reluctant to relocate.

Early in 1943 the agency began at the centers a long and arduous effort to stimulate relocation which was to last until the early fall of 1945. Almost every conceivable device was used to build up confidence among the evacuees and create in their minds a desire to take up residence outside the centers. Pamphlets and releases were prepared in practically all the field offices describing the particular localities involved and outlining the general relocation prospects for evacuees. Periodic newsletters were sent out to keep evacuees at all centers constantly informed of specific job opportunities and other changing features in the relocation picture in each major community. Special teams made up of employees from the Washington office and field offices were sent to centers to describe relocation prospects and hold interviews with individual evacuees who might be interested. Photographs and motion pictures giving the evacuees the visual impression of living conditions in some of the outside communities were sent into the centers and widely exhibited. The National Director and other principal staff members, on their visits to the centers, almost never overlooked an opportunity to emphasize the importance of relocation before evacuee groups.

All of these efforts were undoubtedly helpful but they were never quite enough. At all times there was a deep-seated core of resistance to relocation at the WRA centers and this problem became increasingly difficult as the more readily "relocatable" people gradually moved out. By early 1944, the agency decided that the main key to a breakdown of this resistance lay in throwing a greater degree of responsibility for stimulating relocation on the evacuees themselves. All Project Directors were advised to foster the organization of relocation committees made up of both WRA staff employees and evacuee leaders. An effort was made to bring the community councils into the picture as actively as possible. Every encouragement was given the evacuees to express their misgivings about relocation and to make recommendations for changes in the policy and procedures.

Another important element in the relocation program at the centers was the family counseling program which was started in the late spring

of 1944. At all centers a staff of trained case workers was assigned to the job of interviewing evacuee families, analyzing their specific problems and attempting to work out a family relocation plan which would meet the situation. This work was done on a rather systematic basis with the eventual goal of covering every family and every unattached individual in the center. Those who were capable of making their own living or had some adequate means of support usually presented no particular problem. Those who needed some sort of welfare assistance required particularly careful attention.

Under legislative authority which was granted in 1942, the Social Security Board was authorized to provide special welfare assistance to persons displaced by restrictive governmental action who might be in need of such assistance. The administration of this program was in the hands of the county welfare boards throughout the country but the funds were provided through the Social Security Board. Since the program clearly applied to relocating evacuees who developed a need for emergency assistance after resettlement, WRA worked out a definite system under which it could allocate part of its funds to the Social Security Board for this purpose with the understanding that the necessary arrangements would be made for handling cases at the local level. In cases where the relocated evacuee was in need merely of emergency aid to tide him over a difficult situation, he was referred to the appropriate welfare agency by the nearest WRA field office and given whatever assistance was necessary in presenting his case. In cases where the evacuee family or unattached individual needed continuing assistance, an inquiry was made at the community of destination before the person or family actually left the relocation center. This action was initiated at the relocation center and sent forward with all essential details to the nearest field office where contact was then made with the appropriate welfare agency. Throughout 1943 and 1944 several hundred evacuees received some form of emergency welfare assistance under this program.

Progress of Relocation in 1944

During the first half of 1944 the volume of relocation continued on about the same level as during a comparable period of the preceding year. Although the totals for April, May, and June were somewhat lower than they had been during 1943, those for January, February, and March were significantly higher.

By early spring enough people had left the centers over the whole period of the relocation program so that WRA was able to make some rather definite plans for the closing of its first relocation center. After a number of centers had been considered as possibilities, the Jerome center in Arkansas, the last of the centers to begin operations, was selected as the first to close. It was closed on June 30 after approximately 5,700 unrelocated residents had been transferred to several of the other centers, mainly Rohwer and Gila River. Throughout the fall relocation continued on about the same level as during the previous

year. By December 17, when the War Department announced the revocation of the mass exclusion orders, about 35,000 evacuees, including approximately 2,300 who had entered the armed forces, had left the centers on indefinite leave.

The Liquidation Program

During the first few years of its official life, WRA did everything it could to encourage the movement of evacuees from the relocation centers back into private life. The agency held firm, however, to the conviction that it would have to maintain the centers as a place of refuge for the evacuated people as long as they were denied the privilege of returning to their former homes. With the revocation of the mass exclusion orders, this prime justification for the continued existence of the centers disappeared at one stroke. The Authority announced on December 18, the day after the revocation announcement, that all relocation centers would be closed somewhere between 6 months and a year after January 2, 1945—the date when the revocation actually became effective.

The actual time of closing at each center was left on this somewhat flexible basis for two reasons. First, the Authority realized that it would take a minimum of 6 months at almost any center for the remaining resident population to overcome its fears and misgivings, complete its relocation plans, and actually make the physical movement. Secondly, however, the Authority realized that unless it did establish an outside limit of 1 year for the duration of any center, there would be a strong tendency among the residents to procrastinate and thus a real danger of a large and unwieldy residue of people to be relocated in the last few weeks before actual closing.

At the same time, on December 18, WRA also announced the termination of all seasonal leave, the liquidation of farming operations at all centers except Colorado River and Gila River—where winter vegetables were still in the ground—and the closing of relocation center schools at the end of the spring term in June 1945. This last step, most staff members felt, would be the most important single incentive in stimulating the evacuees to leave the centers. However, the policy was adopted on the schools, as in case of all other activities, not primarily as a spur to relocation but as a practical operating necessity. If the last center were to be closed by January 2, 1946, it was obviously essential that the various phases of center management should be gradually liquidated over a period of several months rather than closed out in one somewhat hectic, last-minute operation. All liquidation announcements, it should be added, were made with reference to the *relocation centers* and were not meant to be applicable to the Tule Lake Segregation Center which was regarded as a specialized problem.

At the time the revocation announcement was made there were slightly under 80,000 people still residing in the nine WRA centers including Tule Lake. On the basis of conversations with the staff officers of the Western Defense Command, WRA estimated that there

would be about 5,000 or 6,000 people—most of them renunciants—who would be declared ineligible for relocation and that these detainees would be accompanied in detention by enough family members to make up approximately 20,000. This meant, in short, that WRA had to assist in the relocation of approximately 60,000 people within a period of 12 months—almost twice as many as it had helped to resettle in the preceding two and a half years.

One of the first steps taken to accomplish this job was the establishment of field relocation offices in the west coast evacuated area. During the first several weeks of 1945 area offices were established in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle, and district offices were set up in about 25 other communities. For approximately 3 months these offices functioned under the general supervision of the Assistant Director stationed in San Francisco but in April they were put on the same basis as other field offices throughout the country and made responsible to the Washington office.

In planning the liquidation program WRA realized keenly that one of its most acute immediate problems would be a strong tendency for excessive visiting at the relocation centers by evacuees who had already relocated. Once the liquidation announcement was made, WRA figured that thousands of the young Nisei who had established themselves in outside communities might well rush back to the centers in large groups for consultation with their parents and other family members whom they had left behind. Some of this visiting, the agency felt, would undoubtedly be necessary in the interest of developing plans for the relocation of the family members still resident in the centers and should definitely be encouraged. Other visits, however, would be made merely for social purposes and without any constructive ends in view. While WRA fully sympathized with the normal desire of the members of a family to hold a reunion, it did feel that this period of intense activity at the centers would be a particularly bad time for excessive traveling in and out, and that too much visiting by the relocated evacuees would result in loss of jobs, violation of War Manpower Commission regulations, and the jeopardizing of relationships with employers generally. Consequently, the Authority adopted regulations, immediately after the revocation announcement, putting temporary controls on visits to the relocation centers.

Project Directors were instructed not to admit any visiting evacuees unless they had obtained prior approval from the appropriate WRA field office. The field offices, in turn, were assigned the responsibility of investigating the request of any relocated evacuee for a permit to visit a center in order to make certain that the visit was needed and would contribute toward the development of relocation plans for the family members still in residence. Although this control system involved a great deal of communication between the centers and field offices and aroused a great deal of criticism from evacuees and friends of evacuees, WRA feels definitely that it served a useful purpose. It kept visiting at the centers within reasonable bounds during a period when the Nation's transportation facilities were badly overloaded, when

the center staffs were extremely overworked, and when all attention needed to be focused on the primary business of relocation. The control system was revoked on April 16, 1945.

One other feature of the WRA liquidation policy was the provision of resettlement assistance to people who had relocated outside the evacuated area before the revocation announcement and who now wished to exercise the option of returning to their former homes. Fairness to the early resettlers clearly required such a policy. Assistance was made available to such people in the form of rail fare and transportation of personal property. Grants to cover subsistence while traveling and to assist the resettler over the first 30-day period in this new locality, however, were made available only to those leaving directly from the relocation centers. Altogether during 1945 about 5,000 of the approximately 35,000 people who relocated prior to revocation took advantage of this provision and received WRA transportation grants for travel back to the evacuated area.

The Final Relocation Drive

During the late fall of 1944, when plans were being made for the post-revocation program of liquidation at the centers, most WRA staff members anticipated that the program would come as a distinct and unpleasant shock to most of the remaining residents of the centers. It is questionable, however, whether many staff members foresaw just how deep-seated and widespread these feelings would actually be. At Tule Lake, one of the members of the Washington staff reported, the residents received the announcement of revocation of the exclusion orders with a marked amount of apathy and seemed to be much more interested in a project trial which was scheduled to take place within a few days.

Although Tule Lake, with its large number of detainees and excludees, was clearly in a different position than the other centers, the reaction there was only a more pronounced manifestation of the attitude which was displayed elsewhere. The predominant feeling, as reported by community analysts at the centers, was one of disbelief. Every possible pretext was eagerly seized upon to justify the rationalization that WRA did not actually intend to close the centers and that its announcement was merely a "bluff" to stimulate further relocation. An evacuee at one of the centers summed up this feeling rather succinctly when he reportedly said, "This is a city. You can't close a city." Another manifestation of this same tendency was the rumor which gained extremely wide currency that WRA would probably close all centers except the two in Arizona which would be maintained for the "unrelocatable." The basis for this rumor was, apparently, the statement in the WRA liquidation announcement that farm operations would be discontinued immediately at all centers except these two. The only reason for the exception was, as previously explained, that these centers were in a winter vegetable area and that there were crops in the ground which required harvesting. But this explanation did not

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suffice for many hundreds of evacuees who persisted in believing that the Colorado River and Gila River centers would be maintained beyond the end of the year 1945.

One of the "weapons" which the evacuees used in convincing themselves and one another that the centers could not close was a small pamphlet which WRA had prepared and distributed back in the spring of 1942. This brochure, written during the early period when WRA policies had been formulated only in tentative form, was issued to provide a stop-gap type of information for the rather badly confused evacuated people. It was never intended in any sense as a statement of policy but merely as a general informational guide. It reflected the thinking which prevailed within WRA shortly after the Salt Lake City conference and, consequently, made two or three references to the WRA centers as "war-duration communities." Upon this slender basis many of the evacuees attempted to build an elaborate case that WRA had made definite commitments to keep the centers open for the duration of the war and that it was guilty of bad faith in the adoption of its liquidation policy.

In an effort to counteract these feelings, WRA concentrated its first attention on convincing the evacuees that the liquidation announcement was not a bluff and that the centers would actually close. With this purpose very largely in mind, the Director made a visit during the early months of the year to all eight of the regular centers where he spoke before community mass meetings, met with members of the community councils and other evacuee leaders, and attempted to answer all questions. This tour quite obviously accomplished its main purpose. Although there were a few evacuees at all centers who remained unconvinced that liquidation was actually imminent, the great majority began gradually to concede this point in their own minds and soon shifted their resistance to other grounds.

The new focal point for discussion became the difficulty of relocating. The evacuees at all centers began stressing the Nation-wide housing shortage, the losses they had suffered in evacuation, the public hostility against them (particularly in the west coast area), and the fact that many of the people still in the centers were well along in years and had passed the peak of their earning power. All of these arguments were brought definitely forward at what came to be called the "all-center conference" which was held at Salt Lake City in February. This conference, initiated largely by members of the community council at the Central Utah center, was attended by council representatives from all centers except Manzanar and Tule Lake. Although there was a strong tendency at the conference to adopt a resolution highly critical of WRA, some of the more moderate delegates prevailed and the document actually issued by the conference was mainly a plea for more extensive and far-reaching relocation assistance. In a preamble, however, the conferees did imply rather heavily that they were questioning the fundamental wisdom of closing the relocation centers.

While WRA was anxious not to antagonize the conferees or destroy their prestige in their respective communities, it was in the awkward

position of not being able to concede very much of what the conferees were seeking. As explained earlier, WRA knew that if it increased the amount of relocation assistance, this would immediately bring sharp outcries of protest—and well justified ones—from all the evacuees who had relocated earlier and had shown a stronger tendency than the remaining residents to cooperate with WRA in achieving its main objective. Even more importantly, WRA felt it could be almost certain that if one concession of this kind were made, many of the evacuees would feel it was merely a prelude to further concessions and would sit tight in order to reap all the possible benefits WRA was prepared to offer. Quite plainly, WRA's only feasible course was to stand firm and insist quietly that the centers would be closed. Although the WRA reply to the all-center conference was generally conciliatory in tone and did make a few minor concessions, this was its essential position.

Throughout this whole period, despite all the argument and resistance, the relocation totals were mounting rather steadily week by week. During the week ending May 5, for example, a total of 788 people left the centers—the highest number for any single week up to that time during the entire history of the program. WRA's goal was a total of 16,000 people to be relocated between January 1 and June 30, which would leave approximately 44,000 awaiting relocation in the final 6 months of the calendar year. This objective was not quite achieved by June 30 but was missed only by the narrowest of margins.

About this time, however, the agency began to grow quite seriously worried about the deepening transportation problem. This, it will be remembered, was the period after the war in Europe had ended and all efforts were being made to concentrate on a final drive against Japan. The redeployment of troops from the European theatre across the continent to the Pacific threatened to strain the Nation's transportation facilities as they had never been strained before. While WRA had experienced considerable success in working out arrangements with the American Association of Railroads and the Office of Defense Transportation for the necessary cars and special trains to handle the relocation movements, there was a great danger that excessive numbers of the evacuees would indulge in the all-too-human tendency of procrastinating until the last minute and thus create a serious transportation overload and a tremendous burden of work for the relocation center staffs. In fact, many of the evacuees who had expressed a willingness to relocate had also announced that they would not leave until they knew definitely when their particular center was to close. A comparatively spaced-out, regular flow of relocation movement, with specific dates for center closures, was clearly essential in the interest of both the evacuees and the Nation at large.

On June 22, accordingly, WRA announced that the Canal Camp at the Gila River center and Units II and III at the Colorado River center would close by October 1. Four weeks later, on July 13, it issued a comprehensive schedule for the closing of all centers, except Tule Lake, between October 15 and December 15. But these two steps, which were taken quite deliberately to hasten the process of relocation and break

down some of the unnecessary procrastination, were not quite enough. There were still a large number of evacuees at all centers who persisted in talking about "staying until the last minute" and who threatened that they were "going to see what happened" if they remained there when the deadline arrived. Although WRA realized that some of this was merely talk and that not many of the evacuees would actually be likely to carry out such threats, the mere existence of such talk was a serious obstacle to effective execution of the liquidation plan. Consequently, the agency announced a "scheduling" of relocation at all centers, first for the individuals and families requiring special welfare assistance outside the centers and then for all remaining center residents.

The policy statement which covered the scheduled relocation of all the remaining center residents was known as Administrative Notice No. 289 and has provoked a considerable amount of discussion outside the agency. It provided that each Project Director, starting 6 weeks before the scheduled closing date of his center, should establish weekly quotas for relocation in order to meet the goal of depopulation by the deadline date. These quotas were to be filled, insofar as possible, by people who stepped forward and volunteered to develop relocation plans. If the quota for any particular week could not be met by volunteering, however, the Project Director was authorized to assign a departure date for certain individuals in sufficient number to make up the quota. Those who were assigned a departure date were given the option of selecting the place where they wished to relocate. In case they refused to make any selection, they were to be given a rail ticket to the community from which they were originally evacuated. The notice also provided that if an evacuee refused to pack his belongings, they would be packed for him, and he would be escorted to the train, if necessary, by the internal security force. All centers were warned to avoid such use of force except as an unavoidable last resort and were instructed not to schedule any evacuee for relocation to a community unless the appropriate field office had indicated that some form of at least temporary housing was available.

This was the only time in the history of the WRA program when the agency resorted to a threat of physical force in order to complete its relocation schedule and it was the occasion for considerable criticism of the Authority by groups and individuals interested in the welfare of the evacuated people. It should be stated here that WRA adopted the policy set forth in Administrative Notice No. 289 with conscious reluctance but with a profound conviction that it had no truly feasible alternative. By the time 289 was adopted, the agency's operations had been geared up to handle a regular flow of relocation movement. Any serious slow-down in the movement at that particular time would have had almost disastrous consequences. It would have seriously jeopardized the good relations which WRA was then enjoying with the transportation industry. It would have encouraged, almost incalculably, a resurgence of the still latent conviction among the evacuees that relocation was impossible and that WRA did not really mean to close the centers. And finally, it would undoubtedly have given new vigor

to the opposition forces on the west coast which had been fighting the return of the evacuees with every weapon at their command and which were undoubtedly ready to grasp any pretext for believing that they had accomplishd a substantial "victory."

By midsummer of 1945 most of the terrorism directed against returning evacuees by west coast racist elements had died down and was no longer a major problem of the agency in completing its relocation schedule. In its place, however, there developed during the summer and early fall a mounting volume of criticism from groups and individuals who had previously cooperated closely in carrying out the program. This "friendly opposition," as it came to be called inside the agency, was centered primarily in Los Angeles County and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in the San Francisco Bay area. It was "spark-plugged" and stimulated, WRA feels certain, to a very large degree by alert young Nisei who had relocated throughout the country and were enjoying the financial advantage of having their parents maintained at government expense in relocation centers. It began to manifest itself in a small way shortly after the announcement of WRA's plans for liquidation, rose steadily through the spring, and reached a climax of intensity following the issuance of Administrative Notice 289 on scheduled relocation.

Stressing the difficulties of return to the evacuated area and overlooking the deadening effects of institutionalized life at the centers, the "friendly oppositionists" worked with great persistence and ingenuity throughout the summer and fall to prevent WRA from carrying out its schedule of center closings. Large volumes of mail on this subject were addressed not only to the WRA Director but also to the Secretary of the Interior and the President. Resolutions were passed and critical articles were written for liberal journals such as the *Nation* and the *Christian Century*. Local officials, particularly in Los Angeles County, were persuaded to oppose the center closing program and to question some of WRA's other objectives and procedures. In some cases, evacuees were advised to "sit tight" and wait for the last-minute postponement of the center closing which, they were assured, was "almost sure to come." A great deal of energy was thrown into this campaign—energy which, WRA cannot help feeling, might better have been expended in helping the returned evacuees to solve their problems of personal adjustment.

Meanwhile, WRA went doggedly ahead with its program. The Authority recognized that the housing problem on the west coast was difficult, that there were hostile forces prepared to make life unpleasant for the returning evacuees, and that many of the people in the centers might have some difficulty in reestablishing themselves in view of their advanced age and after such a long period of life in the centers. But WRA's basic conviction was that none of these problems would be solved or even alleviated by keeping the centers open beyond the scheduled dates.

The only feasible answer to the housing problem, the agency felt, was for the evacuees to leave the centers, establish themselves at least

temporarily in the communities of their choice, and then conduct an intensive individual search for appropriate quarters. The suggestion made by some of the friendly oppositionists that the whole relocation movement should be postponed until special housing could be built for the evacuees was rejected as completely impractical. In view of the serious difficulties which many war veterans were even then having in finding adequate housing, it was rather obvious just how much chance the evacuated people would have to gain special concessions in this particular field.

Likewise, in meeting the problem represented by the hostile forces on the west coast, WRA's conviction was that the only answer lay in an increasing volume of returning evacuees, a gradual strengthening of their contacts with the friendly groups, and a concrete demonstration that terroristic methods would not prove effective. A slow-down in the return movement was unquestionably the precise thing that the hostile forces wanted to see. Instead of pacifying them, it would undoubtedly have stimulated them to greater and bolder efforts to drive out the evacuees who had returned and to achieve their ultimate goal of a west coast region completely "cleansed" of its Japanese minority. The best evidence that this reasoning was sound is the fact that as the return movement did continue at a steady pace, the opposition forces were steadily brought under control and finally made almost wholly ineffective.

The problem represented by the older and less physically able evacuees was undoubtedly a real one although the Director of WRA has always felt that it was considerably exaggerated by the Issei themselves, by their relocated children, and by some of the sympathetic groups. Before launching the liquidation program WRA had very carefully canvassed the available welfare facilities in the evacuated area and had satisfied itself that provision of some sort would be made for all people who were genuinely incapable of self-support. The alternative of maintaining these same people at government expense in the relocation centers would have been virtually impossible to justify. In addition to the excessive cost which would have been involved in maintaining the centers for a few thousand dependent people (plus family relatives who could not reasonably be separated from them), there was the additional drawback that these people would have been maintained in an institutional environment which, practically all welfare students agree, is much less desirable than a system of maintenance in private homes or normal family surroundings. Finally, WRA would have probably rejected such a solution in any event on the ground that it tended to separate the Japanese people from the whole population as a group requiring special treatment. WRA has always believed that any type of special treatment for the people of Japanese descent—whether restrictive or solicitous—was a bad precedent for a democratic Nation.

Purely through fortuitous circumstance, Administrative Notice 289 was issued exactly 2 weeks before VJ day and was actually disseminated among the evacuees only a few days before that event. Conse-

quently, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to state which of these two developments had the more important influence in breaking down the last real vestiges of evacuee resistance to center closure. Most of the community analysts are inclined to say that it was the cumulative effect of the two events which finally convinced even most of the "die-hards" that a return to private life was inevitable and would have to be accepted. The occurrence of VJ day was important, superficially because it completely eliminated the protracted argument about "war-duration communities," and more significantly because it convinced some of the most relocation-resistant Issei that they would spend the rest of their lives in the United States and that they could no longer count on official intercessions from Japan on their behalf. It became clear, in other words, that there was no longer any feasible alternative to the relocation policy of WRA and that the most sensible course was to "cooperate with the inevitable."

But the important point is that the resistance was almost entirely dissipated and that the WRA was able to carry out its program of center closing on schedule without resorting to compulsion in more than a half dozen cases. All centers except Granada were closed anywhere from 2 to 15 days before the scheduled date and evacuees at all centers except Tule Lake were restored to normal communities before December 1.

The Resettlement Pattern

Throughout the early months of 1945, the majority of people leaving the relocation centers were bound for destinations outside the evacuated area. Many of these were people who had developed their relocation plans before revocation of the exclusion order and were only then carrying them into effect. Moreover, the somewhat precarious state of public opinion on the west coast was such that during the first few months of the year only the bolder-spirited evacuees and those with properties which could readily be reoccupied were inclined to go back to their former homes. By late spring, however, enough of the early resettlers had established themselves satisfactorily so that the movement back to the coast began to take on significant volume. By the end of June approximately half of those leaving the centers were going eastward and the other half were headed back home. From that point on, the balance swung increasingly in favor of "westward" relocation. By the end of October the proportion of people moving in this direction was as high as 85 or 90 percent of the total leaving relocation centers. Then throughout December, January, and February—after the relocation centers had closed—the overwhelming majority of the people who left the Tule Lake center, after clearance by the Department of Justice, also found their relocation destinations in the evacuated area. The net result, after closure of the Tule Lake center on March 20, was that approximately 57,000 evacuees had returned to the former exclusion zone, nearly 52,000 had settled in other sections of the country, and roughly 3,000 still remained, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in the

custody of the Department of Justice. A group of 450 evacuees were transferred from the Tule Lake center to Department of Justice internment camps on the day the segregation center closed.

In announcing the liquidation program on December 18, 1944, WRA specified that all of its field offices would be closed within 2 months after closure of the last relocation center. At the time this announcement was made, the agency did not realize that there would be such a large volume of people eligible for relocation at Tule Lake or that this one center would remain in operation as a WRA responsibility until the spring of 1946. Furthermore, it did not foresee all of the many troublesome problems of evacuee adjustment that actually developed in the west coast region. Toward the end of 1945, as the status of the Tule Lake renunciants began finally to be clarified and the scope of the west coast adjustment problems became increasingly apparent, WRA postponed the closing dates for most of the field offices and announced that all area offices would remain in operation until May 15. Most of the district offices in the west coast section were maintained until May 1.

The chief problem that remained unsolved in the former exclusion area in the early spring of 1946 was housing. As far back as the preceding summer, WRA, realizing that adequate housing could not be found immediately for all of the evacuees who planned to return to the Los Angeles and San Francisco vicinities, had begun to explore with the Army and the Federal Public Housing Authority the possibilities of some emergency solution. Eventually, a program was worked out under which a number of surplus Army facilities in the vicinity of the two principal California cities were made available for evacuee occupancy on a temporary basis and under FPHA management. By the time the Tule Lake center closed there were about 2,100 evacuees living in these facilities in Los Angeles County and about 1,000 more in the San Francisco Bay area.

Gradually throughout the spring the population of these "special projects" was reduced. Many of the occupants moved out into normal quarters; several large groups of them found employment with canneries and other concerns which provided trailer housing; and in early May a special trailer project at Burbank in Los Angeles County was opened for the approximately 800 evacuees still remaining in the special projects who were classified as "hardship cases." The last of the special projects was officially closed on May 18.

Aside from the housing problem, there were a number of other difficulties facing the returned evacuees in late 1945 and early 1946. In some sections of California local licensing boards persistently refused to grant permits to the evacuees for engaging in professional practice or commercial undertakings. Under the so-called "escheat law" which was enacted by the State Legislature in the dark year of 1943, a great many evacuees were deprived of rural homes on the ground that the property had been purchased or leased by alien parents in the name of citizen children and in violation of the statute. In the area around Seattle there was a drive, reportedly led by the avowedly anti-evacuee

International Teamsters' Union, to boycott the handling of evacuee farm produce and thus force the returned evacuee farmers off the land.

Throughout the spring the field offices in the former exclusion area worked in close cooperation with the groups which were supporting the rights of the evacuees to soften or eliminate these last vestiges of discrimination and help create a more secure future for the evacuated people. At each of the field offices the objective of WRA was to make as much progress as possible on the solution of these problems before the date of closure and to foster the formation and activation of local resettlement committees which would carry on the work after the agency had finally been liquidated. Such committees were eventually organized in all the west coast communities where WRA had field offices and where significant numbers of evacuees had returned.

The progress made in solving the remaining problems of adjustment prior to May 15 was admittedly somewhat uneven. In several communities WRA attorneys were successful in persuading the local licensing boards to change their policy of discrimination against evacuee applicants; in others the anti-evacuee attitude persisted. Although the boycott against evacuee farm produce in the Seattle area was broken as an organized form of discrimination, the escheat problem in California remained a serious one which can probably be solved only by appropriate changes in State or Federal legislation.

On the whole, WRA felt that, with the closure of its last field offices on May 15, it had done just about everything a Federal agency can appropriately and effectively do to assist the evacuated people through the transition back to normal private life. The problems which remained were largely the type which the individual must solve for himself in our society if he is to be a self-reliant and productive member of that society. Or they were the kind which could be handled most effectively by citizens' committees or by local governmental or private agencies trained in a particular field of action. The problem of finding suitable housing and employment, for example, is clearly the type of thing which the individual can tackle most effectively for himself. The role of a government agency such as WRA is to see that there is no widespread discrimination against the evacuees purely on racial grounds; the task of actually locating suitable quarters is not one for a branch of the Federal Government to perform. Similarly, the task of constantly combating purely local manifestations of racial prejudice is one that can most effectively be carried out by civic-minded groups in the community familiar with the local situation and armed with special powers of persuasion which representatives of the Federal Government seldom have. Finally, the problem of providing assistance for those who are incapable of self-support can obviously be best carried out by local welfare agencies with staffs trained in this type of work and funds to carry on a continuing program over a period of years.

WRA feels, in short, that the obligation of the Federal Government to the evacuees has, with one notable exception which will be discussed later, been adequately discharged. Although there can never be full or adequate recompense for the experiences which the evacuated people

went through, it is best, we feel, to set these down among the civilian casualties of war and to build on the present base toward a better and more secure future for the people of Japanese descent in this country. The building of that future lies largely in the hands of the still-active groups which have supported the evacuated people throughout the war and, even more importantly, in the hands of the evacuees themselves.

Evacuee Property

BY THE TIME WRA first assumed full responsibility for the protection of evacuees' real and personal property, in August 1942, evacuation-incurred property problems had become snarled and material losses had already reached disturbing proportions.

Several factors contributed to the property problems which WRA inherited: (1) the absence of any property safeguards whatever for several weeks after evacuation was a foregone conclusion; (2) delay in providing property protection after an order from Assistant Secretary of War McCloy had made such protection a definite responsibility of the Western Defense Command; (3) property protection measures which were inadequate to counteract initial losses or halt those which mounted throughout the period of exile; (4) division of responsibility in the initial stages among the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Office of Alien Property Custodian, and the Farm Security Administration, each with differing policies and none of them strong enough to prevent initial hardship; (5) wartime hate, prejudice and greed which opposed the recognition of rights and privileges of the minority and created indifference on the part of many west coast law enforcement authorities to destruction and pilferage of evacuees' property.

Many initial losses occurred before evacuation. Many families had been left destitute following the FBI raids in December and the rounding up of several thousand Issei. Other Japanese sold goods and property at sacrifice prices to persons who threatened to report them to the FBI if they refused offers to buy. Special police finally had to be stationed in the fishing village of Terminal Island, in Los Angeles Harbor, to protect families of interned aliens. Junk and secondhand dealers were buying furnishings valued from $50 to $200 for $4 and $5 by telling panicky families that the government intended to seize their household belongings. Since no official statements were made in this period, victims were strongly inclined to believe the rumors of the moment.

On February 20, the day after evacuation was authorized, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy sent a memo to the Western Defense Commander in which he instructed:

* * * Where they [the evacuees] are unable to protect physical property left behind in military areas, the responsibility will be yours to provide reasonable protection, either through the use of troops or through other appropriate measures.

In his final report the WDC Commander explained the delay which occurred in carrying out this responsibility.

* * * Prior to March 10 the General Staff * * * had not engaged in any extensive planning or preparation for the [evacuation] program. The tactical duties imposed upon it were such that it was unable to do so and at the same time meet the responsibilities imposed on the Headquarters by the essentially military aspects of its missions. * * *

A byproduct of evacuation

On March 15, however, the WDC head delegated authority to the Farm Security Administration "to institute and administer a program which will insure continuation of the proper use of agricultural lands voluntarily evacuated by enemy aliens and others designated by me, and which will insure fair and equitable arrangements between the evacuees and the operators of their property." Unfortunately, there was a further delay of several weeks before this delegation of authority actually became effective.

Still a fledgling organization at the end of March, WRA delegated to the Treasury Department the authority given to the Director by Executive Order 9102 "to assist persons removed under * * * [executive order] in the management of their property." This authority was subsequently redelegated by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which became generally responsible for protection of urban evacuee properties.

On March 11 WDC created the Wartime Civil Control Administration, which set up 48 "control stations," through which those about to be evacuated were processed. Stations were staffed with representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Farm Security Administration, and the Federal Security Agency. Financial assistance with evacuation problems was offered by Federal Security only to those who were destitute. Both Federal Reserve and Farm Security encouraged evacuees to make their own arrangements, wherever possible, for disposition of their property. Both stressed rapid liquidation of assets, since there were no facilities for storage of movable property or disposition of automobiles during "voluntary" evacuation.

The Army prohibited evacuees from taking automobiles to reception centers. If an evacuee car-owner did not wish to dispose of his vehicle privately, he could sell it to the Army, or store it with the Federal Reserve Bank, at owner's risk, without insurance, in open spaces such as assembly centers. Under this policy the cars suffered rapid deterioration and the owners became increasingly disturbed. By late fall of 1942, according to a Federal Reserve Bank report, all but 117 of the 2,000 cars thus stored had been sold to the Bank. Then, the report states, the Army, "in consideration of the national interest during wartime, and in the interests of the evacuees themselves, decided to requisition these [117] vehicles."

The Federal Reserve Program

In April of 1942, after evacuation had become a controlled movement, military authorities instructed the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco "to provide warehouse facilities in a manner which would not exhaust or burden facilities of that character already in existence," and to make every effort "to keep the number of warehouses at a minimum to limit guarding costs." Since the evacuees had been encouraged earlier to make their own arrangements, fewer than 3,000 family heads took advantage of government storage, and did so only as a last resort.

In an effort to forestall the victimizing of evacuees by unscrupulous creditors, the president of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank issued a special regulation on March 18, the very day when WRA was being created in Washington by Executive Order of the President. Under terms of this order, any evacuee who felt that he was in danger of being victimized could apply to the Bank to have his property "frozen" and thus made ineligible for any kind of transaction except under special licenses issued by the Bank.

This system of protection, if vigorously exercised, might well have prevented some of the worst of the evacuee property losses. Actually, however, the Bank relied chiefly on the power of "moral suasion" to prevent unfair transactions and exercised the freezing power on only one occasion. The authority was obviously considered a dangerous weapon in a property-minded Nation. On handing over its property responsibility to WRA toward the end of 1942, Federal Reserve also delegated its freezing power. But losses had already been sustained; the time for effective application of freezing controls was past.

In commenting on Federal Reserve property protection policies in a May 1942 report, the Tolan Congressional Committee called them "deficient" and added:

> Although the Bank * * * apparently has ample authority for assuming powers of attorney and otherwise controlling the disposition of property, it appears to have emphasized a policy of immediate liquidation. The conditions under which the Bank will accept property for storage have thus far been cautious in the extreme.

The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco considered that it had "no further responsibility in the Japanese evacuation program by December 31, 1943."

Farm Security Program

In a final report to the Western Defense Command on the protection of evacuee agricultural properties, the Farm Security Administration stated the dimensions of the problem. Before evacuation, FSA indicated, Japanese-operated farms on the coast comprised two percent of all farms. Averaging 42 acres in size, however, they involved only three-tenths of one percent of the total farm acreage. While the average value of all west coast farms was $57.94 per acre, with one out of four acres in crop production, Japanese-operated farms, with three out of four acres planted, averaged $279.98 an acre. Intertilled truck, fruit, and specialty crops were often planted and harvested several times a year. Japanese grew 90 percent of coast strawberries, 73 percent of the celery, 70 percent of the lettuce, half the tomatoes, the majority of the snap beans, cauliflower, and spinach, and millions of dollars worth of carrots, cantaloupes, and other fruits and vegetables.

FSA's primary concern was to keep nearly 7,000 evacuee-operated farms, involving roughly a quarter of a million acres, in active production during a period of tremendous food requirements. Because many of the evacuee farm properties were so comparatively small, Farm Security found it convenient to encourage the formation of corporations, which would operate a whole group of evacuee holdings under lease, and "to make loans of considerable size to such cor-

porations." Typical leases between evacuees and the corporations agreed that the evacuee owner should receive 50 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of crops after operating expenses had been deducted. In spite of such provisions in individual contracts with the owners, however, FSA viewed the entire income of a corporation as subject to crop mortgage and, accordingly, demanded full repayment before any lessor's interests should be recognized. Thus some evacuees received nothing because of poor crops on someone else's land. Individually leased farms were subject to the same FSA policy of collection without regard to the emergency circumstances.

In August 1942, Farm Security turned over all its responsibility connected with evacuee farm properties, except for control of its loans and collections, to the WRA. However, in November the agency called on WRA for assistance in problems involving these loans. A memo of that month from the WRA Evacuee Property Office in San Francisco summarized the situation:

* * * It is already apparent that a number of these loans are not likely to be repaid within the period of 12 months for which the loans were made, so that it becomes essential to the protection of evacuee interests to find out just what the collection policy of FSA will be with respect to requests for renewals or extensions of time * * * we have learned that [FSA] expects to exert a "firm collection policy."

* * * [FSA] feels that it was more or less of a temporary arrangement to carry through the crop season that was already under way, and * * * that the loans should be liquidated as completely as possible and that operators needing additional financing should either obtain it from the usual commercial channels or that some other government agency should provide the necessary funds. * * *

In the Seattle area we are already observing cases where operators of evacuee farms are abandoning the properties, knowing that they will not be able to repay their loans in full by the due date and believing that they have no opportunity of obtaining extensions of time or renewals of their loans. * * *

WRA and FSA were unable to reach a compromise. FSA continued its "firm collection policy." In addition, WRA's problem was complicated by FSA's reluctance to release any information concerning its loans to evacuees, in spite of instructions to FSA from WCCA in July 1942 to turn over to WRA all its evacuee property responsibilities except for loans made to substitute operators.

WRA Evacuee Property Policy

When WRA inherited the property problems of the evacuees in August 1942, the agency set up an Evacuee Property office headquartered, not in Washington, but in San Francisco—in the locale of the property itself and its attendant problems. The new division functioned under a tentative policy for 5 months, then was provided with basic operating principles in January 1943.

The policy statement specified that the Authority was an intermediary only, and would direct no action in regard to evacuee property. WRA would furnish investigation, information, advice, and service in carrying out evacuees' decisions. Service would extend only to negotiation with an agent of the evacuee's choosing, such as bank, attorney, real estate firm, accountant, or other qualified principal.

Property conservation became a prime consideration in WRA's handling of both real estate and movable goods. The Authority could readily see the damage already done by earlier policies of quick liquidation and was determined to minimize such losses in the future to the greatest possible extent.

Movable Property

Because evacuees had been encouraged to make their own arrangements for storage of personal property in the months prior to WRA's assumption of property responsibility, the 19 warehouses which the Federal Reserve Bank turned over to the Authority contained only 38,693 individual parcels belonging to 2,983 families. Others who had not sold their household effects in panic or desperation had stored the goods in vacant stores, churches, houses, garages, or other outbuildings on their vacated land. Some had reserved a room in a house rented to a tenant for the duration, with a verbal agreement that the reserved room would remain unmolested until the owner could recover the goods stored therein.

WRA assumed the obligation previously carried by the Bank to ship free of charge to relocation centers such household and personal goods as had been stored in government warehouses. In the beginning, goods in private storage were ineligible for free shipment. The first WRA regulations permitted evacuees to have privately stored possessions moved into government warehouses for free storage but stipulated that cost of movement would have to be borne by the evacuees. It soon became evident, however, that the majority of evacuees had so depleted their savings that they could not afford to pay for this transportation. It also became increasingly evident that goods stored in vacant stores and churches or left with neighbors were not adequately safeguarded. Losses were steadily mounting from fire, theft, and vandalism. Local law enforcement agencies all too frequently provided inadequate protection.

In recognition of this situation, WRA established procedures in January 1943 under which evacuees could have privately stored property moved at government expense to one of the WRA warehouses which were leased in key cities of the evacuated area. Great numbers of evacuees took advantage of this safer storage, but not before costly losses had been sustained.

As the relocation program developed, further changes were made in original regulations regarding storage and movement of household goods and business equipment. For 15 months after the first leave regulations became effective in October 1942, relocation was attempted principally by young unattached persons with little property and few property problems. They were scarcely touched by the WRA limitation of 500 pounds of personal effects to be transported at government expense from WRA warehouses to a center or the community of resettlement. By the end of 1943, however, as more of the property-owning evacuees began to resettle, it became obvious that the whole procedure on movable goods needed careful reexamination.

To meet these changing needs and corollary problems, a conference was held in the middle of January 1944 in San Francisco involving the agency's property, transportation, and legal personnel from centers, and from the Washington, San Francisco, and area offices. More thorough investigation, reporting, and documenting of fraud, vandalism, pilferage, fire damage, and management lapses were urged upon property supervisors in the evacuated area. Transportation procedures were amended to permit the cost of packing of evacuee property at the centers at government expense, and the 500-pound limit on personal property shipments was eliminated as of March 4, 1944. New provisions allowed free transportation of 5,000 pounds of fixtures, equipment, tools, or machinery necessary to business enterprise if a family were unable to procure substitute equipment in the new area.

During the liquidation period of 1945 and 1946 WRA had to alter policy frequently to carry out its dual aim of giving all possible service to returning evacuees and at the same time terminating its property program. The deadline for emptying government warehouses on the west coast, which was originally set for February 28, 1946, had to be extended to March 15. The reason for this was that many evacuees were living either in temporary quarters such as hostels or "special projects," or were doubled up with other families, and in neither case were able to accommodate their personal property. Special consideration beyond final deadlines was given in genuine hardship cases. A particular function of the Authority during this period was arranging contacts with local agencies, organizations, and firms which would continue some type of property assistance where WRA service left off.

After first circularizing bilingual newspapers, WRA moved from its warehouses and sold at public auction unclaimed property in all cases where the owner was unidentified, or could not be located, or failed to request or refused shipment by the authorized closing date. The last of the warehouses was closed toward the end of April and the movable property program formally terminated.

Real Property

In 1943 the Evacuee Property offices began an exhaustive land ownership survey in the evacuated area, which was not completed until 1945. All county recorders' records were searched and all parcels of evacuee-owned land were identified, classified, catalogued, and mapped. The survey revealed a total of 5,788 evacuee holdings in 44 counties of the three Pacific States. Of 3,742 urban properties, 3,267 were in California; of 2,046 rural holdings, 1,715 were in California.

The Farm Security Administration had turned over to WRA responsibility for several hundred evacuee-operated farms, while the Federal Reserve Bank had relinquished to the Authority control over 1,325 evacuee businesses in California, 185 around Portland, and 1,277 in Washington.

Throughout the exclusion period, WRA concerned itself with finding lessors for commercial, agricultural, and residential property, and buyers for evacuees wishing to sell real estate; effecting settlement of

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claims for or against evacuees; adjusting differences arising out of inequitable, hastily made, or indefinite agreements; securing accountings for amounts due evacuees and facilitating collections; and determining whether property was being satisfactorily maintained.

When the exclusion ban was lifted and WRA's liquidation program announced, the property problem shifted to one of helping the evacuees to reoccupy their properties in the former prohibited zone. Many hasty leases merely specified vaguely that they were to be effective "for the duration." Others stating the "duration of hostilities" permitted the tenant to hold out for the end of hostilities with Japan. "Duration of the war" clauses were interpreted by some lease-holders to extend to the time when the President should proclaim the end of the National emergency. Few leases named a termination date. Some lessors had made only oral contracts.

Gradually, however, the great majority of these problems were straightened out and nearly all evacuee property holders who still retained title or had adequately drawn leases were able to regain possession of their homes. The most significant fact is that the number of Japanese home-owners in the west coast region was sharply reduced between 1942 and 1946. According to a WRA survey, the number of Japanese-owned or Japanese-leased farm properties in the evacuated area dropped from the nearly 7,000 tabulated by FSA at the time of evacuation to a little over 2,000 after the repeal of exclusion. The mortality among urban property ownerships and leaseholds, which has never been adequately tabulated, was undoubtedly less drastic but quite probably substantial.

The loss of hundreds of property leases and the disappearance of a number of equities in land and buildings which had been built up over the major portion of a lifetime were among the most regrettable and least justifiable of all the many costs of the wartime evacuation.

The Emergency Refugee Shelter

ON THE morning of June 10, 1944, the Director of the War Relocation Authority and the members of his staff were surprised to read in the newspapers that the agency had been given a new and somewhat different kind of responsibility. The President, the news stories of that day indicated, had decided to establish an emergency refugee shelter at Fort Ontario, Oswego, N. Y., for a group of approximately 1,000 war refugees to be brought in from Europe outside the regular immigration quotas and had made WRA responsible for administration of this shelter. It was not until many weeks later that the Authority learned the full background of events lying behind this unexpected expansion of its program.

In the early spring of 1944 the War Refugee Board felt that its rescue operations abroad were hampered by the fact that the United States had not yet made a concrete move in the direction of offering asylum to war refugees. The Executive Director of the board discussed the matter with the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War, who made up the board, and also with the President. As a result of the liberation of Rome, the Executive Director pointed out, displaced persons were streaming through the Allied lines in Italy, and taxing supply lines seriously. When this situation was presented to the President, he decided to have approximately 1,000 refugees of assorted nationalities removed from the congested area and brought to the United States for war-duration shelter. The program was authorized in a cablegram which the President sent to Ambassador (at large) Robert Murphy in Algiers on June 9 and was initiated almost immediately. The refugees to be given shelter were selected in Italy by a representative of the War Refugee Board, which sponsored the venture, and United States Army members of the Subcommission on Displaced Persons of the Allied Control Commission. The refugees embarked at Naples in mid-July on a troopship and arrived in the United States in early August.

The People

The refugees at the time of arrival at Fort Ontario were a decidedly bedraggled group. They were weary from the long journey, which included crowded quarters in an Army transport and an all-night ride by day coach to Oswego. But there was a deeper weariness, born of persecution, flight, internment, and war, which showed on their faces. At Fort Ontario they found barracks, mess halls, a barbed wire fence—familiar reminders of life in other camps. But in other respects, Fort Ontario in summer was an inviting spot and they could relax as they viewed the lake front or strolled around the green parade ground.

At the gate, responsibility for their care had passed from the Army to the War Relocation Authority. The WRA was not happy at the prospect of running another camp. Out of its experience in the operation of relocation centers for Japanese American evacuees had come the conviction that detention in camps was an unnatural existence which should be avoided if any alternative was possible. The Authority had made last-minute attempts to alter the Oswego plan so that the refugees could be permitted, after a brief reception period, to live normal lives in ouside communities. But President Roosevelt, in announcing the project, had stated that the refugees would remain at Fort Ontario * * * "under appropriate security restrictions * * * for the duration of the war." As a consequence, both the War Refugee Board, which had the overall policy responsibility, and the Department of Justice, which held that these people were "not actually living within the United States," insisted upon a literal interpretation of the President's words even after the group had been screened for security by U. S. military intelligence officers.

So WRA set about the task of administering a Shelter that would give the residents the maximum of freedom consistent with the conditions governing their residence. Fortunately, the refugees' sense of isolation and confinement was lessened somewhat by the town's prevailing attitude of friendliness and solicitude of relatives, friends, and private agencies interested in their welfare. In fact, the amount of attention received, especially during the Shelter's early days, was out of all proportion to the size and importance of the project. Messages and packages came from all parts of the country as the newspapers and newsreels portrayed the gaunt and grimy company. Even the customs inspectors who examined the baggage chipped in and bought a complete outfit for a ragged 9-year-old boy. It was America's first close-up of a war refugee.

The 982 residents of Fort Ontario had in common their fund of refugee experience, but as individuals, and even as groups, they differed widely. In age, they ranged from a Spanish citizen of 80 who had been born in Salonika, Greece, to "International Harry" Maurer, delivered by an English Army doctor to an Austrian mother in an American ambulance in Italy two days before the ship sailed. They were predominantly Jewish, with small contingents of Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox, and Protestants, but even the Jewish majority represented all shadings from extreme orthodoxy to reformed. The group was polyglot in the most literal sense—it contained persons of 18 nationalities and the WRA found that it had to use at least German, Serbo-Croatian and Italian, in addition to English, to make itself understood by all the residents. Yugoslavs, Austrians, Poles, and Germans accounted for almost 90 percent of the group, while Czechs, Russians, Bulgarians, Turks, French, Hungarians, Rumanians, and other nationalities made up the remainder.

A substantial percentage of the Oswego refugees had a better than average education. For example, 713 persons spoke one or more languages in addition to their native tongue. Many in the group had been

successful business or professional people in their homelands. Whether by chance or design, the group that came to Fort Ontario included more persons with relatives in the United States and more who had applied for American visas in past years than a random selection would normally have produced. There were over 50 families with "fireside" relatives in the United States, including spouses, parents, or children. The Shelter population also included parents of more than a score of men in the American armed forces.

Many of the refugees had known extreme persecution—close to a hundred were alumni of Dachau and Buchenwald. In the past 5 years most of them had personally experienced war and its deprivations—including the loss of immediate family members. All were anti-Nazis.

The Program

Aside from its location in a zone where rigorous winter weather prevailed, the site of the Emergency Refugee Shelter was advantageous from a number of points of view. There were individuals in the town who were indifferent or even antagonistic toward the refugees but they were a small minority. Most of the townspeople were friendly and an advisory committee of town residents formed in the early days was consistently helpful to the Shelter administration and to the refugee population. By the opening of the fall term arrangements had been made for almost 200 refugee children to attend Oswego's public and parochial schools. Because the town had lost population and teacher loads were down, there was room in the classes; cooperating private agencies helped with books and supplies, and the Shelter was close enough so that the younger children could all walk to school. At first unfamiliarity with the English language made progress difficult for some of the children. But the bulk of them made a surprisingly quick adjustment and were soon integrated into the various classes. It was a tremendously heartening experience both for the children and their parents.

WRA felt that its responsibility at Fort Ontario covered the essentials of everyday living—food, shelter, essential medical care, and grants to provide minimum clothing and incidentals. The Authority's policy was based on the belief that goods and services over and beyond these basic essentials should be provided from private sources. At first a number of the private agencies vied with each other in offering educational, recreational, religious, and other services. Duplication of effort resulted until most of them wisely decided to channel their efforts through a coordinating committee which established headquarters in Oswego. The committee's executive director consulted with the Shelter director from time to time concerning offers of assistance made by private agencies. The agencies sponsored and financed all educational, recreational, and religious activities. They provided supplies for publication of a weekly newspaper and arranged film programs several nights during the week. They furnished instruction and materials for English and vocational training classes, supported dramatic, musical, and arts and crafts activities, at times supplemented the government's

clothing allowances and provided medical services which were valuable from a rehabilitative point of view. The agencies paid tuition and other costs for students attending the State Teachers College, financed a nursery school, and reimbursed WRA to the extent of $9.50 a month for the employment of over 50 Shelter residents in cultural and educational projects. Such personnel included the movie projectionist, librarian, music and art teachers, janitors of recreation and school buildings, the staff of a weekly newspaper, and community religious workers.

The refugees maintained their own households and most of the able-bodied among them were employed in essential project duties at the rate of $18 per month. They completely staffed their own mess halls, provided a major portion of the services in the hospital, and assisted the appointed personnel in the offices, warehouses, and shops. Refugee hospital workers, for example, included five doctors, two dentists, a pharmacist, and various technicians. The most difficult task was to recruit refugee workers for delivery of coal, removal of garbage, trash and ashes, upkeep of the grounds, and similar arduous tasks. The quota of physically capable men was small and most of them were white-collar workers who had never performed this type of labor. A rotation system was introduced in which each of the able-bodied persons was periodically excused from his regular job to do a weekly stint of the heavier chores, but the success of this plan was decidedly uneven throughout the project's life. An advisory council of Shelter residents, elected on a basis of proportional nationality representation shortly after the group's arrival, tried for some weeks to create mutual understanding concerning these heavy duty tasks between the Shelter director and the population, but resigned in December 1944 because of its inability to handle the work situation.

Under WRA policies the refugees were not permitted to work in private industry in or outside the Shelter. The only exception was made in the fall of 1944 when an average of 50 refugees were recruited on an emergency basis over a period of several weeks to help save a local fruit crop. During this time they received prevailing wages.

The First Year

Generally speaking, the early fall of 1944 was a happy period at Fort Ontario. For the first time in years many of these people were enjoying good food; their wardrobes were replenished and a variety of other facilities were available to them. Many of them had visits from their American relatives and friends, and after the quarantine period, they were permitted to go downtown to shop. Had Fort Ontario been a normal community it would probably have settled into routine ways by Christmas, but it was by no means a normal community.

In many respects it did superficially resemble a town. Most of the adults worked; the children attended school; the people took part in social, recreational, and religious activities. In their store-bought clothes they were all but indistinguishable from the Oswego citizenry. Apart from the fact that they ate most of their meals in mess halls instead of

at home, their daily habits resembled those of the average American family. But there was a subtle difference. One of the residents summed it up when he said that they possessed everything but the one thing they wanted most—freedom.

It is true that these people, before coming to the United States, had signed a statement indicating their understanding and acceptance of the conditions governing their residence at Fort Ontario and their return abroad at the war's end. Yet few of the residents were psychologically able to accept this as a commitment. They had always looked on the United States as the land of liberty and felt certain that they would be free agents on their arrival here or shortly thereafter. As it became increasingly evident that this was not to be, the people grew restive and Fort Ontario took on for them some of the characteristics of the internment camps and other places of detention in which they had been previously confined. They were grateful for the chance to come to the United States and appreciative of the arrangements made for their care, but they could not understand why, as anti-Nazis, they were subjected to restrictions more confining than they had experienced under the Allied occupation in Italy. Even after they were security-checked by United States military intelligence, they needed a pass to go outside the Shelter gate; they were not permitted to venture beyond the city's environs; and they could not accept private employment. It was not just the fence that disturbed them—it was the indeterminate nature of their detention and the uncertainty of what lay beyond. Abroad, their very struggle for life had kept them going; now inaction strained some of them almost to the breaking point. They fretted ceaselessly. Minor events took on exaggerated meaning. Rumors were rampant. Nerves were rubbed raw.

After several futile attempts to effect a change in the detention policy which was being rigidly maintained by the War Refugee Board and Department of Justice, the Director of WRA sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior, 4 months after the Shelter opened, indicating that the Shelter had already outlived its usefulness and that retrogression in the condition of the people might be expected beyond that point. Since acceptance of the Shelter residents as ordinary quota immigrants seemed out of the question at that time, WRA pushed for a plan of "sponsored leave" under which private agencies, at their own expense, would undertake to resettle the Shelter residents, assure their well-being in normal communities throughout the United States, pledge the Government that none would become a public charge, and agree to their return at any time and to any place designated by the Government. WRA had been assured by a number of the private agencies that they would be willing to carry out such a program. The Secretary of the Interior accepted the idea, finding it "intolerable that anti-Nazis should be kept under lock and key," but the War Refugee Board and the Department of Justice, to whom the proposal was subsequently made, were unwilling to permit any change in the leave regulations. WRA tried throughout the winter to obtain some relaxation which would permit residents to leave the Shelter, if only for a temporary

period, but such leave was permitted only in medical cases for which Shelter hospital facilities were not adequate.

It was a bleak winter. A suicide and a death by accident depressed morale. The work situation was far from satisfactory. Heavy snows impeded the tasks at hand and made increasingly difficult the completion of chores essential to project maintenance and well-being.

In the spring, as the end of the war in Europe became increasingly imminent, the emphasis in the thinking of the Shelter residents shifted to the second of the two original conditions mentioned by President Roosevelt—that the refugees "would be returned to their homelands" at the end of the war. The refugees, their relatives and friends, and numerous private organizations continued to campaign for the release, or at least parole, of the Shelter residents. But a new concern was evident—that the second of the President's statements would be observed in the same literal sense as the first and that the refugees would be returned to their homelands. As reports came in from liberated portions of Europe, it became evident that such return would be involuntary on the part of most Shelter residents. A survey of desires for future residence completed by WRA in April indicated that less than 14 percent were willing to return to their homelands and that the vast majority were hoping to remain in the United States.

By this time Brig. Gen. William O'Dwyer had succeeded John W. Pehle as Executive Director of the War Refugee Board. The board was going out of existence in a few months; the Shelter was unfinished business; and the General was eager to dispose of it. He consulted with representatives of the agencies concerned—the State and Justice Departments, the War Relocation Authority, UNRRA, and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Meetings were held at which several possible solutions were discussed. Finally, it was decided that UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee would work with WRA on plans for those Shelter residents who wished repatriation or emigration to other countries of their choice. This left the main issue unsettled, although hope was expressed that a solution would be found consistent with United Nations policy on displaced persons.

While these negotiations were proceeding, the Shelter director despaired of any constructive solution and resigned his post in May in order to form a national committee which would work for the freedom of the Shelter residents. A committee of 27 leading Oswego citizens also memorialized the President and Congress about this time, urging that the refugees be released and permitted to apply for admission to the United States under the immigration laws.

Early in June, President Truman transferred from the moribund War Refugee Board to the Department of the Interior the overall policy responsibility for Fort Ontario. At this juncture the Secretary of the Interior strongly urged the President to approve a program of sponsored leave. The Department of Justice again objected, but this time proposed an alternate method by which, if certain conditions could be satisfied, the refugees might be brought within the scope of the immigration laws.

Meanwhile, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, which had received many inquiries concerning the status of the refugees, decided to conduct its own investigation. A subcommittee, visiting Oswego in the latter part of June, took testimony from WRA officials, Oswego townspeople, and the refugees themselves. The committee members were impressed with the calibre of the refugee group, both in terms of their good behavior and their contributions to the cultural and educational life of the town. They inquired searchingly into the relationships and connections which the refugees still had in various parts of the world and were given substantial evidence indicating that most of the group no longer felt any meaningful ties with their homelands.

The House subcommittee reported back to the full committee on immigration and the full committee issued a resolution on July 6 which asked the Departments of State and Justice to ascertain whether it was "practicable" to return the refugees to their homelands. If so, they were to be returned at the first available opportunity. The committee also declared that "the continued expense of $600,000 per annum in maintaining the camp at Oswego is inadvisable, unwarranted, and should be discontinued." If the return of the refugees was not deemed practicable, the Attorney General was requested to declare them illegally present in the country and to dispose of them in accordance with existing laws.

This focusing of attention on the Shelter problem gave heart to the Shelter population, who felt that their cause was being given some consideration, and that their detention would soon be at an end. The mood was lighter during the late spring and summer. An arts and crafts exhibit of the best work of Shelter residents attracted such wide notice that a selection of the best objects was put on display at the Syracuse Art Museum. The theatrical and musical groups were active. The end of the school year found one-fifth of the 40 refugee high school students on the honor roll; the other children in the junior high and elementary schools had done correspondingly well.

A few slight relaxations in the leave regulations were now made. Several children were placed in foster homes outside the Shelter, refugees were permitted to visit next of kin in outside hospitals, and the boundary for passes was extended from the city limits of Oswego to a distance of 20 miles, enabling residents to visit nearby towns and state parks. At the same time, however, disquieting reports were coming in from liberated Europe and residents were becoming increasingly anxious about their future plans.

The Immigration Issue

During this period a number of administrative regulations were put into effect at the Shelter which improved the work situation, raised safety and sanitation standards, and brought about a substantial improvement in cooperative relationships with the private agencies. An executive committee of Fort Ontario residents also took office during this period and, for the first time since the resignation of the

refugee advisory council over the work issue of December 1944, the Shelter had a form of representative self-government. Following the resignation of the Shelter director in May, the project was headed up for an interim period by members of the Washington staff on detail until a new Shelter Director was appointed in the latter part of July. The WRA Chief Engineer, who was named Shelter Director at that time, served until the project's end, 7 months later.

Meanwhile, in Washington, Secretary Ickes, in a memorandum to the State and Justice Departments on July 31, urged that those Departments take steps to follow the course of action suggested by the Attorney General and approved by the President to provide for the temporary admission, under appropriate immigration statutes, of those refugees whose return abroad was found to be impracticable. Another waiting period followed, but as a direct result of this correspondence, the State and Justice Departments arranged for representatives to visit Oswego for the purpose of interviewing and classifying all Shelter residents. The following categories were mentioned by Secretary Byrnes in a letter of August 23, to Mr. Ickes, in which the Attorney General concurred:

1. In accordance with President Roosevelt's commitment to the Congress, all of the refugees who can be returned to their homelands should be returned as soon as practicable, unless they desire to proceed to some other country.

2. Those refugees who do not wish to be returned to their homelands, but who desire to proceed to some other country will be permitted to do so.

3. Those refugees who do not desire to leave the United States and who cannot, as a practical matter, be returned to their homelands, should be turned over to the Immigration and Naturalization Service by the War Relocation Authority and will be granted a temporary stay in the United States as nonimmigrants, the passport and nonimmigrant visa requirements being waived by me on an emergency basis. Any aliens in this group who are eligible for admission into the United States as immigrants will be permitted to proceed to Canada or some other country and obtain immigration visas from an American consular officer. Those who do not depart on or before the day their temporary stay expires will become subject to deportation proceedings, unless such stay is extended.

Mr. Byrnes stated that in view of the House Resolution, the proposed action would not be taken "until the program is laid before" the Senate and House committees on immigration. "If those committees do not disapprove," he continued, "the program will then be submitted to the President and if he approves will be placed in effect."

Before initiating the survey, the State and Justice Departments invited the Interior Department (i.e. WRA) to participate, and in September four representatives from each of the three Departments interviewed all Shelter residents and classified them along the lines suggested by Secretary Byrnes. The Shelter population at the time of the inquiry consisted of 918 persons. The review panel, consisting of one representative from each of the three Departments, found that only 32 persons desired to return to their homelands. The State and Justice Department representatives felt that it was practicable to classify an additional 695 persons as returnable to their countries of origin or former residence, despite their unwillingness to be repatriated. The WRA Refugee Program Officer, who headed the Interior Department group and served on the review panel, dissented on 90 percent of these cases.

His position generally was that it was inhumane to force people to return abroad against their desires, under prevailing conditions. He agreed, however, in most instances with the majority recommendation that 72 persons who were willing to leave the United States should be permitted to seek admission to the countries of their choice. There was a unanimous finding by all three Departments that 119 persons should be classified as "not practical to return."

The difference of opinion between the State and Justice representatives on the one hand, and the Interior representative on the other, hinged on the meaning of the word "practicable." The State and Justice officials felt that it was "practicable" to return virtually all of the Shelter residents except where there were close family ties in the United States or a clear showing that the individual's safety would be jeopardized by his repatriation—as, for example, in the case of returning White Russians to the Soviet Union. The Refugee Program Officer, who was fully supported by the National Director on this question, felt that while it was probably physically possible to return the people, they should not be forced back against their will to countries where they feared continued religious or political persecution and where many of their immediate family members had been exterminated. In essence, WRA's position was that United States policy with respect to this tiny segment of the world's displaced population should be consistent with the policies of UNRRA, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, and our own Army in occupied zones of Europe. All of these agencies opposed involuntary repatriation.

The findings of the interdepartmental survey were forwarded to the three Cabinet officers in the latter part of October. Anticipating that there might be a delay in arriving at a decision, because of the broader policy questions involved, WRA on October 24 had recommended to Secretary Ickes that the Department press for an interim policy of sponsored leave pending the final judgment of the Government as to the practicability of the refugees' return. The Secretary so recommended in a letter to the President dated October 31.

Finally, a meeting was called for December 5 and representatives of the three Departments met to consider a draft of a letter to Senator Russell and Congressman Dickstein which had been prepared for the signatures of the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Interior. This draft, which was written in the Justice Department, was intended to inform the chairmen of the two committees on immigration of the results of the survey made at Oswego and to urge upon them a settlement of the matter in line with the majority findings. The State Department representative concurred with the draft prepared by the Justice Department, but the Interior Department representative expressed belief that it would be unacceptable to his Department. The issue again was over the meaning of the term "practicable." The Interior Department representative felt that the draft as prepared had no reference to United Nations' or even United States' policy on the handling of displaced persons. An alternate draft prepared in the Department of the Interior was forwarded to Attorney General

Clark and Assistant Secretary of State Russell for their consideration in mid-December. However, neither draft was ever sent to Senator Russell or Representative Dickstein.

Instead, the problems of the Shelter were solved suddenly, unexpectedly, and finally. On December 22, 1945, President Truman, in a general statement on immigration to the United States, opened the way for residents of the Shelter to apply for formal admission to the United States, by calling upon the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to adjust the immigration status of these people in strict accordance with existing laws and regulations. The President pointed out that a careful survey by the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service showed that most of the Shelter residents would, upon application, be admissible under the immigration laws. He then declared, "It would be inhumane and wasteful to require these people to go all the way back to Europe merely for the purpose of applying there for immigration visas and returning to the United States." This was virtually the position which WRA had been taking all through the negotiations.

Resettlement and Liquidation

Plans for the resettlement of the Shelter population and liquidation of the camp as soon as the opportunity arose had been laid well in advance of the President's announcement. Immediately after the announcement no time was lost in putting these plans into effect. Representatives of the State and Justice Departments and of the United States Public Health Service assembled at the Shelter on January 7 to begin the official immigration examination. On the same day the National Refugee Service, a private agency which had volunteered to accomplish the resettlement of the refugees and had been designated to do so by WRA, opened its Fort Ontario headquarters. Together with other cooperating private agencies, the National Refugee Service immediately began interviewing the Shelter population and assisting them to make resettlement plans. One month later Fort Ontario was a ghost town.

The first party of slightly under 100 residents left by bus January 17 for Niagara Falls, Canada, where they received their immigration visas. The remainder of the Shelter population departed between that date and February 5. The vast majority of the Shelter residents desired to enter the United States and were able to meet the immigration and quota requirements.

Of the original 982 travel-weary refugees who had arrived at Fort Ontario in August 1944, 69 had voluntarily departed from the United States before the period of Shelter liquidation. Sixty-six of these had been voluntarily repatriated to Yugoslavia and one each had gone to Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, and the Union of South Africa. During the 18-month period, 14 refugees had died and 23 babies were born at the Shelter. This left 922 persons in residence at the Shelter at the time when the final processing began.

Of the 922 residents, 765 journeyed to Niagara Falls and were admitted to the United States as permanent immigrants. A total of 134 received temporary permits to enter the United States. Of those temporarily admitted, the majority—88—were awaiting permanent immigration in March, when quota numbers would be available for their entry. The balance of the 134 consisted of 19 persons awaiting voluntary repatriation, 8 awaiting emigration to countries of their choice, and 19 found by the Immigration officers to be inadmissible to the United States for reasons of health. The 23 children born in the Shelter were adjudged United States citizens by birth.

After the long months of delay, the speed with which the final processing was carried on served as a bracing tonic. Had the immigration processing or resettlement planning been stretched out over a long period, it is possible that, desirous as they were of leaving, a number of the Shelter residents might, like WRA's other "clients," have become apprehensive about quitting the security of the Shelter. As it turned out, however, time did not permit indecision. Families having relatives or friends willing and able to bear responsibility for their future welfare were encouraged to resettle in the communities where their sponsors resided. Those whose ties were nonexistent or tenuous were aided in the selection of communities where they would be assisted by a cooperating agency in finding housing, employment, and other resources for social adjustment. Thus every member of the Shelter population, whether admitted to the United States on a permanent or temporary basis, had a definite resettlement plan at the time of his departure, involving either family or agency sponsorship. The private agencies pledged the Government that none would become a public charge.

While many of the refugees settled in the East, particularly in New York City where a number had close kinship ties, the Shelter population actually spread to 70 communities in 21 states throughout the country. Accomplishing the resettlement of the entire group within the time allotted, called for close coordination at every step between the WRA staff at the Shelter and the private agencies who were developing the placement plans and taking over full responsibility at the Shelter gate. It represented the high point of a unique collaboration between the Government and the private agencies which had begun in the project's earliest days and had characterized its development throughout.

As the refugees left the Shelter, the government officials, Oswego townspeople and the private agency workers who had come to know them best believed that most of them had a high potential for successful adjustment in the United States. During their stay they had learned to speak English, in many cases quite fluently. Although they had only seen the main street of an upstate New York town of 20,000 population and had spent most of their time behind barbed wire, they had learned a surprising amount about American customs and habits and had acquired a sense of values which enabled them to face their future realistically. The remarkable record of the children had caused the Oswego superintendent of education to predict that they would get along without difficulty in any schools to which they transferred.

The last resident left Fort Ontario February 5, and after property questions and other liquidation matters had been satisfactorily settled, the historic post was turned back to the Army on February 28, 1946. During the Shelter's life WRA consistently tried to perform its stewardship in a humane and reasonable manner. As in the case of the relocation centers for Japanese Americans, however, the Authority's most acute sense of accomplishment came at the end when it could close the camp and release the residents to free lives in normal communities throughout the United States.

Reflections and Recommendations

MOST of those who have been closely associated with the WRA program throughout its active life are deeply regretful that it ever had to be undertaken and fervently hopeful that it never will have to be repeated. Yet there are lessons to be learned from the WRA experience that can be pondered with profit by other government administrators, by students and analysts of the American democratic process, and by all those who are concerned with the intensely practical problem of safeguarding human freedoms in periods of national stress. This concluding section of WRA's report to the American people is not an attempt to assess the meaning of the Authority's experiment in human conservation finally or fully. That will require far more exhaustive research and much more thoughtful study than were possible for the compilers of this somewhat hastily prepared document. We have, however, attempted a rough evaluation of some of the principal issues that were involved in the program and are setting them down here in the hope that they may help the Nation to avoid a repetition of some of its wartime mistakes and that they may suggest some new avenues of approach to the perennial problem of combating racial intolerance.

Democracy Evacuates a Minority

It was the first time in American history, I guess, that they asked you who your grandfather was and if you gave the wrong answer, they did things to you different from what they did to other people. When you thought about it too long or too hard, it made you just a little sick inside. * * *

From a letter by an anonymous evacuee.

If some official of the United States Government had recommended to the President in—let us say—the summer of 1935 that as many as 70,000 American citizens should be cleared summarily from a broad area of the country without individual hearings or trials and merely on the grounds of their racial ancestry, the response would almost certainly have been an immediate, Nation-wide, and vigorous repudiation. Newspaper editors and columnists throughout the country, men and organizations dedicated to the protection of civil rights, radio commentators, and thousands of ordinary citizens would have been deeply shocked and disturbed. The official who advanced the idea would probably have been widely labeled as "dangerous" and "un-American" and would have been called upon to produce literally overwhelming reasons why his proposal should be adopted. If there were even any grounds for argument—any room for reasonable doubt—about the wisdom and necessity of the proposal, we may be quite sure it would have been rejected.

Yet when Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt advanced precisely such a recommendation in February of 1942, it went almost unnoticed in many sections of the country, was approved by a number of keen and conscientious observers of public affairs, and was ultimately sanctioned by the President and by every member of the Cabinet directly concerned. There are a great many reasons for this seemingly paradoxical development, some of them quite obvious and others exceedingly subtle, and they deserve some analysis.

For one thing the Nation was deeply absorbed in February of 1942 with some of the gravest and most perilous problems in its history—problems which reduced even such a drastic proposal as General DeWitt's to relative insignificance. Newspapers which would have unquestionably banner-headlined the evacuation proposal in 1935 reported it in 1942 in brief dispatches tucked away on the inside pages. Radio commentators who would have devoted entire broadcasts to a searching analysis of the recommendation's terms and implications merely noted it in passing. High government officials, harassed by a host of pressing questions demanding immediate and decisive action, were unable to study the evacuation idea as carefully or think through its consequences as fully as they undoubtedly would have liked to do.

But there is another, possibly more significant, reason for the widespread acceptance accorded to General DeWitt's proposal. Experience shows us clearly that when war strikes a democratic nation, something strange and almost sinister happens to the public mind. Virtually overnight the military tends to become somewhat sacrosanct and unchallengeable. The mere phrase "military necessity" uttered by a high Army officer is frequently enough to silence some of our most analytical minds and our most conscientious students of public affairs; the simple statement that a particular line of action is needed for "the effective prosecution of the war" has an almost incalculable effect in winning public acceptance for even some of the most extreme and unprecedented proposals. Such a development in public attitudes is, of course, largely inevitable and—as long as wars exist—in many ways desirable. The moment enemy forces threaten our national safety, the ordinary citizen and even the high civilian officials of government are practically compelled to place great reliance on the men who have been trained in military science and who have made a profession of the "art of war." Civilians are understandably—and justifiably—reluctant to place undue burdens upon the military and are strongly inclined to accept almost without question their judgments upon military matters. The "armchair strategist" has always been an object of contempt in our society and those rash civilians who challenge the decisions of the high commanders on questions of major military policy in wartime run the grave risk of being considered unpatriotic or even worse by their fellows.

But the fact that all of this psychological drift is explainable and that it has definite value in the effective waging of a war should not blind us to its ominous overtones and far-reaching implications. Career military officers, for all their training and expertness in the field of warfare, are wholly fallible humans whose values do not always coin-

cide precisely and at all points with some of the Nation's best civilian thinking. When they approach problems with sociological ramifications, their judgments are likely to be narrow-visioned and single-minded, focused on the purely military aspects of the problem and inclined to choose the solution which appears most efficacious from the strictly military point of view.

It was in some such frame of mind, we may be reasonably certain, that General DeWitt approached the problem represented by the tenth of a million people of Japanese descent residing within his command. In his final report General DeWitt emphasizes time and again that military considerations were uppermost in his mind. He says at one point—

> The mission of the Commanding General was to defend the west coast from enemy attack, both from within and from without. The Japanese were concentrated along the coastal strip. The nature of this area and its relation to the national war effort had to be carefully considered.

Now, what were the primary reasons that prompted General DeWitt to recommend a mass evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent from the coastal area? Unfortunately, these are nowhere succinctly stated in his final report, but they are rather diffusely discussed and suggested in one chapter of the report entitled "Need for Military Control and for Evacuation." In essence, the General made four major points: (1) that the west coast Japanese were "a tightly knit and unassimilated racial group"; (2) that this group had many organizational and personal ties with the homeland of Japan; (3) that the group had shown a pronounced tendency to settle in the vicinity of vital defense installations and facilities; and (4) that there was evidence of persistent communication between unknown persons on the west coast and the Japanese forces at sea. Let us consider these four basic points separately.

It is true, unquestionably, that many of the west coast Japanese showed the characteristics of a "tightly knit, unassimilated racial group." This was particularly the case in the more isolated rural areas and in sections where Caucasian prejudice against the Japanese had virtually driven them into isolation. On the other hand, careful students of the Japanese American social pattern—who might well have been consulted by General DeWitt but quite obviously were not—have emphasized the marked tendency among this particular group, as compared with many other immigrant and second-generation groups, to adapt themselves to American ways of life and habits of thought. Observer after observer—from the popular magazine writers to the painstaking scientific students of culture and sociology—have been almost invariably impressed not only by the eagerness of Nisei to be as "American" as possible but by their conspicuous success in doing so. General DeWitt's first point, in short, is not wholly inaccurate, but it certainly needs much more qualification and limitation than he has ever given it. Once it is given that necessary qualification and limitation and thus put into proper perspective, it becomes a highly dubious thesis upon which to base an argument for mass evacuation.

As evidence of the ties which the Japanese American population on the west coast had with the Japanese Empire, General DeWitt's

report presents a long list of Japanese organizations and societies with militaristic or nationalistic titles which had chapters or branches in California and the other coastal States. No effort is made, however, to analyze the actual extent of the influence of these groups among the Japanese American population, the size of their membership, or the scope of their activities. There can be little doubt that these organizations did have members among the west coast Japanese population and little doubt that many of them were dedicated to a furtherance of the war aims of Imperial Japan. But this is not the same thing as saying that the United States was helpless to cope with these organizations or that their mere existence justified the evacuation of every last person of Japanese descent. The fact is that these organizations were well known to the intelligence agencies and that their most active members were under rather constant and careful surveillance. Many of them, in fact, were picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the enemy alien raids just after Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence, either in General DeWitt's report or in any other document which WRA has ever seen, that these organizations were still functioning in any significant way in February of 1942 at the time General DeWitt made his recommendations for a mass evacuation program.

As further evidence of ties with Japan, General DeWitt's report cites the institution of the Kibei, the existence of Japanese language schools, and the contributions made to Japan in the prewar period. Although the DeWitt report neglects to mention the fact, it is certainly pertinent to indicate that a great many other immigrant groups in the United States have similar institutions. The Italians, the Germans, the Scandinavian peoples, the Irish, the Greeks—to name only a few—all have their patriotic societies, all encourage the study of homeland institutions by the second-generations, all make contributions to the home country. In ordinary times, these tendencies are regarded as perfectly normal manifestations of nostalgia among a people who are, at best, only partially adjusted to their new environment and who are consequently reluctant to cut ties entirely with the land of their origin. In the case of the Japanese, an additional, and potent, motive was that some of the best employment opportunities for the American-born Nisei lay in firms which traded with the Orient and which frequently required a knowledge of the Japanese language and Japanese institutions as a condition of employment. But in General DeWitt's report, all of these activities are represented as though they were peculiarly Japanese and invariably sinister in their motivation.

Many comments have been made on General DeWitt's charge that the Japanese American people showed a pronounced tendency to settle in the vicinity of vital installations. In fact, the General anticipates some of these questions by tacitly admitting that there was no substantial evidence of subversive motives lying behind this pattern of settlement. The report asserts at one point—

> It could not be established, of course, that the location of thousands of Japanese adjacent to strategic points verified the existence of some vast conspiracy to which all of them were parties. Some of them doubtless resided there through mere

coincidence. It seemed equally *beyond doubt* (italics supplied), however, that the presence of others was not mere coincidence.

The report then goes on to cite two examples, both in Santa Barbara County, where Japanese farms were found thickly clustered around utilities, airfields, bridges, telephone and power lines, whereas nearby areas, equally fertile but lacking such installations, were virtually uninhabited by the Japanese. These are the only two specific examples given in the entire report to justify the sweeping language and ominous innuendo of the section quoted above. WRA research has since established the fact that in one of these areas the settlement of the Japanese was primarily due to the purchase of a farm there in the early years of the century—long before most of the installations were established—by a prominent and prosperous Japanese farmer who promptly attracted others in as workers and associates. In the other area the settlement was chiefly traceable to the fact that Japanese farmers were willing to work comparatively small pockets of land between the oilfields and along the seashore which few other farmers were interested in tackling. Yet the report declares it is "beyond doubt" that these settlements were not the result of coincidence and thus, by clear implication, part of "some vast conspiracy." After the examples have been cited, the language of the report regarding their significance is not quite so emphatic.

> Such a distribution of the Japanese population [it continues] *appeared* (italics supplied) to manifest something more than coincidence. In any case, it was certainly evident that the Japanese population of the Pacific was, as a whole, ideally situated with reference to points of strategic importance, to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should any considerable number of them have been inclined to do so.

No further comment seems necessary except to note that this reasoning was used to justify an unprecedented interference with the lives and liberties of 110,000 men, women, and children.

In discussing communication between the mainland and enemy ships offshore, General DeWitt's report mentions "hundreds of reports nightly of signal lights visible from the coast, and of intercepts of unidentified radio transmissions." Although the report nowhere asserts that this signaling was traced to persons of Japanese ancestry onshore, the implication that such people were responsible for it is almost inescapable. In the spring of 1944 Attorney General Biddle asked the Federal Communications Commission for comment on this particular part of General DeWitt's report. Chairman Fly of the FCC wrote the Attorney General in reply—

> You direct attention particularly to [General DeWitt's] reference to hundreds of reports of such signaling by means of signal lights and unlawful radio transmitters and state that investigation by the Department of Justice of great numbers of rumors concerning signal lights and radio transmitters proved them, without exception, to be baseless. * * *
>
> Throughout this period [from December 1941 to July 1942] on the west coast * * * the Commission's Radio Intelligence Division was engaged in a comprehensive 24-hour surveillance of the entire radio spectrum to guard against any unlawful radio activity. * * * In the early months of the war, the Commission's field offices and stations on the west coast were deluged with calls, particularly from the Army and Navy, reporting suspicious radio signaling and requesting the

identification of radio signals. * * * There were no radio signals reported to the Commission which could not be identified, or which were unlawful. Like the Department of Justice, the Commission knows of *no evidence of any illicit radio signaling in this area during the period in question.* [Italics supplied.]

In summary, then, all four of the major reasons advanced by General DeWitt for urging mass evacuation are found to be tenuous, highly arguable, or wholly unfounded.

Admittedly, however, this analysis is made with the tremendous advantage afforded by hindsight. In the early months of 1942 General DeWitt carried an extremely heavy responsibility and faced an indisputably perilous situation. An attack on our western coastline by Japanese forces was a very substantial and imminent possibility. General DeWitt must obviously have known, much more fully than the average citizen did at that time, the extent of the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor and the truly frightening naval superiority which the Japanese temporarily enjoyed in the Pacific. He knew that he had within his command more than 100,000 people who were racially related to the enemy. He had very substantial, very plausible reasons for believing that some of them might be more loyal to Japan than to the United States. He could be certain, in any case, that the entire group was a source of widespread apprehension among the civil population of the west coast and might well become the focus for localized, but nonetheless serious, community disorders. To state the matter quite baldly, the people of Japanese descent—regardless of their individual intentions and loyalties— were a burdensome, distracting element to have around on the west coast in the early months of 1942. Their mass removal, it might well have been argued, would greatly simplify the task of defending the coastline against possible invasion and permit the concentration of military energies and resources on the military aspects of the problem. It was, clearly, not a time for taking chances. Three of President Roosevelt's top legal advisers told him in a memorandum submitted just before the signing of Executive Order 9066—

> In time of national peril any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of action to preserve the national safety, not for the purpose of punishing those whose liberty may be temporarily affected by such action, but for the purpose of protecting the freedom of the Nation, which may be long impaired, if not permanently lost, by nonaction.

All of these are weighty arguments which cannot lightly be set aside even by the most fervent defenders of civil liberties and minority rights. They were, in all probability, among the considerations running through the busy mind of President Roosevelt when he signed the Executive Order authorizing evacuation. But this line of argument is only dimly suggested in the writings and statements of General DeWitt and his principal staff officers. Mingled with some talk about the urgency of the situation and the folly of "leaving any stone unturned," there is a great deal of emphasis on blanket, racial charges of the type which the California Joint Immigration Committee had been disseminating against the people of Japanese descent for decades. There is, for one example, this statement in General DeWitt's memorandum of February 14 recommending the evacuation:

In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an *enemy race* (emphasis supplied) and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become "Americanized" (quotation marks in the original), the racial strains are undiluted. * * * That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn against this Nation when the final test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today. * * * The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken.

There is also this somewhat suaver statement of the same point of view made by General DeWitt's chief of staff for civil affairs, Col. Karl R. Bendetsen, in a speech before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on May 20, 1942:

Now, if you and I had settled in Japan, raised our families there and if our children and grandchildren were raised there, it is most improbable that during a period of war between Japan and the United States, if we were not interned, that we would commit any overt acts of sabotage acting individually. Doubtless, in the main, and irrespective of our inner emotions, you and I would be law abiding. But when the final test of loyalty came, if United States forces were engaged in launching an attack on Japan, I believe it is extremely doubtful whether we could withstand the ties of race and affinity for the land of our forbears, and stand with the Japanese against United States forces. To withstand such pressure seems too much to expect of any national group, almost wholly unassimilated and which has preserved in large measure to itself, its customs and traditions—a group characterized by strong filial piety.

Finally, there is the testimony submitted by General DeWitt to a subcommittee of the House Committee on Naval Affairs sitting in San Francisco in April 1943. A few random statements will serve to illustrate the point.

* * * [There] is the development of a false sentiment on the part of certain individuals and some organizations to get the Japanese back on the west coast. I don't want any of them here. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty. * * * It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. * * * You needn't worry about the Italians at all except in certain cases. Also, the same for the Germans except in individual cases. But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.

Once the evacuation had been ordered and was sustained by Congress in Public Law 503, the only recourse available to the individual evacuee was an appeal to the courts. The Supreme Court did not rule on the question, ironically enough, until December 18, 1944—one day after revocation of the mass exclusion orders. Nevertheless, this decision in the case of Korematsu v. United States is a highly important one since it lays down an authoritative interpretation of the legal significance of evacuation. For this reason, it is essential to understand the precise nature of the question to which the Court addressed itself.

The majority members of the Court, by their own statements, were not attempting to decide in the Korematsu case whether the decision to evacuate was a wise decision or even a necessary one. They were concerned solely with deciding whether it was a legitimate exercise of the war powers conferred upon the President and Congress by the Con-

stitution. With three members dissenting, the majority of the Court ruled that on this basis, the evacuation was constitutional "as of the time" when it was ordered. Mr. Justice Black wrote for the majority—

> Korematsu was not excluded from the military area because of hostility to him or his race. He *was* excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our west coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the west coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some; the military authorities considered that the need for action was great and time was short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.

It would be difficult to find a better illustration of the attitude discussed earlier in this section—the attitude of suspended judgment regarding the actions of the military in time of war. As Mr. Justice Black suggests, there were ample reasons, quite aside from any feelings of race hostility, to justify the ordering of a mass evacuation in early 1942. If the evacuation had been ordered and carried out with conscious reluctance, with a clear recognition of its drastic implications in terms of civil liberties, and with a firm determination to revoke the exclusion orders at the earliest feasible opportunity, WRA would feel that there was little basis for valid criticism or complaint of the action. But we do not believe that the evacuation was actually ordered or executed in any such frame of mind. To be more specific, one may legitimately ask whether General DeWitt and the officers on his staff were as completely free of racial feelings in the matter as were the members of the Supreme Court in rendering the Korematsu decision. As already indicated, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that General DeWitt was by no means free of such feelings in ordering the evacuation and that he held them long after it had become an accomplished fact.

WRA believes that, in all probability, a *selective* evacuation of people of Japanese descent from the west coast military area was justified and administratively feasible in the spring of 1942. It does not believe, however, that a mass evacuation was ever justified and it feels most strongly that the exclusion orders remained in effect for months and perhaps for years after there was any real justification for their continuance. Above all else, the Authority deplores the stigmatizing effects of the mass evacuation—the spurious color of official approval which it lent to the racial thinking of west coast pressure groups—the severe blow which it dealt to the democratic faith of thousands of young American citizens.

But WRA's view of the evacuation can perhaps best be summed up by quoting from a press release which was prepared but never issued—a release which the Authority submitted to the War Department as a suggested draft for issuance by the Secretary of War on the day the exclusion orders were revoked. The final paragraph of this document declared—

not to be copied

Traditionally, in this democratic Nation, we have been reluctant to sanction the imposition of military controls over the movements of our civilian population. We have done so only in situations of extreme national hazard. And we have always been alert to abandon those controls once the danger to our national safety was clearly passed. The [revocation of exclusion] is in full harmony with that basic American tradition. It is also in sharp contrast to the experience of the Axis countries where liberties, once given up, can be regained only at the point of a gun.

The Impact of Camp Life on the Evacuated People

Despite the many disagreements among WRA staff members on various facets of the program, there was virtual unanimity among them on one basic point. With very few exceptions, although with varying degrees of intensity, nearly all employes of the agency in positions of responsibility concluded fairly early in the program that the relocation centers were bad for the evacuated people and bad for the future health of American democracy, and agreed that they should be abolished at the earliest practical date. This conviction eventually became so widespread and so strong that practically all other considerations were subordinated to it.

Yet, oddly enough, this was one point of view which WRA always had the greatest difficulty in bringing people outside the agency to understand and appreciate. As previously indicated, many individuals and groups who were in the forefront of the fight to combat racial intolerance and regain status for the evacuees could not wholly grasp the depth and intensity of WRA's feeling about relocation center environments and consequently disagreed strongly with the agency's policy of center closure. This difference of opinion between WRA and some of its most vigorous collaborators came to a head particularly during 1945, the year of center liquidation.

WRA's view was based originally on a partially emotional, partially intellectual, revulsion against the idea of camp life which sprang up in the minds of some staff members even before half the evacuated people had been transferred to relocation centers. But it was greatly strengthened and reinforced by the actual experiences of center administration. Before the program ended most staff members were firmly convinced that another year of center life beyond the deadline date which WRA had established would have meant an almost irreparable setback for the program of reintegration and readjustment which the agency had undertaken. Since so many people of unquestioned good will and high intelligence had great difficulty in understanding this point of view, it deserves some further explanation.

It is true, of course, that once WRA had decided on relocation as its main objective, the effort to make the centers into some approximation of normal communities inevitably suffered. It may even be argued that WRA abandoned that attempt before giving it a completely fair trial. But the essential point about all this is that the effects of camp life on the evacuated people were progressive, inexorable, and only dimly perceived—if perceived at all—by the great majority of the evacuees. Members of the WRA staff, from their special point of vantage, could

see that with every passing week most center residents were losing initiative and self-reliance, becoming progressively disaffected with and maladjusted to the larger American community, and turning into "wards of the Government" in the fullest and most disturbing sense of that term. But to many of the evacuees the picture looked sharply different. To them the centers provided refuge from the storms of racial prejudice and the disruptions of total war. They were communities in which a man merely had to go through the prescribed routines of work, in which he could easily divest himself of many of the more vexing responsibilities of his previous life—communities in which a man could "ride out" the wartime period without too much personal discomfort and with a maximum of compensating personal security. In the minds of many evacuees, the centers were also—and this has not been nearly well enough understood—the Government's "compensation" to the people of Japanese descent for the "monstrous injustice" of the evacuation. Large numbers of the Issei, in particular, came eventually to feel that they had a very genuine stake—almost an equity—in these communities and that the Government had no moral or legal right to take this haven away from them.

In the face of these attitudes, WRA's attempts at persuasion, argument, and even financial incentive were only partially effective. In the end, the agency had virtually no alternative except to insist upon the closure of the centers and the departure of the few remaining residents without regard to their individual wishes. The Authority regrets that this element of compulsion was found necessary in the latter stages of the program; it went definitely against the basic preferences of the Director and most staff members and was undertaken only as a last resort. But the agency has no regrets about choosing this course in preference to the alternative of prolonged center operation, and no misgivings whatever about the results that were actually achieved.

There are three factors which created the bad environment of relocation centers: (1) the fact of detention, (2) the fact of group stigma, and (3) the fact of government control over all really essential operations. Each of these deserves some analysis.

From the purely legal standpoint, WRA's detention of the evacuees was extremely limited. Actually, there was never any time in the history of the centers when it was completely impossible for any of the residents to leave; and after October 1, 1942—even more particularly after the mass registration in the spring of 1943—the great majority of residents were able to leave upon satisfying a few fairly simple requirements which were quite liberally interpreted. Yet all the physical aspects, all the factors that make for a detention psychology, were definitely present—the armed guards on the periphery, the watchtowers, the fences, the gates, the necessity of passes. Even though the majority of the evacuees were throughout most of their center residence under only a very technical and temporary sort of detention, the fact remained that some of them could not satisfy the requirements and were thus under full detention, while many others regarded the detention as a very real and meaningful part of their lives. Inevitably it conditioned their

thinking deeply and widened the gap in outlook between themselves and WRA staff members.

The fact of group stigma was also quite vivid in the minds of the evacuees and certainly not without foundation. The mere fact of evacuation had created this stigma and subsequent events tended to intensify it throughout 1943. Many of the center residents, WRA has always felt, had a pronounced tendency to exaggerate both the degree and scope of anti-evacuee sentiment outside the centers and were also too strongly inclined to belittle or overlook the genuinely significant manifestations of growing good will and tolerance toward the group over wide areas of the country. It is unfortunate, for example, that so many of the evacuees persisted in reading some of the most flagrantly hostile California newspapers and in listening to some of the most racist-minded commentators on the radio. But the fact remains that they did these things and the result was to deepen their sense of isolation from the American scene, their feeling that they were inevitably an alien and an unwanted people.

In some ways, the factor of government control is perhaps the most important of all, not because it affected center environment or evacuee attitudes any more deeply than the other two but because it is the one factor which is not necessarily peculiar to the WRA situation. Whenever any government agency sets up camps for a displaced people and appropriates funds for their maintenance and operation, it is undoubtedly going to find, as WRA did, that it will have to exercise a rather large measure of supervision—or at least veto power—over the community operations. Inevitably, this makes for an institutionalized environment which, in turn, produces frustration, demoralization, and a feeling of dependency among the residents. WRA believes firmly that even without the factors of qualified detention and group stigma, its centers would still have been undesirable places and that the very idea of putting displaced people in camps is invariably a bad one. The agency's advice to others who may be faced with a similar problem is to avoid the "camp approach" and seek some other solution wherever there is any possibility of doing so. The institutionalizing effects of camp life, WRA has learned, are subtle, difficult to combat, and self-perpetuating. Constant alertness and great ingenuity are needed to prevent them from becoming hardened and virtually ineradicable.

Some Noteworthy Features of WRA Administration

In contrast to many of the special wartime agencies of the Federal Government, WRA was a small, relatively compact organization, preponderantly staffed by government "career people" and given responsibility for a program which directly affected only a small segment of the American population. After elimination of three regional offices in November 1942, the agency's pattern of organization was quite simple, with the line of authority running straight from the National Director to the directors of the 10 relocation centers. All of these features gave the Authority certain advantages and enabled it to do a job which

might have been completely impossible for a larger, more unwieldy organization burdened with other responsibilities.

One of the most important byproducts of the agency's compactness was a definite tendency toward broad staff participation in policy formulation. Whenever the Director had an important decision to make, his usual practice was to call in all the principal members of his immediate staff, who were also the chiefs of the agency's operating divisions. The Solicitor, for example, was both the supervisor of all the lawyers in the agency and also the personal legal adviser to the National Director. All other division chiefs also served in a similar dual capacity. Further, all these officers advised and were consulted on all major policy issues, regardless of divisional special responsibility. The result was that practically every important policy problem which arose in the agency was approached from a number of specialized points of view and examined both in general and in the light of the specific operating responsibilities of the several divisions in the Authority. The Director added his own reflections on the problem as it looked from the top administrative chair. The group as a whole, guided by the Director, then attempted to synthesize the various individual recommendations, and resolved the conflicts wherever possible.

The Authority believes that this was a sound method of policy formulation and much superior to the system of having all decisions made by the chief officer of the agency with the advice of perhaps the two or three specialists most directly concerned with the problem under consideration. As evidence that this method was satisfactory, it is necessary merely to note that, despite the tremendously complex nature of most WRA policy problems, the agency made only a few decisions—the early exclusion of Issei from participation in community government was one of these—which proved clearly unwise or impractical and which it later came sincerely to regret.

Another, and closely related, feature of WRA administration was the great emphasis laid on careful advance planning. At frequent intervals—seldom less often than once a week—the Director and his principal staff members met to discuss the problems of the moment and to anticipate those which might lie ahead. Whenever a problem could be definitely foreseen, the Director generally assigned to the appropriate staff members the specific responsibility of thinking it through and formulating specific recommendations for meeting it. This practice proved its value time and time again, both negatively and positively. In connection with the mass registration for leave clearance in the spring of 1943, the agency learned what could happen when advance planning was not sufficiently tight and comprehensive. In the segregation transfers, the closing of Jerome, the regearing of center policies following revocation of the exclusion orders, and the final closing of the other nine centers, it reaped the benefits of extremely detailed and thoughtfully considered planning-in-advance.

Shortly after the Poston strike and the Manzanar disturbance—and largely as a result of those two incidents—WRA undertook an almost unique experiment in Federal administration which proved definitely

valuable and may have far-reaching significance for other agencies engaged in similar tasks. Realizing that the Poston and Manzanar incidents had come at a time when the agency did not have enough information about community trends and that the symptoms of unrest which had boiled up in those two centers were probably dormant at all the others, the Director authorized the immediate appointment of "community analysts" at all relocation centers. These analysts were scientists by training and profession—social anthropologists, for the most part—who had no direct responsibilities whatever for center administration and were assigned to the specific task of studying the social structure of the relocation center community, identifying the more salient and significant evacuee reactions and attitudes, and occasionally forecasting the probable community response to contemplated policies. In the Washington office there was a small staff of analysts who provided technical guidance for the work at the centers and synthesized the reports of the center analysts for Washington staff consumption. In this way the principal operating officials and policy formulators of the Authority both in Washington and at the centers were kept constantly informed of the most important trends of evacuee thinking—as well as the probable evacuee reactions to proposed policies—and were able to shape their decisions and their actions accordingly. This did not mean, of course, that it was always possible to formulate policies and translate them into action in accordance with the desires of the evacuees; in fact, such a course was only seldom possible or feasible. But the community analysis set-up did mean that the desires, beliefs, and attitudes of the evacuees, so far as they could be determined, were constantly taken into consideration and weighed along with other factors. Although the analysts were not often able to predict specific outbreaks of trouble at the centers, they did render almost invaluable service in analyzing the causes of an outbreak, once it had occurred, and in giving the administrators an insight into the courses of remedial action most likely to prove effective.

The community analysis reports of the agency are being deposited with the National Archives in Washington and with the University of California libraries both at Berkeley and Los Angeles. They will provide a wealth of highly valuable material for social scientists and others interested in studying the social patterns of a displaced minority in government-operated camps.

Unfinished Business

Despite all the excellent progress that was made during the latter years of the war toward a better reintegration of our Japanese minority, it cannot, of course, be said that all problems are solved or even that the group has achieved the full status which it should ultimately have in our society. Evacuation and life in the relocation centers have seriously damaged thousands of lives, some of them perhaps beyond the possibility of full repair. Property losses have been suffered which require fair compensation. State and Federal laws are still on the books

which single out the Japanese and some other oriental peoples for discriminatory treatment; these need modification or repeal.

After carefully assessing the present situation, the War Relocation Authority believes that three major lines of action are needed to insure a better integration of the Japanese people into the body of our society and to soften existing injustices. These are: (1) enactment of legislation providing for an "Evacuation Claims Commission" to consider claims against the government for property losses suffered as a direct result of the evacuation, (2) modification of the Federal naturalization laws to put Japanese people on the same basis as members of other nations and other races, and (3) continuation and expansion of activity by local citizen committees and groups to aid the process of evacuee adjustment and reintegration.

As already indicated, the program for safeguarding the property of the evacuated people, while well intentioned, was not always handled with the highest degree of efficiency and was a long way from being comprehensively effective. The result is that many hundreds of the evacuees—just how many WRA has never had the time nor the staff to determine—have suffered loss or impairment of property values because of governmental action and through no fault of their own. In simple justice to these people, WRA feels strongly that some provision is needed in Federal law so that claims for evacuation-caused property losses can be considered promptly and settled with a minimum of delay and inconvenience. As this is written, a bill which would accomplish this purpose, S. 2127, has been introduced in the Senate (79th Congress, 2d Session). Similar legislation has been recommended to the House by the Secretary of the Interior but the House bill has not yet been introduced. WRA recommends that such legislation be enacted as promptly as possible.

The history of the naturalization laws in this country is little known and widely misunderstood. One of the commonest errors, for example, is to assume that Japanese aliens were declared ineligible for naturalization in 1924 and because of that fact were subsequently barred from immigration. Precisely the reverse is true. Japanese aliens have never been eligible for naturalization as American citizens and it was this fact of ineligibility which was used to exclude them from immigration under the 1924 statute. Until the period immediately after the Civil War, the privilege of naturalization in the United States was confined exclusively to "free white persons." Then in 1870 the statute was broadened to include "persons of African descent or African nativity." No further change was made until 1940, when the privilege was extended to "members of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere." In 1943 the previous absolute bar against all orientals was lowered in the case of the Chinese. It still continues, however, in the case of all other orientals.

There are a great many reasons why this purely racial restriction should be removed from our naturalization laws. But perhaps the most important is that it has been used by racist elements in various Western States as the basis for discriminatory legislation which severely hampers thousands of people from making a living merely because their ances-

tors happened to be Japanese or Filipino or Hindu. The so-called "alien land laws," for example, are nearly all phrased so that their provisions apply to "aliens ineligible for naturalization." This formula, sharply delimiting the economic opportunities of Japanese and other oriental aliens while staying within the allowable limits of the Constitution, was discovered over 30 years ago by U. S. Webb, the then attorney general of California and his close associate, Francis J. Heney, co-author with Webb of the first alien land law. Devised originally by two able legal practitioners and rabid anti-orientalists, it has stood the test of time and court decisions and still prevents the Japanese in the West Coast States and some of the inland Western States from owning or leasing farm land and—in some cases—even from sharing in its profits. Thus in these particular States, the Japanese alien, whose whole background and training may be agricultural, is prevented from engaging in farming except as a paid laborer despite the fact that he may have had sons in the American armed forces who have given up their lives for their country.

WRA believes that this situation is wholly indefensible and recommends the passage of legislation which would extend the privilege of naturalization equally to members of all the races of the world. In addition, the Authority feels that all discriminatory State laws or local regulations against persons of Japanese descent which still remain in effect and which would not be abrogated by this process of broadening the naturalization laws should be repealed.

Little additional comment is needed on the work of the local citizen's committees beyond the expression of a sincere hope that they will keep up the good work as long as any substantial problem of adjustment for the evacuated people continues in their particular locality.

An Anatomy of Intolerance

Rather early in the spring of 1942 a member of the WRA Washington staff, making his first trip to the west coast, remarked rather sadly to a colleague that racial prejudice seemed to be a deep-seated characteristic of the American people. He continued—

> Since the war started we've been telling ourselves that it is characteristically American to love freedom, to favor the underdog, to resent special privilege, and to fight courageously for principles. I think all of that is true. But I submit that it's just as characteristically American—just as much a part of the blood and bone of this country—to resent all foreigners, to bedevil and persecute racial minorities, and to fear and distrust all people who look, act, or think differently from ourselves. There's a five-dollar word for all this. I thing it's called xenophobia, meaning "a tendency to fear and hate foreigners." And if there's a more xenophobic country on the globe than these United States, I have yet to hear about it.

There were many times during the WRA program when it looked as if the xenophobic tendency in American life might win out over some of our other national impulses and bring about a permanent disbarment of the Japanese American people. The tangible results of unreasoning prejudice in the case of this group are fairly easy to assess. They

include the 8,000 people who found the prospect of remaining in this country intolerable and elected instead to go to a war-torn Japan. They include 110,000 temporarily disrupted lives, several million dollars' worth of lost or damaged property, and a total cost to the Federal Government of more than a quarter of a billion dollars for the evacuation and relocation programs.

But perhaps the most disturbing results are the least tangible ones—the pattern we have established for undemocratic behavior, the stain on our national record in the eyes of freedom-loving peoples throughout the world, and the physical discomfort and mental anguish we have brought upon thousands of sincere, well disciplined, and patriotic people. If we had learned to judge people by their individual worth instead of by the pigmentation of their skin and the slant of their eyes, these things would not have happened and we would be a prouder, more widely respected Nation today.

All of this is a segment of history which cannot be erased, and its results and implications will undoubtedly continue to be felt in one way or another for many years to come. But the evacuation, for all its drastic character and its high cost in the impairment of human values, was not without its benefits and compensations. Although the American people of Japanese descent did reach a low point during 1943 when they were more widely reviled and distrusted than ever before, the War Relocation Authority firmly believes that in the following two years of 1944 and 1945 they not only regained their prewar status but actually achieved a higher level of popular acceptance than they have known since the first regular Japanese immigrants arrived at San Francisco in the early 1880's.

This truly astounding reversal is due primarily to two developments: (1) the spectacular and highly publicized record of the Japanese American soldier, and (2) the much quieter, much less obvious process of reintegration throughout the country. The exploits of the Nisei troops and the impact of these exploits on the American public have already been fully examined in connection with the fight for status. The reintegration process needs more analysis than it has so far had.

When WRA first decided on relocation as the main objective of the program, many staff members started talking and thinking in terms of an extremely widespread dispersal of the evacuated people from one end of the country to the other. The end result of the relocation program, they predicted, might be a distribution of the Japanese people throughout many States following roughly the ratio of Japanese in the total population—that is, a little less than one-tenth of one percent. They figured, of course, that there would be a somewhat larger concentration in the Pacific coast area than elsewhere but nothing comparable to the prewar clustering in that region. There were, however, several serious flaws in this calculation.

By March 11, 1943, when the Director first proposed a relaxation of the exclusion ban to the War Department, the Authority had already come to realize some of the many forces which were operating to pull many of the evacuated people back to their former homes. This was

The Nisei learned about America

particularly true of the Issei who had spent the major portion of their lives in the west coast region and who, like most older people, were reluctant to start afresh in some unfamiliar section of the country. In the case of hundreds of families at the relocation centers, homes, farms, and other property owned in the west coast region provided a tie back to the evacuated area which could not be overlooked or minimized. And finally some of the same factors that have operated to increase the general population of the coastal region so sharply in the last few decades—equable climate, growing economic opportunities, pleasant scenery, a general informality of living and social customs—have also exerted an influence on the people of Japanese descent. Despite all the discriminations and recriminations which they have suffered in the coastal States, large numbers of the evacuated people persisted in an almost sentimental fondness for the region and a tendency to regard it as "home."

In the light of these considerations, it is not entirely surprising that after revocation of the mass exclusion orders nearly one half of the total evacuee population should return to the coastal States. In fact, this result is closely in line with predictions which the WRA made in the winter and spring of 1944 and 1945 around the time of the lifting of the ban. But it is also true—and equally noteworthy—that approximately 54,000 people of Japanese descent who were formerly congregated in a strip of land about 200 miles wide along the western coast line are now spread out across the remainder of the country. They have tended to gather much more in some areas than in others. The distribution is fairly heavy, for example, in the vicinity of Chicago, Denver, and Salt Lake City, while it is extremely light throughout most of the cotton belt States of the South. But there is only one State (South Carolina) in the Union, according to WRA records, which has never received an evacuee, and in many the number of Japanese American residents is quite close to the projected ratio of one-tenth of one percent. Some approximation at least of the desirable redistribution of the Japanese American people has been achieved. This is surely one of the most rapid population readjustments in American history.

When the evacuees first began leaving the centers in significant numbers during the spring of 1943—at the same time when popular feeling against them was reaching its Nation-wide peak—the residents of many midwestern cities and farming communities had their first real chance to see and know the American people of Japanese descent through first-hand contact. The results of these contacts were not manifested immediately, but gradually the feeling grew and spread that here were no Emperor-worshipping fanatics but a group of decent, well-behaved, sincere human beings, trying hard to make a satisfactory adjustment and and facing many of the same problems as all other Americans. Once this seed was planted it grew rapidly, nourished by a gradual relaxation of the most acute fears and tensions of the early war period and by the news of Nisei combat accomplishments in the hills of southern Italy and the Vosges Mountains of east-central France. Eventually, a more aroused attitude developed in many quarters—a tendency to ask why

these people should have been dispossessed in the first place and to insist that they be accorded fair and proper treatment.

But this marked shift in popular thinking did not spring up spontaneously. It was carefully nurtured and fostered by thousands of decent-minded citizens in hundreds of communities throughout the Middle West and the East. These groups held meetings; they distributed literature; they talked among their friends and acquaintances; they worked constantly at the problem of developing better public sentiment toward the evacuated people. And they, together with the WRA field officers who worked with them every step of the way, deserve a major share of the credit for the profoundly encouraging results that were achieved.

The final outcome does not entirely invalidate the somewhat sour comments made by one WRA staff member in the spring of 1942 and quoted at the beginning of this section. But in the light of what happened in 1944 and 1945 to the evacuated people, these remarks quite clearly need some editing and expansion. Although there is undoubtedly a marked xenophobic tendency in the United States, there is also a strong and stubborn potential for fair-mindedness among the American people—a potential which should be carefully studied, fostered, and brought to the highest degree of assertiveness in the interest of greater racial tolerance and a richer realization of democratic values.

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Appendix



THE EVACUATED PEOPLE

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Statistics Section
Washington, D. C.

TABLE 1.—*Location of centers; date first evacuee arrived; date and size of peak resident population; number of days center in operation and date last resident departed, by center: WRA Centers from inception to closing*

NOTE.—Resident population refers to population excluding evacuees on short-term and seasonal leave.

Center	Location			Date first evacuee arrived	Peak Population		Days Center in operation	Date last resident departed
	State	County	Last post office address		Date	Population		
Central Utah	Utah	Millard	Topaz	9–11–42	3–17–43	8,130	1,147	10–31–45
Colorado River	Arizona	Yuma	Poston	5– 8–42	9– 2–42	17,814	1,301	11–28–45
Gila River	Arizona	Pinal	Rivers	7–20–42	12–30–42	13,348	1,210	11–10–45
Granada	Colorado	Prowers	Amache	8–27–42	2– 1–43	7,318	1,146	10–15–45
Heart Mountain	Wyoming	Park	Heart Mountain	8–12–42	1– 1–43	10,767	1,187	11–10–45
Jerome	Arkansas	Drew & Chicot	Denson	10– 6–42	2–11–43	8,497	634	6–30–44
Manzanar	California	Inyo	Manzanar	[1] 6– 1–42	9–22–42	10,046	1,270	11–21–45
Minidoka	Idaho	Jerome	Hunt	8–10–42	3– 1–43	9,397	1,176	10–28–45
Rohwer	Arkansas	Desha	Relocation	9–18–42	3–11–43	8,475	1,170	11–30–45
Tule Lake	California	Modoc	Newell	5–27–42	12–25–44	18,789	1,394	3–20–46

[1] Center under jurisdiction of WCCA until June 1, 1942.

Source: WCCA Form TSO–1, WCCA Form TSO–2, Form WRA–31, and Form WRA–176.

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TABLE 2.—*Age by sex and nativity: All WRA Centers, January 1, 1943 (number and percent)*

NOTE.—Refers to resident population of centers including evacuees on short-term and seasonal leave. By January 1, 1943, transfer of evacuees to WRA Centers was complete except for (1) 930 Hawaiian evacuees, 814 American-born and 116 foreign-born, who entered in February and March of 1943, and (2) miscellaneous admissions from 1943 to 1945 of aliens paroled or released from Department of Justice internment camps, a small number of voluntary evacuees, persons from institutions, etc. By this date 866 evacuees, 816 American-born and 50 foreign-born, had relocated from centers on indefinite leave.

Age	Number									Percent								
	Total			American-born			Foreign-born			Total			American-born			Foreign-born		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Total...	110,240	60,189	50,051	71,531	36,635	34,896	38,709	23,554	15,155	100.0	54.6	45.4	64.9	33.2	31.7	35.1	21.4	13.7
Under 5....	8,110	4,225	3,885	8,081	4,208	3,873	29	17	12	7.3	3.8	3.5	7.3	3.8	3.5	(1)	(1)	(1)
5–9.....	7,161	3,614	3,547	7,105	3,590	3,515	56	24	32	6.5	3.3	3.2	6.5	3.3	3.2	(1)	(1)	(1)
10–14.....	9,537	4,813	4,724	9,465	4,779	4,686	72	34	38	8.6	4.3	4.3	8.6	4.3	4.3	(1)	(1)	(1)
15–19.....	15,484	7,815	7,669	15,357	7,749	7,608	127	66	61	14.1	7.1	7.0	13.9	7.0	6.9	.2	.1	.1
20–24.....	15,656	7,742	7,914	15,401	7,622	7,779	255	120	135	14.2	7.0	7.2	14.0	6.9	7.1	.2	.1	.1
25–29.....	9,642	4,869	4,773	9,371	4,720	4,651	271	149	122	8.7	4.4	4.3	8.5	4.3	4.2	.2	.1	.1
30–34.....	4,766	2,608	2,158	4,191	2,296	1,895	575	312	263	4.3	2.4	1.9	3.8	2.1	1.7	.5	.3	.2
35–39.....	4,974	2,761	2,213	1,677	1,078	599	3,297	1,683	1,614	4.5	2.5	2.0	1.5	1.0	.5	3.0	1.5	1.5
40–44.....	6,764	3,273	3,491	587	409	178	6,177	2,864	3,313	6.2	3.0	3.2	.6	.4	.2	5.6	2.6	3.0
45–49.....	5,889	2,051	3,838	196	121	75	5,693	1,930	3,763	5.4	1.9	3.5	.2	.1	.1	5.2	1.8	3.4
50–54.....	6,249	3,524	2,725	69	48	21	6,180	3,476	2,704	5.7	3.2	2.5	(1)	(1)	(1)	5.7	3.2	2.5
55–59.....	6,459	4,939	1,520	13	7	6	6,446	4,932	1,514	5.9	4.5	1.4	(1)	(1)	(1)	5.9	4.5	1.4
60–64.....	5,367	4,416	951	5	4	1	5,362	4,412	950	4.9	4.0	.9	(1)	(1)	(1)	4.9	4.0	.9
65–69.....	2,888	2,433	455	2	1	1	2,886	2,432	454	2.6	2.2	.4	(1)	(1)	(1)	2.6	2.2	.4
70–74.....	944	814	130	5	2	3	939	812	127	.8	.7	.1	(1)	(1)	(1)	.8	.7	.1
75 & over...	350	292	58	6	1	5	344	291	53	.3	.3	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	.3	.3	(1)

1 Less than 0.05 percent.
Source: Form WRA-26.

TABLE 3.—*Final registration results on DSS form 304A and form WRA–126 rev. by sex, citizenship, and center: Residents of WRA 17 years of age and over, 1943*

NOTE.—Refers to final replies to Question 28 for all evacuees 17 years of age and over who resided in WRA Centers during February and March of 1943 when the Army Enlistment and WRA Leave-Clearance Registration program was carried out (see page 56 for statement of Question 28); final replies reflect changes from original answers submitted between date of registration and September 1943. Also included in table are evacuees who were registered between March and September 1943 as they reached the age of 17.

Center, sex and citizenship	Eligible to register	Did not register	Answer to Question 28					
			Total registered	Yes	Qualified answer	No	Did not answer	Unknown
TOTAL	77,957	3,254	74,703	68,018	1,041	5,376	234	34
Male citizen	21,061	654	20,407	16,435	446	3,421	71	34
Female citizen	19,250	732	18,518	16,661	375	1,377	105	...
Male alien	22,281	1,280	21,001	20,495	139	341	26	...
Female alien	15,365	588	14,777	14,427	81	237	32	...
CENTRAL UTAH	6,456	.....	6,456	5,769	254	433	....	...
Male citizen	1,707	.....	1,707	1,292	67	348	....	...
Female citizen	1,604	.....	1,604	1,346	182	76	....	...
Male alien	1,819	.....	1,819	1,815	.....	4	....	...
Female alien	1,326	.....	1,326	1,316	5	5	....	...
COLORADO RIVER[1]	12,644	.....	12,644	11,843	140	634	27	...
Male citizen	3,474	.....	3,474	2,858	115	501	....	...
Female citizen	3,274	.....	3,274	3,119	22	117	16	...
Male alien	3,496	.....	3,496	3,478	.....	12	6	...
Female alien	2,400	.....	2,400	2,388	3	4	5	...
GILA RIVER	9,746	.....	9,746	8,823	(2)	920	3	...
Male citizen	2,659	.....	2,659	1,961	(2)	698	....	...
Female citizen	2,432	.....	2,432	2,212	(2)	220	....	...
Male alien	2,775	.....	2,775	2,773	(2)	2	....	...
Female alien	1,880	.....	1,880	1,877	(2)	.....	3	...
GRANADA	[3] 5,015	1	5,014	5,004	.....	10	....	...
Male citizen	1,580	.....	1,580	1,570	.....	10	....	...
Female citizen	1,311	.....	1,311	1,311	.....	.....	....	...
Male alien	1,237	1	1,236	1,236	.....	.....	....	...
Female alien	887	.....	887	887	.....	.....	....	...
HEART MOUNTAIN	8,042	3	8,039	7,706	60	181	92	...
Male citizen	2,145	.....	2,145	1,929	38	134	44	...
Female citizen	1,684	.....	1,684	1,610	15	35	24	...
Male alien	2,343	2	2,341	2,317	3	8	13	...
Female alien	1,870	1	1,869	1,850	4	4	11	...
JEROME	5,854	6	5,848	4,385	346	1,089	28	...
Male citizen	1,615	.....	1,615	1,139	147	315	14	...
Female citizen	1,588	.....	1,588	1,242	46	286	14	...
Male alien	1,569	5	1,564	1,184	100	280	....	...
Female alien	1,082	1	1,081	820	53	208	....	...
MANZANAR	6,848	.....	6,848	5,950	29	825	44	...
Male citizen	1,907	.....	1,907	1,395	1	503	8	...
Female citizen	1,703	.....	1,703	1,352	27	289	35	...
Male alien	2,022	.....	2,022	1,996	1	25	....	...
Female alien	1,216	.....	1,216	1,207	.....	8	1	...

TABLE 3.—*Continued*

Center, sex and citizenship	Eligible to register	Did not register	Answer to Question 28					
			Total registered	Yes	Qualified answer	No	Did not answer	Unknown
MINIDOKA	6,718	26	6,692	6,605	33	41	....	13
Male citizen	1,419	26	1,393	1,333	12	35	....	13
Female citizen	1,459	.....	1,459	1,449	5	5	....	...
Male alien	2,157	.....	2,157	2,148	8	1	....	...
Female alien	1,683	.....	1,683	1,675	8	.....	....	...
ROHWER	5,791	.....	5,791	5,494	179	113	5	...
Male citizen	1,586	.....	1,586	1,431	66	86	3	...
Female citizen	1,412	.....	1,412	1,308	78	26	....	...
Male alien	1,788	.....	1,788	1,761	27	.....	....	...
Female alien	1,005	.....	1,005	994	8	1	2	...
TULE LAKE	10,843	3,218	7,625	6,439	(2)	1,130	35	21
Male citizen[1]	2,969	628	2,341	1,527	(2)	791	2	21
Female citizen	2,783	732	2,051	1,712	(2)	323	16	...
Male alien	3,075	1,272	1,803	1,787	(2)	9	7	...
Female alien	2,016	586	1,430	1,413	(2)	7	10	...

1 Refers to original replies; final replies not available.

2 Not available; included in "Yes" and "No" answers.

3 Excludes 11 persons, 8 male citizens and 3 female citizens, physically incapable of registering, but otherwise eligible.

Source: DSS Form 304A and Form WRA–126 Rev.

TABLE 4.—*Type of segregant by sex and nativity: All evacuees segregated at Tule Lake, September 1943–May 1944*

NOTE.—Although persons may properly fall in one or more of the categories under "Type of Segregant," at the time of segregation each segregant was classified into one of the types giving preference to the categories in the order listed (See page 63 for definition of types of segregants.)

Sex and type of segregant	Number			Percent		
	Total	American-born	Foreign-born	Total	American-born	Foreign-born
Total	18,422	12,489	5,933	100.0	100.0	100.0
Segregation parolee	134	.....	134	.7	.....	2.3
Leave denial	514	348	166	2.8	2.7	2.8
Repatriation	7,222	4,698	2,524	39.2	37.7	42.5
Registration	4,785	3,274	1,511	26.0	26.2	25.5
Voluntary family member	5,615	4,080	1,535	30.5	32.7	25.9
Nonsegregant[1]	152	89	63	.8	.7	1.0
Male	10,765	6,940	3,825	58.4	55.6	64.5
Segregation parolee	134	.....	134	.7	.....	2.3
Leave denial	299	205	94	1.6	1.6	1.6
Repatriation	4,364	2,656	1,708	23.7	21.4	28.7
Registration	3,116	2,115	1,001	16.9	16.9	16.9
Voluntary family member	2,774	1,923	851	15.1	15.4	14.4
Nonsegregant[1]	78	41	37	.4	.3	.6
Female	7,657	5,549	2,108	41.6	44.4	35.5
Segregation parolee	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Leave denial	215	143	72	1.2	1.1	1.2
Repatriation	2,858	2,042	816	15.5	16.3	13.8
Registration	1,669	1,159	510	9.1	9.3	8.6
Voluntary family member	2,841	2,157	684	15.4	17.3	11.5
Nonsegregant[1]	74	48	26	.4	.4	.4

1 Refers to persons at Tule Lake prior to segregation who remained at Tule Lake but who did not fall into any of the segregant classifications; includes medical cases who could not be moved, members of internees' families waiting for transfer to the Department of Justice family internment camp, etc.

Source: Form WRA-274 and list of **Original Residents of Tule Lake Who Remained as Segregants After December 13, 1943**, compiled by Statistics Section, Tule Lake Center.

TABLE 5.—*Inductions into armed forces, by Center: Japanese Americans inducted from WRA Centers from inception to closing*

NOTE.—This report is limited to those WRA center residents and relocated evacuees visiting at centers who were inducted directly from centers, and excludes (1) evacuees inducted prior to evacuation, (2) relocated evacuees volunteering and called by Selective Service who did not return to a center for induction, and (3) evacuees volunteering and called by Selective Service at centers who relocated prior to induction. (War Department Releases indicate that between November 1940 and December 1945, 25,778 Japanese Americans were inducted into the Armed Forces—438 officers and 25,340 enlisted men—with an estimated 13,528 from the mainland and 12,250 from Hawaii.)

Center	Total	Volunteered prior to Jan. 20, 1944[1]	Inducted after Jan. 20, 1944[2]
Total	3,600	805	2,795
Central Utah	472	80	392
Colorado River	611	116	495
Gila River	487	84	403
Granada	494	117	377
Heart Mountain	385	38	347
Jerome	52	37	15
Manzanar	174	42	132
Minidoka	594	219	375
Rohwer	274	15	259
Tule Lake	57	57	....

1 Does not include volunteers not accepted for service.

2 Includes volunteers and Selective Service inductions (Selective Service was reestablished for Japanese Americans on January 20, 1944).

Source: Reports from WRA Centers.

TABLE 6.—*State and post-office address of first destination by nativity, prior to January 1, 1945; and January 1, 1945, and later: Evacuees relocating from WRA Centers, 1942-1946*

NOTE.—Refers to reported destinations of evacuees on last permanent departure from WRA Centers excluding departures to U. S. Armed Forces, institutions, Department of Justice internment camps, to Japan, and deaths in centers; subsequent movements of relocated evacuees from one address to another are not reflected in this table. All destinations are classified by postal address with result that rural-farm population in surrounding area is included with each post-office address; only those postal addresses to which 200 or more evacuees relocated directly from centers are listed. Prior to January 3, 1945, all parts of the United States except the excluded area (composed roughly of the western half of Washington and Oregon, all of California, and the southern part of Arizona) were open to relocating evacuees; on January 3 restrictions on return of evacuees to excluded area were lifted except for persons served individual exclusion orders by the Western Defense Command.

State and postal address of first destination	Number			Percent		
	Total	Prior to Jan. 1, 1945	Jan. 1, 1945, and later	Total	Prior to Jan. 1, 1945	Jan. 1, 1945, and later
Total	106,925	31,625	75,300	.....	.....	.....
Destination unknown	2,355	1,808	547	.....	.....	.....
Destination known: Number	104,570	29,817	74,753	100.0	100.0	100.0
Destination known: Percent	100.0	28.5	71.5			
United States	103,609	29,793	73,816	99.1	99.9	98.7
Alabama	4	2	2	(1)	(1)	(1)
Arizona	818	152	666	.8	.5	.9
Glendale	487	73	414	.5	.2	.6
Other	331	79	252	.3	.3	.3
Arkansas	161	21	140	.2	.1	.2
California	43,775	[2]194	43,581	41.9	.7	58.2
Alameda	211	.....	211	.2	.....	.3
Berkeley	844	.....	844	.8	.....	1.1
Burbank	228	.....	228	.2	.....	.3
Dinuba	201	.....	201	.2	.....	.3
Florin	294	.....	294	.3	.....	.4
Fowler	329	4	325	.3	(1)	.4
Fresno	1,532	.....	1,532	1.5	.....	2.0
Gardena	368	.....	368	.4	.....	.5
Guadalupe	286	2	284	.3	(1)	.4
Lodi	779	.....	779	.7	.....	1.0
Lomita	218	.....	218	.2	.....	.3
Long Beach	1,014	5	1,009	1.0	(1)	1.4
Loomis	211	.....	211	.2	.....	.3
Los Angeles	10,129	52	10,077	9.8	.2	13.5
Monterey	313	.....	313	.3	.....	.4
Mountain View	291	.....	291	.3	.....	.4
Newcastle	226	.....	226	.2	.....	.3
Oakland	777	4	773	.7	(1)	1.0
Palo Alto	245	15	230	.2	.1	.3
Parlier	391	.....	391	.4	.....	.5
Pasadena	589	2	587	.6	(1)	.8
Penryn	424	.....	424	.4	.....	.6
Reedley	443	.....	443	.4	.....	.6
Richmond	261	.....	261	.2	.....	.3
Sacramento	2,769	4	2,765	2.6	(1)	3.7
San Diego	501	.....	501	.5	.....	.7
San Francisco	2,845	4	2,841	2.7	(1)	3.8
Sanger	352	.....	352	.3	.....	.5
San Jose	1,712	4	1,708	1.6	(1)	2.3
San Mateo	334	.....	334	.3	.....	.4

TABLE 6.—*Continued*

State and postal address of first destination	Number			Percent		
	Total	Prior to Jan. 1, 1945	Jan. 1, 1945, and later	Total	Prior to Jan. 1, 1945	Jan. 1, 1945, and later
Santa Ana	247	1	246	.2	(1)	.3
Santa Barbara	260	.....	260	.2	.....	.3
Selma	319	4	315	.3	(1)	.4
Stockton	1,574	.....	1,574	1.5	.....	2.1
Venice	223	.....	223	.2	.....	.3
Walnut Grove	592	.....	592	.6	.....	.8
Watsonville	378	.....	378	.4	.....	.5
Other	11,065	93	10,972	10.7	.4	14.7
Colorado	6,108	3,135	2,973	5.8	10.5	4.0
Boulder	239	161	78	.2	.5	.1
Denver	3,124	1,299	1,825	3.0	4.4	2.4
Grand Junction	202	156	46	.2	.5	.1
Other	2,543	1,519	1,024	2.4	5.1	1.4
Connecticut	186	71	115	.2	.2	.2
Delaware	7	1	6	(1)	(1)	(1)
District of Columbia	319	192	127	.3	.6	.2
Florida	37	8	29	(1)	(1)	(1)
Georgia	10	8	2	(1)	(1)	(1)
Idaho	3,932	2,084	1,848	3.8	7.0	2.5
Boise	289	210	79	.3	.7	.1
Caldwell	457	215	242	.4	.7	.3
Fayette	373	148	225	.4	.5	.3
Twin Falls	338	212	126	.3	.7	.2
Weiser	307	162	145	.3	.5	.2
Other	2,168	1,137	1,031	2.1	3.9	1.4
Illinois	12,776	7,652	5,124	12.2	25.7	6.9
Chicago	11,309	6,599	4,710	10.8	22.2	6.3
Other	1,467	1,053	414	1.4	3.5	.6
Indiana	254	188	66	.2	.6	.1
Iowa	641	503	138	.7	1.7	.2
Des Moines	378	285	93	.4	1.0	.1
Other	263	218	45	.3	.7	.1
Kansas	103	96	7	.1	.3	(1)
Kentucky	22	20	2	(1)	.1	(1)
Louisiana	100	8	92	.1	(1)	.1
Maine	7	3	4	(1)	(1)	(1)
Maryland	123	66	57	.1	.2	.1
Massachusetts	203	132	71	.2	.4	.1
Michigan	3,047	1,990	1,057	2.9	6.7	1.4
Ann Arbor	534	437	97	.5	1.5	.1
Detroit	1,649	1,007	642	1.6	3.4	.9
Other	864	546	318	.8	1.8	.4
Minnesota	2,046	1,292	754	2.0	4.4	1.0
Minneapolis	1,354	763	591	1.3	2.6	.8
St. Paul	282	170	112	.3	.6	.1
Other	410	359	51	.4	1.2	.1
Mississippi	52	42	10	(1)	.1	(1)
Missouri	1,108	666	442	1.1	2.3	.6
Kansas City	346	215	131	.3	.7	.2
St. Louis	469	285	184	.5	1.0	.2
Other	293	166	127	.3	.6	.2
Montana	780	511	269	.7	1.7	.4
Nebraska	919	620	299	.9	2.1	.4
Omaha	221	154	67	.2	.5	.1
Other	698	466	232	.7	1.6	.3
Nevada	305	155	150	.3	.5	.2

TABLE 6.—*Continued*

State and postal address of first destination	Number			Percent		
	Total	Prior to Jan. 1, 1945	Jan. 1, 1945, and later	Total	Prior to Jan. 1, 1945	Jan. 1, 1945, and later
New Hampshire	9	2	7	(1)	(1)	(1)
New Jersey	2,240	679	1,561	2.1	2.3	2.1
Bridgeton	1,970	623	1,347	1.8	2.1	1.8
Other	270	56	214	.3	.2	.3
New Mexico	185	70	115	.2	.2	.2
New York	2,651	1,131	1,520	2.5	3.8	2.0
New York City	2,036	874	1,162	1.9	2.9	1.5
Other	615	257	358	.6	.9	.5
North Carolina	8	7	1	(1)	(1)	(1)
North Dakota	20	7	13	(1)	(1)	(1)
Ohio	4,422	2,854	1,568	4.3	9.6	2.1
Cincinnati	616	491	125	.6	1.6	.2
Cleveland	3,089	1,820	1,269	3.0	6.2	1.7
Other	717	543	174	.7	1.8	.2
Oklahoma	121	36	85	.1	.1	.1
Oregon	2,612	[3] 524	2,088	2.5	1.8	2.7
Nyssa	319	92	227	.3	.3	.3
Ontario	566	187	379	.5	.7	.5
Portland	859	33	826	.9	.1	1.1
Vale	206	97	109	.2	.3	.1
Other	662	115	547	.6	.4	.7
Pennsylvania	1,008	385	623	1.0	1.3	.8
Philadelphia	740	285	455	.7	1.0	.6
Other	268	100	168	.3	.3	.2
Rhode Island	7	7	.....	(1)	(1)	(1)
South Carolina	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
South Dakota	50	49	1	(1)	.2	(1)
Tennessee	29	24	5	(1)	.1	(1)
Texas	274	130	144	.3	.4	.2
Utah	5,641	2,427	3,214	5.4	8.1	4.3
Brigham City	351	71	280	.3	.2	.4
Clearfield	278	69	209	.3	.2	.3
Ogden	900	301	599	.9	1.0	.8
Salt Lake City	2,002	1,007	995	1.9	3.4	1.3
Tooele	241	89	152	.2	.3	.2
Other	1,869	890	979	1.8	3.0	1.3
Vermont	6	6	.....	(1)	(1)	(1)
Virginia	22	7	15	(1)	(1)	(1)
Washington	5,323	[2] 852	4,471	5.1	2.9	6.0
Seattle	2,760	13	2,747	2.7	(1)	3.7
Spokane	1,294	516	778	1.2	1.8	1.0
Tacoma	229	1	228	.2	(1)	.3
Other	1,040	322	718	1.0	1.1	1.0
West Virginia	1	1	.....	(1)	(1)	.....
Wisconsin	769	493	276	.7	1.7	.4
Milwaukee	422	291	131	.4	1.0	.2
Other	347	202	145	.3	.7	.2
Wyoming	368	290	78	.4	1.0	.1
Hawaii	912	24	888	.9	.1	1.2
Alaska	49	.....	49	(1)	.....	.1

1 Less than 0.05 percent.

2 Departures to California prior to January 1, 1945, refer to evacuees granted permits by Western Defense Command to return to California.

3 Departures to Washington and Oregon prior to January 1, 1945, refer, for most part, to evacuees relocating to eastern half of State, which was never evacuated; in some cases, evacuees were granted permits by Western Defense Command to return to evacuated portion of State.

Source: Forms WRA–177, 178, and 222.

TABLE 7.—*Number of evacuees known to have returned to West Coast States compared with 1940 population of Japanese descent by county, and post-office address: California, Washington, and Oregon*

NOTE.—Evacuees who returned to west coast refer to (1) evacuees who relocated directly from WRA Centers with reported destination on west coast, and (2) already relocated evacuees who requested and received WRA assistance to return to west coast. All destinations are classified by postal address with result that rural-farm population in surrounding area is included with each post-office address; only those addresses reported by 100 or more evacuees are listed. Population of Japanese descent, 1940, is listed for counties only, since U. S. Bureau of the Census figures for cities refer to population within city limits and hence must not be compared with returns to west coast by post-office address as summarized in this table.

State, county, and post-office address	Evacuees returned to west coast			Population of Japanese descent, 1940	Percent 1940 population returned
	From WRA centers	Already relocated	Total		
Total	51,710	5,541	57,251	112,353	51.0
California	43,775	4,819	48,594	93,717	51.9
Washington	5,323	531	5,854	14,565	40.2
Oregon	2,612	191	2,803	4,071	68.9
Area evacuated[1]	48,586	5,541	54,127	111,450	48.6
California	43,775	4,819	48,594	93,717	51.9
Alameda County	2,359	344	2,703	5,167	52.3
Alameda	211	31	242	.....	.....
Berkeley	844	143	987	.....	.....
Oakland	777	129	906	.....	.....
San Lorenzo	114	4	118	.....	.....
Other	413	37	450	.....	.....
Amador County	.....	.....	.....	2	(2)
Butte County	105	2	107	216	49.5
Calaveras County	.....	.....	.....	6	(2)
Colusa County	48	.....	48	155	31.0
Contra Costa County	562	60	622	829	75.0
Brentwood	149	.....	149	.....	.....
Richmond	261	51	312	.....	.....
Other	152	9	161	.....	.....
Eldorado County	13	.....	13	3	(2)
Fresno County	3,845	451	4,296	4,527	94.9
Clovis	94	15	109	.....	.....
Del Rey	130	14	144	.....	.....
Fowler	329	27	356	.....	.....
Fresno	1,532	186	1,718	.....	.....
Kingsburg	127	21	148	.....	.....
Parlier	391	47	438	.....	.....
Reedley	443	60	503	.....	.....
Sanger	352	23	375	.....	.....
Selma	319	58	377	.....	.....
Other	128	.....	128	.....	.....
Glenn County	65	.....	65	.....	(3)
Humboldt County	2	.....	2	.....	(3)
Imperial County	136	6	142	1,583	9.0
Inyo County	1	.....	1	1	(2)
Kern County	181	6	187	756	24.7
Bakersfield	115	4	119	.....	.....
Other	66	2	68	.....	.....
Kings County	186	23	209	508	41.1
Hanford	156	22	178	.....	.....
Other	30	1	31	.....	.....
Lake County	.....	.....	.....	1	(2)
Los Angeles County	15,195	1,977	17,172	36,866	46.6
Burbank	228	9	237	.....	.....
Compton	113	2	115	.....	.....

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 7.—*Continued*

State, county, and post-office address	Evacuees returned to west coast			Population of Japanese descent, 1940	Percent 1940 population returned
	From WRA centers	Already relocated	Total		
Gardena	368	27	395	.....	.....
Hollywood	189	20	209	.....	.....
Lomita	218	1	219	.....	.....
Long Beach	1,014	54	1,068	.....	.....
Los Angeles	10,129	1,527	11,656	.....	.....
Norwalk	143	22	165	.....	.....
Pasadena	589	91	680	.....	.....
San Fernando	172	23	195	.....	.....
San Gabriel	106	1	107	.....	.....
Santa Monica	157	4	161	.....	.....
Venice	223	19	242	.....	.....
Other	1,546	177	1,723	.....	.....
Madera County	156	5	161	170	94.7
Madera	156	5	161	.....	.....
Other	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Marin County	32	.....	32	150	21.3
Mendocino County	6	.....	6	53	(2)
Merced County	378	54	432	715	60.4
Cortez	153	.....	153	.....	.....
Livingston	124	25	149	.....	.....
Other	101	29	130	.....	.....
Modoc County	19	.....	19	4	(2)
Monterey County	538	78	616	2,247	27.4
Monterey	313	59	372	.....	.....
Salinas	167	13	180	.....	.....
Other	58	6	64	.....	.....
Napa County	48	4	52	54	(2)
Nevada County	54	.....	54	.....	(3)
Orange County	536	36	572	1,855	30.8
Garden Grove	101	2	103	.....	.....
Santa Ana	247	25	272	.....	.....
Other	188	9	197	.....	.....
Placer County	1,005	52	1,057	1,637	64.6
Loomis	211	29	240	.....	.....
Newcastle	226	14	240	.....	.....
Penryn	424	8	432	.....	.....
Other	144	1	145	.....	.....
Plumas County	.....	.....	.....	1	(2)
Riverside County	349	48	397	552	71.9
Riverside	168	15	183	.....	.....
Other	181	33	214	.....	.....
Sacramento County	4,000	304	4,304	6,764	63.6
Elk Grove	99	3	102	.....	.....
Florin	294	24	318	.....	.....
Isleton	108	.....	108	.....	.....
Sacramento	2,769	265	3,034	.....	.....
Walnut Grove	592	7	599	.....	.....
Other	138	5	143	.....	.....
San Benito County	113	5	118	526	22.4
San Bernardino County	172	16	188	346	54.3
San Diego County	855	79	934	2,076	45.0
San Diego	501	70	571	.....	.....
Other	354	9	363	.....	.....
San Francisco County	2,845	435	3,280	5,280	62.1
San Francisco	2,845	435	3,280	.....	.....
San Joaquin County	2,711	147	2,858	4,484	63.7
Acampo	176	.....	176	.....	.....
Lodi	779	59	838	.....	.....

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 7.—*Continued*

State, county, and post-office address	Evacuees returned to west coast			Population of Japanese descent, 1940	Percent 1940 population returned
	From WRA centers	Already relocated	Total		
Stockton	1,574	77	1,651	.....	.....
Other	182	11	193	.....	.....
San Luis Obispo County	142	12	154	925	16.6
San Mateo County	589	72	661	1,218	54.3
Redwood City	145	32	177	.....	.....
San Mateo	334	37	371	.....	.....
Other	110	3	113	.....	.....
Santa Barbara County	762	72	834	2,187	38.1
Guadalupe	286	16	302	.....	.....
Santa Barbara	260	40	300	.....	.....
Santa Maria	154	8	162	.....	.....
Other	62	8	70	.....	.....
Santa Clara County	3,092	326	3,418	4,049	84.4
Cupertino	154	5	159	.....	.....
Gilroy	131	13	144	.....	.....
Mountain View	291	36	327	.....	.....
Palo Alto	245	41	286	.....	.....
San Jose	1,712	193	1,905	.....	.....
Santa Clara	132	6	138	.....	.....
Other	427	32	459	.....	.....
Santa Cruz County	408	26	434	1,301	33.4
Watsonville	378	18	396	.....	.....
Other	30	8	38	.....	.....
Shasta County	41	.....	41	2	(2)
Siskiyou County	67	.....	67	7	(2)
Solano County	174	4	178	906	19.6
Suisun	100	4	104	.....	.....
Other	74	.....	74	.....	.....
Sonoma County	353	42	395	758	52.1
Petaluma	160	29	189	.....	.....
Sebastopol	151	2	153	.....	.....
Other	42	11	53	.....	.....
Stanislaus County	163	35	198	369	53.7
Turlock	108	29	137	.....	.....
Other	55	6	61	.....	.....
Sutter County	89	2	91	423	21.5
Tahama County	8	.....	8	38	(2)
Tulare County	731	57	788	1,812	43.5
Dinuba	201	13	214	.....	.....
Lindsay	101	13	114	.....	.....
Orosi	138	5	143	.....	.....
Visalia	152	12	164	.....	.....
Other	139	14	153	.....	.....
Tuolumne County	2	4	6	.....	(3)
Ventura County	166	19	185	672	27.5
Oxnard	140	17	157	.....	.....
Other	26	2	28	.....	.....
Yolo County	207	6	213	1,087	19.6
Clarksburg	144	.....	144	.....	.....
Other	63	6	69	.....	.....
Yuba County	266	10	276	429	64.3
Marysville	188	10	198	.....	.....
Other	78	.....	78	.....	.....
Washington	3,508	531	4,039	13,889	29.1
Benton County	.....	.....	.....	69	(2)
Chelan County[4]	12	.....	12	26	(2)
Clallam County	.....	.....	.....	17	(2)
Clark County	16	6	22	110	20.0

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 7.—*Continued*

State, county, and post-office address	Evacuees returned to west coast			Population of Japanese descent, 1940	Percent 1940 population returned
	From WRA centers	Already relocated	Total		
Grays Harbor County	6	.....	6	2	(2)
Jefferson County	7	7	14	37	(2)
King County	2,971	440	3,411	9,863	34.6
Seattle	2,760	398	3,158	.....	.....
Other	211	42	253	.....	.....
Kitsap County	70	5	75	345	21.7
Kittitas County	.....	.....	.....	9	(2)
Klickitat County	21	16	37	121	30.6
Lewis County	13	.....	13	62	(2)
Mason County	5	3	8	23	(2)
Okanogan County[4]	5	.....	5	.....	(3)
Pacific County	2	.....	2	94	(2)
Pierce County	260	32	292	2,050	14.2
Tacoma	229	24	253	.....	.....
Other	31	8	39	.....	.....
San Juan County	.....	.....	.....	2	(2)
Skagit County	.....	7	7	66	(2)
Skamania County	.....	.....	.....	4	(2)
Snohomish County	2	.....	2	57	(2)
Thurston County	20	.....	20	90	(2)
Whatcom County	5	.....	5	28	(2)
Yakima County	93	15	108	814	13.3
Oregon	1,303	191	1,494	3,844	38.9
Clackamas County	36	20	56	163	34.4
Clatsop County	2	.....	2	98	(2)
Columbia County	.....	.....	.....	38	(2)
Deschutes County[4]	.....	.....	.....	14	(2)
Hood River County	160	26	186	462	40.3
Hood River	121	22	143	.....	.....
Other	39	4	43	.....	.....
Jackson County	7	1	8	41	(2)
Jefferson County[4]	12	.....	12	12	(2)
Josephine County	17	.....	17	.....	(3)
Klamath County[4]	124	2	126	1	(2)
Lane County	1	.....	1	1	(2)
Lincoln County	2	.....	2	4	(2)
Linn County	.....	.....	.....	4	(2)
Marion County	20	6	26	193	13.5
Multnomah County	906	123	1,029	2,390	43.1
Portland	859	103	962	.....	.....
Other	47	20	67	.....	.....
Polk County	1	4	5	28	(2)
Sherman County[4]	.....	.....	.....	3	(2)
Wasco County[4]	2	.....	2	82	(2)
Washington County	9	9	18	245	7.3
Yamhill County	4	.....	4	65	(2)
Area not evacuated (eastern portions of Washington and Oregon):	3,124	.....	3,124	903	346.0
Washington	1,815	.....	1,815	676	268.5
Adams County	14	.....	14	23	(2)
Asotin County	.....	.....	.....	1	(2)
Columbia County	8	.....	8	.....	(3)
Cowlitz County	.....	.....	.....	127	.....
Douglas County	.....	.....	.....	3	(2)
Franklin County	39	.....	39	67	(2)
Grant County	59	.....	59	.....	(3)
Lincoln County	11	.....	11	33	(2)

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 7.—*Continued*

State, county, and post-office address	Evacuees returned to west coast			Population of Japanese descent, 1940	Percent 1940 population returned
	From WRA centers	Already relocated	Total		
Pend Oreille County	6	.....	6	14	(2)
Spokane County	1,444	.....	1,444	362	398.9
Spokane	1,294	.....	1,294	.....	.....
Other	150	.....	150	.....	.....
Stevens County	3	.....	3	13	(2)
Walla Walla County	188	.....	188	17	(2)
Walla Walla	156	.....	156	.....	.....
Other	32	.....	32	.....	.....
Whitman County	43	.....	43	16	(2)
Oregon	1,309	.....	1,309	227	576.7
Baker County	.....	.....	.....	46	(2)
Grant County	2	.....	2	10	(2)
Harney County	41	.....	41	.....	(3)
Lake County	.....	.....	.....	11	(2)
Malheur County	1,254	.....	1,254	137	915.3
Nyssa	319	.....	319	.....	.....
Ontario	566	.....	566	.....	.....
Vale	206	.....	206	.....	.....
Jamieson	144	.....	144	.....	.....
Other	19	.....	19	.....	.....
Morrow County	.....	.....	.....	3	(2)
Umatilla County	12	.....	12	10	(2)
Union County	.....	.....	.....	10	(2)

1 1940 population less than 100; percent not computed.

2 Percent not applicable.

3 Refers to area of west coast (all of California and roughly the western half of Washington and Oregon) from which persons of Japanese descent were excluded and evacuated in 1942. Alaska and the southern part of Arizona were also evacuated at the same time but are not included in this table.

4 County divided by boundary of evacuated area and only partially evacuated.

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census. **Japanese Population of the Pacific Coast States by Sex and Nativity or Citizenship, by Counties: 1940**, Series P-3, No. 25, December 10, 1941, pp. 2-4. Forms WRA-77b, WRA-177, WRA-178, WRA-222, WRA-303 Rev., and U. S. Standard Form No. 1012a.

TABLE 8.—*Relocation rate per 1,000 population by month: WRA Centers, January 1943–March 1946*

NOTE.—Rates equal the net increase in persons on indefinite leave and terminal departure during month per 1,000 resident population (including persons on short-term and seasonal leave) at beginning of month. Net increases on indefinite leave and terminal departure for period from December 1944 to March 1946 excludes 6,328 mass transfers to internment and sailings to Japan from Tule Lake.

Period	All WRA Centers	Period	All WRA Centers
1943		**1945**	
January	3.9	January	12.7
February	5.0	February	17.9
March	8.2	March	28.2
April	19.3	April	37.9
May	23.6	May	50.8
June	20.7	June	71.3
July	15.4	July	76.9
August	21.2	August	145.0
September	18.3	September	299.8
October	12.4	October	397.3
November	10.5	November	391.1
December	8.0	December	142.3
1944		**1946**	
January	15.5	January	311.8
February	16.9	February	361.9
March	23.6	March	(1)
April	21.4		
May	26.4		
June	28.0		
July	25.9		
August	30.4		
September	20.8		
October	15.3		
November	15.1		
December	7.4		

1 Last WRA center closed in March 1946.
Source: Form WRA-176.

TABLE 9.—*Final departures by nationality and type of departure: Fort Ontario Emergency Refugee Shelter residents, August 5, 1944–February 4, 1946*

Nationality	Total	Born in United States	Refugees										
			Total	Death	Repatriate	Emigrant	In United States						
							Total	U. S. immigrant	Temporary resident				
									Total	Awaiting immigration	Awaiting emigration	Awaiting repatriation	Inadmissible
Total	1,005	[1] 23	982	14	67	2	899	765	134	88	8	19	19
Austria	238	....	238	5	....	1	232	212	20	2	3	7	8
Belgium	3	....	3	....	....	....	3	3	....	....	....	....	....
Bulgaria	4	....	4	....	....	....	4	4	....	....	....	....	....
Czechoslovakia	40	....	40	....	1	....	39	38	1	....	....	....	1
Danzig	9	....	9	....	....	....	9	8	1	1	....	....	....
Holland	1	....	1	....	....	....	1	1	....	....	....	....	....
France	13	....	13	....	....	....	13	13	....	....	....	....	....
Germany	95	....	95	1	....	1	93	90	3	....	3	....	....
Greece	4	....	4	....	....	....	4	....	4	4	....	....	....
Hungary	3	....	3	....	....	....	3	3	....	....	....	....	....
Italy	6	....	6	....	....	....	6	6	....	....	....	....	....
Jugoslavia	368	....	368	6	66	....	296	207	89	74	....	12	3
Poland	153	....	153	1	....	....	152	146	6	....	1	....	5
Rumania	17	....	17	....	....	....	17	11	6	6	....	....	....
Russia	16	....	16	1	....	....	15	14	1	....	1	....	....
Spain	4	....	4	....	....	....	4	4	....	....	....	....	....
Turkey	8	....	8	....	....	....	8	5	3	1	....	....	2
United States	23	23	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....

[1] Includes one person awaiting departure to Jugoslavia with repatriating family member.
Source: Fort Ontario Emergency Refugee Shelter Closing Roster.

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